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  1. Incumbency cisadvantage in U.S. national politics
    the role of policy inertia and prospective voting
    Erschienen: December 2017
    Verlag:  Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Philadelphia, PA

    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia ; no. 17, 43
    Schlagworte: rational partisan model; incumbency disadvantage; policy inertia; prospective voting; median voter
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 52 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Incumbency disadvantage of political parties
    the role of policy inertia and prospective voting
    Erschienen: January 2019
    Verlag:  Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Philadelphia, PA

    We document that postwar U.S. elections show a strong pattern of “incumbency disadvantage": If a party has held the presidency of the country or the governorship of a state for some time, that party tends to lose popularity in the subsequent... mehr

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    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    VS 438
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    We document that postwar U.S. elections show a strong pattern of “incumbency disadvantage": If a party has held the presidency of the country or the governorship of a state for some time, that party tends to lose popularity in the subsequent election. To explain this fact, we employ Alesina and Tabellini's (1990) model of partisan politics, extended to have elections with prospective voting. We show that inertia in policies, combined with sufficient uncertainty in election outcomes, implies incumbency disadvantage. We find that inertia can cause parties to target policies that are more extreme than the policies they would support in the absence of inertia and that such extremism can be welfare reducing

     

    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
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    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia ; 19, 07 (January 2019)
    FRB of Philadelphia Working Paper ; No. 19-7
    Schlagworte: rational partisan model; policy inertia; incumbency disadvantage; election uncertainty; prospective voting
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 64 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Incumbency disadvantage in U.S. national politics
    Erschienen: December 13, 2016
    Verlag:  Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Philadelphia, PA

    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia ; no. 16, 36
    Schlagworte: rational partisan model; incumbency disadvantage; policy inertia; prospective voting; median voter
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 27 Seiten), Illustrationen