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  1. Competitive procurement with ex post moral hazard
    Autor*in: Chakraborty, Indranil; Khalil, Fahad; Lawarrée, Jacques
    Erschienen: January 2021
    Verlag:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    Unlike standard auctions, we show that competitive procurement may optimally limit competition or use inefficient allocation rules that award the project to a less efficient firm with positive probability. Procurement projects often involve ex post... mehr

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    Unlike standard auctions, we show that competitive procurement may optimally limit competition or use inefficient allocation rules that award the project to a less efficient firm with positive probability. Procurement projects often involve ex post moral hazard after the competitive process is over. A procurement mechanism must combine an incentive scheme with the auction to guard against firms bidding low to win the contract and then cutting back on effort. While competition helps reduce the rent of efficient firms, it exacerbates the problem due to moral hazard. If allocative efficiency is a requirement, limiting the number of participants may be optimal. Alternatively, the same incentives can be optimally provided using inefficient allocation rules.

     
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    hdl: 10419/232460
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo working paper ; no. 8863 (2021)
    Schlagworte: competitive procurement; auctions; moral hazard
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 49 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Deposit insurance, moral hazard and bank risk
    Autor*in: Karas, Alexei; Pyle, William; Schoors, Koen
    Erschienen: January 2021
    Verlag:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    Using evidence from Russia, we explore the effect of the introduction of deposit insurance on bank risk. Drawing on variation in the ratio of firm deposits to total household and firm deposits before the announcement of deposit insurance, so as to... mehr

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    Using evidence from Russia, we explore the effect of the introduction of deposit insurance on bank risk. Drawing on variation in the ratio of firm deposits to total household and firm deposits before the announcement of deposit insurance, so as to capture the magnitude of the decrease in market discipline after the introduction of deposit insurance, we demonstrate that larger declines in market discipline generate larger increases in traditional measures of risk. These results hold in a difference-in-difference setting in which private domestic banks serve as the treatment group and state and foreign-owned banks, whose deposit insurance regime does not change, serve as a control group.

     
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    hdl: 10419/232464
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo working paper ; no. 8867 (2021)
    Schlagworte: deposit insurance; market discipline; moral hazard; risk taking; banks; Russia
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 30 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Moral hazard heterogeneity: genes and health insurance influence smoking after a health shock
    Autor*in: Biroli, Pietro; Zwyssig, Laura
    Erschienen: March 2021
    Verlag:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    Decision-making in the realm of health behaviors, such as smoking or drinking, is influenced both by biological factors, such as genetic predispositions, as well as environmental factors, such as financial liquidity and health insurance status. We... mehr

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    Decision-making in the realm of health behaviors, such as smoking or drinking, is influenced both by biological factors, such as genetic predispositions, as well as environmental factors, such as financial liquidity and health insurance status. We show how the choice of smoking after a cardio-vascular health shock is jointly determined by the interplay between these biological and environmental constraints. Individuals who suffer a health shock when uninsured are 25.6 percentage points more likely to reduce smoking, but this is true only for those who have a low index of genetic predisposition to smoking. Individuals with a low index of genetic predisposition are more strategic and flexible in their behavioral response to an external shock. This differential elasticity of response depending on your genetic variants is evidence of individual-level heterogeneity in moral hazard. These results suggest that genetic heterogeneity is a factor that should be considered when evaluating the effectiveness and fairness of health insurance policies.

     
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    hdl: 10419/236207
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 14176
    Schlagworte: moral hazard; genetics; smoking; medicare
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 72 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Asymmetric information and the securitization of SME loans
    Autor*in: Albertazzi, Ugo; Bottero, Margherita; Gambacorta, Leonardo; Ongena, Steven
    Erschienen: 2021
    Verlag:  Swiss Finance Institute, Geneva

    Using all loans granted to firms recorded in the Italian credit register, we estimate correlations between risk-transfer and default probabilities to gauge the severity of informational asymmetries in the loan securitization market. First, the... mehr

