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  1. Aggregation in networks
    Autor*in: Allouch, Nizar
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  School of Economics, Keynes College, University of Kent, Canterbury, Kent

    In this paper, we show that a concept of aggregation can hold in large network games with linear best replies. Breaking up large networks into smaller subnetworks, which can be replaced by representative players, leads to a coarse-grained description... mehr

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    DS 178
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    In this paper, we show that a concept of aggregation can hold in large network games with linear best replies. Breaking up large networks into smaller subnetworks, which can be replaced by representative players, leads to a coarse-grained description of strategic interactions. This method of summarizing complex strategic interactions by simple ones can be applied to compute all Nash equilibria for the special network structure of cograph. A key finding is that a stable Nash equilibrium of the large network game can be decomposed into a collection of Nash equilibria of subnetwork games. Thereby, we establish a systematic relationship between player's position in a subnetwork and his equilibrium action in the large network game.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/265205
    Schriftenreihe: School of Economics discussion papers / University of Kent ; KDPE 2109 (July 2021)
    Schlagworte: aggregation; modular decomposition; network games; public goods; stability
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 24 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. The key class in networks
    Autor*in: Allouch, Nizar; Bhattacharya, Jayeeta
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  School of Economics, Keynes College, University of Kent, Canterbury, Kent

    This paper proposes new centrality measures to characterise the 'key class', when agents in a network are sorted into role-equivalent classes, such that its removal results in an optimal change in the network activity. The notion of role-equivalence... mehr

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    DS 178
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    This paper proposes new centrality measures to characterise the 'key class', when agents in a network are sorted into role-equivalent classes, such that its removal results in an optimal change in the network activity. The notion of role-equivalence is defined through the graph-theoretical concept of equitable partition of networks, which finds wide empirical and theoretical applicability. Players in the network engage in a non-cooperative game with local payoff complementarities. We establish a link between the generic network and its partitioned or quotient graph, and use it to relate the Nash equilibrium activity of classes with their position within the partitioned network. The result informs two class-based centrality measures that geometrically characterise the key class for an optimal reduction (or increase) in the aggregate and the per-capita network activity, respectively.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/265206
    Schriftenreihe: School of Economics discussion papers / University of Kent ; KDPE 2110 (August 2021)
    Schlagworte: Social and economic networks; network games; equitable partition; centrality measures
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 23 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. The Bonacich Shapley centrality
    Autor*in: Allouch, Nizar; Meca, Ana; Polotskaya, K.
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  School of Economics, Keynes College, University of Kent, Canterbury, Kent

    In this paper, we develop a new game theoretic network centrality measure based on the Shapley value. To do so, we consider a coalitional game, where the worth of each coalition is the total play in the game introduced in Ballester et al. (2006). We... mehr

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    DS 178
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    In this paper, we develop a new game theoretic network centrality measure based on the Shapley value. To do so, we consider a coalitional game, where the worth of each coalition is the total play in the game introduced in Ballester et al. (2006). We first establish that the game is convex. As a consequence, the Shapley value belongs to the core, which enhances the attractive features of our new centrality measure. Then, we compute the Shapley value for various examples and illustrate some of its properties.

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/246691
    Schriftenreihe: School of Economics discussion papers / University of Kent ; KDPE 2106 (March 2021)
    Schlagworte: Social networks; network games; peer effects; centrality measures; Bonacich centrality; Shapley value
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 23 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Network games with heterogeneous players
    Autor*in: Orlova, Olena
    Erschienen: 2021
    Verlag:  Universitätsbibliothek Bielefeld, Bielefeld, Germany

    We consider network games in which players simultaneously form partnerships and choose actions. Players are heterogeneous with respect to their action preferences. We characterize pairwise Nash equilibria for a large class of games, including... mehr

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    We consider network games in which players simultaneously form partnerships and choose actions. Players are heterogeneous with respect to their action preferences. We characterize pairwise Nash equilibria for a large class of games, including coordination and anti-coordination games, varying the strength of action preferences and the size of the linking cost. We find that, despite the symmetry and simplicity of the setting, quite irregular network structures can arise in equilibrium, implying that heterogeneity in players' action preferences may already explain a large part of observed irregularity in endogenously formed networks.

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/249882
    Schriftenreihe: Working papers / Center for Mathematical Economics ; 659 (December 2021)
    Schlagworte: network games; strategic network formation; preference heterogeneity; efficiency
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 34 Seiten)
  5. Rating the competition: seller ratings and intra-platform competition
    Autor*in: Charlson, George
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics, Cambridge

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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
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    Schriftenreihe: Cambridge working paper in economics ; 2106
    Cambridge-INET working paper series ; 2021, 03
    Schlagworte: Networks; strategic interaction; network games; interventions; industrial organisation; platforms
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 44 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Third-degree price discrimination in the age of big data
    Autor*in: Charlson, George
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics, Cambridge

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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
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    Schriftenreihe: Cambridge working paper in economics ; 2159
    Janeway Institute working paper series ; 2021, 04
    Schlagworte: Strategic interaction; network games; interventions; industrial organisation; platforms; hypergraphs
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 36 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. Social preferences on networks
    Autor*in: Rezaei, Sarah; Rosenkranz, Stephanie; Weitzel, Utz; Westbrock, Bastian
    Erschienen: December 15, 2020
    Verlag:  Verein für Socialpolitik, [Köln]

    We develop a model of social preferences for network games and study its predictions in a local public goods game with multiple equilibria. The key feature is that players' social preferences are heterogeneous. This gives room for disagreement... mehr

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    We develop a model of social preferences for network games and study its predictions in a local public goods game with multiple equilibria. The key feature is that players' social preferences are heterogeneous. This gives room for disagreement between players about the "right" payoff ordering. When preferences are compatible, however, players coordinate on a refined equilibrium set. How easily the requirements for preference compatibility are met crucially depends on a property of the network structure: neighborhood nestedness. This means that equilibrium selection succeeds in small, connected structures but also in centralized networks. All predictions are confirmed in an experiment.

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/242447
    Schriftenreihe: Jahrestagung 2021 / Verein für Socialpolitik ; 116
    Schlagworte: social preferences; network games; equilibrium selection
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 72 Seiten), Illustrationen