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  1. Classical and belief-based gift exchange models
    theory and evidence
    Autor*in: Dhami, Sanjit S.; Wei, Mengxing; Al-Nowaihi, Ali
    Erschienen: April 2021
    Verlag:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    We derive, compare, and test the predictions of three models of gift exchange: Classical (CGE); Augmented (AGE) based on unexpected wage surprises and first order beliefs; and Belief-based (BGE) that uses second order beliefs to formally model... mehr

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    We derive, compare, and test the predictions of three models of gift exchange: Classical (CGE); Augmented (AGE) based on unexpected wage surprises and first order beliefs; and Belief-based (BGE) that uses second order beliefs to formally model guilt-aversion. Motivated by Akerlof (1982), we also introduce signals of exogenous industry wage norms, θw, and effort norms, θe. We study the effects on the worker’s optimal effort of exogenous variation in the wage, w, the signals θw, θe, and a signal of firm’s expectations of effort from the worker, s. All three models successfully predict gift exchange (higher effort in response to higher w). The AGE and the CGE models fail to explain the data for the worker’s effort responses to the signals θw, θe, and s. The BGE model successfully explains the data in all these respects. Gift exchange is underpinned by guilt-aversion and a formal modelling of second order conditional beliefs.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/235362
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo working paper ; no. 8992 (2021)
    Schlagworte: gift exchange; reciprocity; guilt-aversion; psychological game theory; belief-based models; industry wage norms; industry effort norms
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 45 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Fear and economic behavior
    Autor*in: Andersson, Lina
    Erschienen: February 2022
    Verlag:  Department of Economics, University of Gothenburg, [Göteborg]

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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 2077/70555
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper in economics ; no. 819
    Schlagworte: emotions; fear; risk aversion; psychological game theory
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 36 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Emotions in game theory
    fear, friendliness and hostility
    Autor*in: Andersson, Lina
    Erschienen: 2022
    Verlag:  University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg

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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Dissertation
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9789188199645
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 2077/70648
    Schriftenreihe: Economic studies / Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg ; 252
    Schlagworte: Emotion; Spieltheorie; emotions; fear; risk aversion; psychological game theory; cooperation; repeated prisoners' dilemma; stochastic games; experience goods; asymmetric information; information sharing; product quality; pricing; online reviews
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (4 PDFs), Illustrationen
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    Dissertation, University of Gothenburg, 2022
  4. Pandemics and psychological game theory
    Autor*in: Dufwenberg, Martin; Reed, Kathryn L.
    Erschienen: December 20, 2021
    Verlag:  Department of Economics, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ

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    Schriftenreihe: Economics working papers / Eller College of Management ; 21, 08
    Schlagworte: pandemics; emotions; reciprocity; image; health; psychological game theory
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 38 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. Guilt aversion in (new) games
    does partners' payoff vulnerability matter?
    Autor*in: Attanasi, Giuseppe; Rimbaud, Claire; Villeval, Marie-Claire
    Erschienen: February 2023
    Verlag:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    We investigate whether a player's guilt aversion is modulated by the co-players' vulnerability. To this goal, we introduce new variations of a three-player Trust game in which we manipulate payoff vulnerability and endowment vulnerability. The former... mehr

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    We investigate whether a player's guilt aversion is modulated by the co-players' vulnerability. To this goal, we introduce new variations of a three-player Trust game in which we manipulate payoff vulnerability and endowment vulnerability. The former is the traditional vulnerability which arises when a player's material payoff depends on another player's action (e.g., recipient's payoff in a Dictator game). The latter arises when a player's initial endowment is entrusted to another player (e.g., trustor's endowment in a Trust game). Treatments vary whether trustees can condition their decision on the belief of a co-player who is payoff-vulnerable and/or endowment-vulnerable, or not vulnerable at all, and the decision rights of the vulnerable player. We find that trustees' guilt aversion is insensitive to the dimension of the co-player's vulnerability and to the decision rights of the co-player. Guilt is activated even absent vulnerability of the co-player whose beliefs are disappointed. It is triggered by the willingness to respond to the co-player's beliefs on his strategy, regardless of whether this strategy concerns this player or a third player's vulnerability, that is, indirect vulnerability.

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
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    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/272587
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 15960
    Schlagworte: guilt aversion; vulnerability; psychological game theory; Dictator game; Trust game; experiment
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 48 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Guilt aversion in economics and psychology
    Autor*in: Bellemare, Charles; Sebald, Alexander; Suetens, Sigrid
    Erschienen: 13 May 2019
    Verlag:  CentER, Center for Economic Research, Tilburg

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    Sprache: Englisch
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    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / CentER, Center for Economic Research ; no. 2019, 017
    Schlagworte: guilt sensitivity; psychological game theory; TOSCA; laboratory experiment; guilt aversion
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 40 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. Psychological game theory
    Autor*in: Battigalli, Pierpaolo; Dufwenberg, Martin
    Erschienen: April 30, 2019
    Verlag:  Department of Economics, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ

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    Schriftenreihe: University of Arizona working paper ; 19, 06
    Schlagworte: psychological game theory; belief-dependent motivation; reciprocity; emotions; image concerns; self-esteem
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 56 Seiten)
  8. Public goods games and psychological utility
    theory and evidence
    Autor*in: Dhami, Sanjit S.; Wei, Mengxing; Al-Nowaihi, Ali
    Erschienen: 10 November 2016
    Verlag:  University of Leicester, School of Business, Economics of Division, [Leicester]

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    Sprache: Englisch
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    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / University of Leicester, School of Business, Economics of Division ; no. 16, 17
    Schlagworte: Public goods games; psychological game theory; surprise-seeking/guilt aversion; attribution of intentions; induced beliefs method; strategy method; within subjects design
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 46 Seiten), Illustrationen