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    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    Using all loans granted to firms recorded in the Italian credit register, we estimate correlations between risk-transfer and default probabilities to gauge the severity of informational asymmetries in the loan securitization market. First, the analysis confirms the presence of information frictions in the SME loan securitisation market. Second, the unconditional quality of securitized loans remains significantly better than that of non-securitized ones, in line with the notion that markets anticipate the presence of information frictions and lead to a selection of loans which offsets the detrimental effects of asymmetric information. Third, using data for firms that maintain multiple bank relationships, we obtain indications of the relative importance played by two forms of information friction, adverse selection and moral hazard. While the former is widespread, the latter is present in weak relationships only, in line with the notion that such loans are characterised by a limited commitment to exert costly monitoring by the bank

     
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    Schriftenreihe: Research paper series / Swiss Finance Institute ; no 21, 13
    Schlagworte: securitization; SME loans; moral hazard; adverse selection
    Weitere Schlagworte: Array
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 47 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. To vaccinate or not to vaccinate? This is the question!
    delay the Booster, maybe you get a Bratwurscht!
    Autor*in: Moritz, Karl-Heinz; Stadtmann, Georg
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  [European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Department of Business Administration and Economics], Frankfurt (Oder)

    A game-theoretic setting is used to illuminate the conflict between vaccination proponents and vaccination opponents. A central result is that vaccination proponents could in principle persuade vaccination opponents to vaccinate by means of... mehr

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    A game-theoretic setting is used to illuminate the conflict between vaccination proponents and vaccination opponents. A central result is that vaccination proponents could in principle persuade vaccination opponents to vaccinate by means of subsidization. Such a subsidy could increase benefits for both groups. Deeper analysis provides numerous further insights regarding the stability of these results.

     
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    hdl: 10419/247781
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Department of Business Administration and Economics ; no. 426 (November 2021)
    Schlagworte: vaccination; corona; covid; game theory; moral hazard
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 11 Seiten)
  6. Mandated sick pay
    coverage, utilization, and welfare effects
    Autor*in: Maclean, Catherine; Pichler, Stefan; Ziebarth, Nicolas R.
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, Mannheim, Germany

    This paper evaluates how sick pay mandates operate at the job level in the United States. Using the National Compensation Survey and difference-in-differences models, we estimate their impact on coverage rates, sick leave use, labor costs, and... mehr

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    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
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    This paper evaluates how sick pay mandates operate at the job level in the United States. Using the National Compensation Survey and difference-in-differences models, we estimate their impact on coverage rates, sick leave use, labor costs, and non-mandated fringe benefits. Sick pay mandates increase coverage significantly by 18 percentage points from a baseline level of 66% in the first two years. Newly covered employees take two additional sick days per year. We find little evidence that mandating sick pay crowds-out non-mandated fringe benefits. Finally, we develop a model of optimal sick pay provision and illustrate the trade-offs when assessing welfare.

     
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    hdl: 10419/247692
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / ZEW ; no. 21, 083 (11/2021)
    Schlagworte: sick pay mandates; take-up; social insurance; fringe benefits; moral hazard; unintended consequences; medical leave; National Compensation Survey; optimal social insurance; Baily-Chetty; welfare
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 77 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. The impact of co-payments for nursing home care on use, health, and welfare
    Autor*in: Tenand, Marianne; Bakx, Pieter; Wouterse, Bram
    Erschienen: November 2021
    Verlag:  CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, [Den Haag]

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    Schriftenreihe: CPB discussion paper
    Schlagworte: Population ageing; long-term care; nursing home; co-payments; price sensitivity; moral hazard
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circ 83 Seiten), Illustrationen
  8. Unconventional credit policy in an economy under Zero Lower Bound
    = Política creditica no convencional en una economía con límite inferior de cero en la tasa de política monetaria
    Autor*in: Pozo, Jorge; Rojas, Youel
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  [Banco Central de Reserva del Perú], [Lima, Peru]

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    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series / Banco Central de Reserva del Perú ; DT. no. 2021, 005 (agosto 2021)
    Schlagworte: Unconventional credit policy; asymmetric information; moral hazard; zero Lower bound
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 47 Seiten), Illustrationen
  9. Misappropriation of R&D subsidies
    estimating treatment effects with one-sided noncompliance
    Autor*in: Boeing, Philipp; Peters, Bettina
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, Mannheim, Germany

    In evaluating the effectiveness of R&D subsidies, the literature has focused on potential crowding out effects, while the possibility of misappropriation of public funds that results from moral hazard behavior has been completely neglected. This... mehr

