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  1. Short-termism, shareholder payouts, and investment in the EU
    Erschienen: [2020]
    Verlag:  Harvard Business School, [Boston, MA]

    Investor-driven "short-termism" is said to harm EU public firms' ability to invest for the long term, prompting calls for the EU to better insulate managers from shareholder pressure. But the evidence offered---rising levels of repurchases and... mehr

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    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Investor-driven "short-termism" is said to harm EU public firms' ability to invest for the long term, prompting calls for the EU to better insulate managers from shareholder pressure. But the evidence offered---rising levels of repurchases and dividends---is incomplete and misleading: it ignores large offsetting equity issuances that move capital from investors to EU firms. We show that, over the last 30 years and the last decade, net shareholder payouts have been moderate, and investment and cash balances have increased. In sum, the data provide little basis for the view that short-termism in the EU warrants corporate governance reforms

     

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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / Harvard Business School ; 21, 054
    Schlagworte: short-termism; quarterly capitalism; corporate governance; EU; buybacks; repurchases; dividends; equity issuances; equity compensation; acquisitions; payout policy; capitalflows; capital distribution; CAPEX; R&D; investment; innovation
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 33 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Corporate transactions in hard-to-value stocks
    Erschienen: November 16, 2021
    Verlag:  The Ohio State University, Fisher College of Business, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics, [Columbus, Ohio]

    Hard-to-value stocks provide opportunities for managers to exploit their informational advantage through trading on their firms' and their own personal accounts. In contrast to the prediction that such transactions reflect private information about... mehr

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    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Hard-to-value stocks provide opportunities for managers to exploit their informational advantage through trading on their firms' and their own personal accounts. In contrast to the prediction that such transactions reflect private information about future events, they are contrarian and heavily depend on past returns. Corporate transactions in hard-to-value stocks outperform those in easy-to-value stocks in the early part of our sample, but this difference disappears after 2002, coinciding with a general decline in the profitability of stock market anomalies. Our evidence is consistent with managers' perception of mispricing, rather than private information, being a key motivator of their transactions

     

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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Working papers series / Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics ; WP 2021, 16
    Fisher College of Business working paper series ; WP 2021-03, 16
    Schlagworte: insiders; repurchases; seasoned equity offerings; private information; mispricing
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 54 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Closed-end funds and discount control mechanisms
    Erschienen: [2023]
    Verlag:  Center for Financial Studies, Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, Germany

    The discount control mechanisms that closed-end funds often choose to adopt before IPO are supposedly implemented to narrow the difference between share price and net asset value, We find evidence that non-discretionary discount control mechanisms... mehr

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    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    DS 108
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    The discount control mechanisms that closed-end funds often choose to adopt before IPO are supposedly implemented to narrow the difference between share price and net asset value, We find evidence that non-discretionary discount control mechanisms such as mandatory continuation votes serve as costly signals of information to reveal higher fund quality to investors, Rents of the skill signaled through the announcement of such policies accrue to managers rather than investors as differences in skill are revealed through growing assets under management rather than risk-adjusted performance.

     

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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/270846
    Schriftenreihe: CFS working paper series ; no. 707
    Schlagworte: Closed-end funds; discount; performance; skill; signaling; information asymmetry; repurchases; continuation vote
    Weitere Schlagworte: Array
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 40 Seiten)