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    In evaluating the effectiveness of R&D subsidies, the literature has focused on potential crowding out effects, while the possibility of misappropriation of public funds that results from moral hazard behavior has been completely neglected. This study develops a theoretical framework with which to identify misappropriation. Using Chinese firm-level data for the period 2001-2011, we show that misappropriation is a major threat. 42% of grantees misused R&D subsidies for non-research purposes, accounting for 53% of the total amount of R&D subsidies. In a second step, we study the loss of effectiveness of R&D subsidies in stimulating R&D expenditures that is due to misappropriation. We measure the loss in effectiveness by estimating the causal effect of R&D subsidies in the presence of misappropriation using an intention-to-treat (ITT) estimator and comparing it to the ideal situation (without misappropriation) using the complier average causal effect (CACE). We find that China’s R&D policy could have been more than twice as effective in boosting R&D without misappropriation. R&D expenditures could have been stimulated beyond the subsidy amount (additionality), but noncompliant behavior has resulted in a moderately strong partial crowding out effect. We find significant treatment heterogeneity by period, subsidy size, industry, and ownership. Notably, the loss in effectiveness has diminished following a policy reform in 2006. Nevertheless, the misappropriation of public funds considerably undermines the impact of R&D policies in China.

     
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    hdl: 10419/246587
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / ZEW ; no. 21, 081 (11/2021)
    Schlagworte: R&D subsidies; misappropriation; China; moral hazard; policy evaluation
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (67Seiten), Illustrationen
  10. Firm-bank linkages and optimal policies in a lockdown
    Autor*in: Segura, Anatoli; Villacorta, Alonso
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  Banca d'Italia Eurosistema, [Rom]

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    Schriftenreihe: Temi di discussione / Banca d'Italia ; number 1343 (July 2021)
    Schlagworte: Covid-19; cash shortfall; firms' debt; moral hazard; bank equity; aggregate risk; government interventions
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 65 Seiten), Illustrationen
  11. Household income, liquidity, and optimal unemployment insurance
    Autor*in: Auray, Stéphane; Fuller, David L.; Lepage-Saucier, Nicolas
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  Center for Research in Economics and Statistics, Palaiseau, France

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    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series / Center for Research in Economics and Statistics ; no. 2021, 16 (October 2021)
    Schlagworte: unemployment insurance; liquidity; moral hazard; search; calibration
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 44 Seiten)
  12. Stochastic contracts and subjective evaluations
    Autor*in: Lang, Matthias
    Erschienen: December 2021
    Verlag:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    Subjective evaluations are widely used, but call for different contracts from traditional moral-hazard settings. Previous literature shows that contracts require payments to third parties, which real-world contracts rarely use. I show that the... mehr

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    Subjective evaluations are widely used, but call for different contracts from traditional moral-hazard settings. Previous literature shows that contracts require payments to third parties, which real-world contracts rarely use. I show that the implicit assumption of deterministic contracts makes payments to third parties necessary. This paper studies stochastic contracts, like uncertain arbitration procedures or payments in stock options. These contracts incentivize employees without the need for payments to third parties. In addition, stochastic contracts can make the principal better off compared to deterministic contracts. My results also address the puzzle about the prevalence of labor contracts with stochastic compensation.

     
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    hdl: 10419/249003
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo working paper ; no. 9458 (2021)
    Schlagworte: subjective evaluations; stochastic contracts; budget-balanced contracts; moral hazard; subjective performance measures; incentives
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 50 Seiten), Illustrationen
  13. Misappropriation of R&D Subsidies: estimating treatment effects with one-sided noncompliance
    Autor*in: Boeing, Philipp; Peters, Bettina
    Erschienen: November 2021
    Verlag:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    In evaluating the effectiveness of R&D subsidies, the literature has focused on potential crowding out effects, while the possibility of misappropriation of public funds that results from moral hazard behavior has been completely neglected. This... mehr

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    In evaluating the effectiveness of R&D subsidies, the literature has focused on potential crowding out effects, while the possibility of misappropriation of public funds that results from moral hazard behavior has been completely neglected. This study develops a theoretical framework with which to identify misappropriation. Using Chinese firm-level data for the period 2001-2011, we show that misappropriation is a major threat. 42% of grantees misused R&D subsidies for non-research purposes, accounting for 53% of the total amount of R&D subsidies. In a second step, we study the loss of effectiveness of R&D subsidies in stimulating R&D expenditures that is due to misappropriation. We measure the loss in effectiveness by estimating the causal effect of R&D subsidies in the presence of misappropriation using an intention-to-treat (ITT) estimator and comparing it to the ideal situation (without misappropriation) using the complier average causal effect (CACE). We find that China's R&D policy could have been more than twice as effective in boosting R&D without misappropriation. R&D expenditures could have been stimulated beyond the subsidy amount (additionality), but noncompliant behavior has resulted in a moderately strong partial crowding out effect. We find significant treatment heterogeneity by period, subsidy size, industry, and ownership. Notably, the loss in effectiveness has diminished following a policy reform in 2006. Nevertheless, the misappropriation of public funds considerably undermines the impact of R&D policies in China.

     
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    hdl: 10419/250513
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 14852
    Schlagworte: R&D subsidies; misappropriation; China; moral hazard; policy evaluation
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 70 Seiten), Illustrationen
  14. When pro-poor microcredit institutions favor richer borrowers
    a moral hazard story
    Autor*in: Biancini, Sara; Ettinger, David; Venet, Baptiste
    Erschienen: February 2021
    Verlag:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    We suggest an explanation for the existence of "mission drift", the tendency for Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) to lend money to wealthier borrowers rather than to the very poor. We focus on the relationship between MFIs and external funding... mehr

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    We suggest an explanation for the existence of "mission drift", the tendency for Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) to lend money to wealthier borrowers rather than to the very poor. We focus on the relationship between MFIs and external funding institutions. We assume that both the MFIs and the funding institutions are pro-poor and agree on the optimal proportion of funds to be granted to the poorer borrower. However, asymmetric information on the effort chosen by the MFI to identify higher quality projects may increase the share of loans attributed to wealthier borrowers. This occurs because funding institutions have to build incentives for MFIs, creating a trade off between the quality of the funded projects and the attribution of loans to poorer borrowers.

     
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    hdl: 10419/232490
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo working paper ; no. 8893 (2021)
    Schlagworte: microfinance; mission drift; moral hazard
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 22 Seiten), Illustrationen
  15. Joint debt arrangements in EMU: from NextGenEU to Eurobonds
    Autor*in: Spurga, Simonas Algirdas; Šreiberytė, Emilė
    Erschienen: 2021
    Verlag:  Bank of Lithuania, Vilnius

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    hdl: 11159/5480
    Schriftenreihe: Occasional paper series / Lietuvos Bankas ; no. 37 (2021)
    Schlagworte: Economic and Monetary Union (EMU); Optimum Currency Area (OCA); joint debt; safe asset; fiscal union; Eurobonds; Blue and Red Bonds; Sovereign Bond-Backed Securities (SBBS); European Stability Mechanism (ESM); Next Generation EU; moral hazard; fiscal transfers; international role of the Euro
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 40 Seiten), Illustrationen
  16. Worms, farms and schools
    three essays on investment choices in Uganda
    Autor*in: Lerva, Benedetta
    Erschienen: 2020
    Verlag:  Department of Economics, Stockholm University, Stockholm

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    Medientyp: Dissertation
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    ISBN: 9789179111878
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    Schriftenreihe: Monograph series / Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University ; no. 108
    Schlagworte: field experiments; randomized evaluations; agriculture; education; externalities; technology adoption; financial aid; cash transfers; school inputs; moral hazard; sharecropping
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 234 Seiten), Illustrationen
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    Dissertation, Stockholm University, 2020
  17. Trust and trustworthiness in procurement contracts with retainage
    Autor*in: Walker, Matthew J.; Katok, Elena; Shachat, Jason M.
    Erschienen: 8-26-2020
    Verlag:  Chapman University, Economic Science Institute, [Orange, CA]

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    Schriftenreihe: ESI working papers ; 20, 34
    Schlagworte: trust; procurement; reverse auction; retainage; moral hazard
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 44 Seiten), Illustrationen
  18. The conservatism principle and asymmetric preferences over reporting rrrors
    Autor*in: Chakravarthy, Jivas; Shields, Timothy W.
    Erschienen: 12-22-2020
    Verlag:  Chapman University, Economic Science Institute, [Orange, CA]

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    Schriftenreihe: ESI working papers ; 20, 41
    Schlagworte: accounting conservatism; experimental economics; intentions; moral hazard
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 64 Seiten), Illustrationen
  19. Unconventional credit policy in an economy with supply and demand credit frictions
    Autor*in: Pozo, Jorge; Rojas, Youel
    Erschienen: [2020]
    Verlag:  [Banco Central de Reserva del Perú], [Lima, Peru]

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    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series / Banco Central de Reserva del Perú ; DT. no. 2020, 014 (diciembre 2020)
    Schlagworte: Credit policy; asymmetric information; moral hazard; seniority level
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 74 Seiten), Illustrationen
  20. Allocating losses: bail-ins, bailouts and bank regulation
    Autor*in: Keister, Todd; Mitkov, Yuliyan
    Erschienen: [2020]
    Verlag:  ECONtribute, Bonn

    We study the interaction between a government's bailout policy and banks' willingness to impose losses on (or \bail in") their investors. The government has limited commitment and may choose to bail out banks facing large losses. The anticipation of... mehr

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    We study the interaction between a government's bailout policy and banks' willingness to impose losses on (or \bail in") their investors. The government has limited commitment and may choose to bail out banks facing large losses. The anticipation of this bailout undermines a bank's private incentive to impose a bail-in. In the resulting equilibrium, bail-ins are too small and bailouts are too large. Some banks may also face a run by informed investors, creating further distortions and leading to larger bailouts. We show how a regulator with limited information can raise welfare and improve financial stability by imposing a system-wide, mandatory bail-in at the onset of a crisis. In some situations, allowing banks to choose between meeting a minimum bail-in and opting out can raise welfare further.

     
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    Schriftenreihe: ECONtribute discussion paper ; no. 049 (December 2020)
    Schlagworte: Bank bailouts; moral hazard; financial stability; banking regulation
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  21. Unconventional credit policy in an economy under zero lower bound
    Autor*in: Pozo, Jorge; Rojas, Youel
    Erschienen: July 2021
    Verlag:  Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, International Economics Department, Geneva, Switzerland

    In this paper we develop a simple two-period model that reconciles credit demand and supply frictions. In this stylized but realistic model credit and deposit markets are interlinked and credit demand and credit supply frictions amplify each other in... mehr

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    In this paper we develop a simple two-period model that reconciles credit demand and supply frictions. In this stylized but realistic model credit and deposit markets are interlinked and credit demand and credit supply frictions amplify each other in such a way that produces in equilibrium very low levels of credit and stronger reductions of the real and nominal interest, so an economy is much closer to the ZLB. However, an unconventional credit policy, that consists on central bank loans to firms that are guaranteed by the government, can undo partially the effects of the credit frictions and prevents the economy from reaching the ZLB. Since central bank loans are not subject to the moral hazard problem between bankers and depositors and are government-guaranteed, credit market interventions rise aggregate credit supply and positively affect the aggregate credit demand, respectively. However, once the economy is at the ZLB the effect of a credit policy is reduced due to a relatively stronger inflation reduction, which in turn reduces entrepreneurs' incentives to demand bank loans.

     
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    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series / Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, International Economics Department ; no. HEIDWP2021, 14
    Schlagworte: Unconventional credit policy; asymmetric information; moral hazard; zero Lower bound
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  22. The role of deposit guarantee schemes (DGSs) within the crisis management framework
    Autor*in: Gortsos, Christos V.
    Erschienen: 25/11/2020
    Verlag:  European Banking Institute e.V., Frankfurt am Main, Germany

    The present study undertakes an overview of the role of deposit guarantee schemes (DGSs) within the banking crisis management framework. It is structured in four Section:Section 1 discusses the policy objectives of DGSs, namely the protection of... mehr

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    The present study undertakes an overview of the role of deposit guarantee schemes (DGSs) within the banking crisis management framework. It is structured in four Section:Section 1 discusses the policy objectives of DGSs, namely the protection of depositors and the contribution to the stability of the banking system. Section 2 turns then to the functions (mandates) of DGSs, with a main focus on their institutional design as to the ‘payout (or paybox) function’ and their contribution in resolution financing. Section 3 is on DGSs’ role within the economic and the financial system, developing on their effectiveness as influenced not only by their design features but also by the environment within which they operate and predominantly by macroeconomic conditions and the strength of the sovereign and their institutional relationship with other ‘bank safety net’ components.Finally, the liability of states when establishing DGSs and the problems arising from the operation of DGSs, namely exposure to moral hazard and the differential treatment of banks deemed ‘too-big-to-fail’ (TBTF), are discussed in Section 4

     
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    Schriftenreihe: EBI working paper series ; no. 78 (2020)
    Schlagworte: Deposit guarantee schemes (DGSs); bank runs; stability of the banking system; bank safety net; resolution financing; ‘no creditor worse off (NCWO) principle’; moral hazard; too big to fail; International Association of Deposit Insurers (IADI)
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 28 Seiten)
  23. Inefficiency and regulation in credence goods markets with altruistic experts
    Autor*in: Farukh, Razi; Kerkhof, Anna; Loebbing, Jonas
    Erschienen: February 2020
    Verlag:  Verein für Socialpolitik, [Köln]

    We study a credence goods problem - that is, a moral hazard problem with non-contractible outcome - where altruistic experts (the agents) care both about their income and the utility of consumers (the principals). Experts' preferences over income and... mehr

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    We study a credence goods problem - that is, a moral hazard problem with non-contractible outcome - where altruistic experts (the agents) care both about their income and the utility of consumers (the principals). Experts' preferences over income and their consumers' utility are convex, such that experts care less for consumers when their financial situation is bad. In a market setting with multiple consumers per expert, a cross-consumer externality arises: one consumer's payment raises the expert's income, which makes the non-selfish part of preferences more important and thereby induces the expert to provide higher quality services to all consumers. The externality renders the market outcome inefficient. Price regulation partially overcomes this inefficiency and Pareto-improves upon the market outcome. If market entry of experts is endogenous, price regulation should be accompanied by licensing arrangements that cap the number of experts in the market. Our theory provides a novel rationale for the wide-spread use of price regulation and licensing in real-world markets for expert services.

     
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    hdl: 10419/224590
    Schriftenreihe: Jahrestagung 2020 / Verein für Socialpolitik ; 82
    Schlagworte: altruism; asymmetric information; common agency; credence goods,expert services; externality; inefficiency; moral hazard; regulation
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  24. Loss aversion, moral hazard, and stochastic contracts
    Autor*in: Ho, Hoa
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  Department of Economics, University of Munich, Munich

    I examine whether stochastic contracts benefit the principal in the setting of moral hazard and loss aversion. Incorporating that the agent is expectation-based loss averse and allowing the principal to add noise to performance signals, I find that... mehr

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    I examine whether stochastic contracts benefit the principal in the setting of moral hazard and loss aversion. Incorporating that the agent is expectation-based loss averse and allowing the principal to add noise to performance signals, I find that stochastic contracts reduce the principal's implementation cost in comparison with deterministic contracts. Surprisingly, if performance signals are highly informative about the agent's action, stochastic contracts strictly dominate the optimal deterministic contract for almost any degree of loss aversion. The optimal stochastic contract pays a high wage whenever the principal observes good performance signals, while upon observing bad performance signals it adds a lottery that gives either the high wage or a low wage that serves as a harsh penalty to the agent. In the general case when the agent is both risk and loss averse, I show that if a penalty wage (i.e., a wage level at which the agent feels a substantial disutility) exists, the first best can be approximated closely but not attained. The findings have an important implication for designing contracts for loss-averse agents: the principal should insure the agent against wage uncertainty by employing stochastic contracts that increase the probability of a high wage.

     
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    hdl: 10419/247358
    Auflage/Ausgabe: Draft: March 10, 2021
    Schriftenreihe: Munich discussion paper ; no. 2021
    Schlagworte: loss aversion; moral hazard; stochastic contracts; reference-dependent preferences
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  25. The perils of friendly oversight
    Autor*in: Gerardi, Dino; Grillo, Edoardo; Monzón, Ignacio
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  Collegio Carlo Alberto, [Torino]

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    Auflage/Ausgabe: Revised, May 2021
    Schriftenreihe: Carlo Alberto notebooks ; no. 630 (December 2020)
    Schlagworte: information transmission; moral hazard; oversight; persuasion
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 34 Seiten), Illustrationen