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  1. Using ethical dilemmas to predict antisocial choices with real payoff consequences
    an experimental study
    Autor*in: Dickinson, David L.; Masclet, David
    Erschienen: [2018]
    Verlag:  Center for Research in Economics and Management, University of Rennes 1, University of Caen Normandie, [Rennes]

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / Center for Research in Economics and Management ; WP 2018, 06 (June 2018)
    Schlagworte: experiments; money burning; ethical dilemmas; anti-social behavioral; trolley problem
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 26 Seiten)
  2. Delegation and nonmonetary incentives
    [1]
    Autor*in: Ambrus, Attila; Egorov, Georgij V.
    Erschienen: December 4, 2015
    Verlag:  Economic Research Initiatives @ Duke (ERID), Durham, NC

    In many contracting settings, actions costly to one party but with no direct benefits to the other (money-burning) may be part of the explicit or implicit contract. A leading example is bureaucratic procedures in an employer-employee relationship. We... mehr

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    Standort:
    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    In many contracting settings, actions costly to one party but with no direct benefits to the other (money-burning) may be part of the explicit or implicit contract. A leading example is bureaucratic procedures in an employer-employee relationship. We study a model of delegation with an informed agent, where the principal may impose money-burning on the agent as a function of the agent's choice of action, and show that money-burning may be part of the optimal contract. This result holds even if action-contingent monetary transfers are possible, as long as transfers from the principal to the agent are bounded from below (as in limited liability or minimal wage requirements). In fact, the optimal contract can involve a combination of both efficient monetary incentives and inefficient nonmonetary incentives through money burning. Our model delivers some results novel to the delegation literature. First, money-burning is more likely if the principal is more sensitive to the choice of action than the agent. This is consistent with the perception that there is more bureaucratization in large organizations. Second, money-burning is more likely if the agent's limited liability constraint is tighter relative to his participation constraint. This implies that a higher minimum wage distorts employment contracts towards using socially wasteful nonmonetary incentives, leading to a Pareto inferior outcome as the agent is still held down to his reservation value through increased money burning.The appendices for this paper are available at the following URL: "http://ssrn.com/abstract=2700851" ssrn.com/abstract=2700851

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    Übergeordneter Titel: Delegation and nonmonetary incentives - Alle Bände anzeigen
    Schriftenreihe: ERID working paper ; Number 200
    Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) Working Paper ; No. 200
    Schlagworte: delegation; organizational procedures; money burning
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 49 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Delegation and nonmonetary incentives
    [2], Supplementary appendix to "Delegation and nonmonetary incentives"
    Autor*in: Ambrus, Attila; Egorov, Georgij V.
    Erschienen: December 4, 2015
    Verlag:  Economic Research Initiatives @ Duke (ERID), Durham, NC

    Supplementary Appendix to "Delegation and Nonmonetary Incentives."The paper "Delegation and Nonmonetary Incentives" to which these Appendices apply is available at the following URL: "http://ssrn.com/abstract=2700821" http://ssrn.com/abstract=2700821 mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Supplementary Appendix to "Delegation and Nonmonetary Incentives."The paper "Delegation and Nonmonetary Incentives" to which these Appendices apply is available at the following URL: "http://ssrn.com/abstract=2700821" ssrn.com/abstract=2700821

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    Übergeordneter Titel: Delegation and nonmonetary incentives - Alle Bände anzeigen
    Schriftenreihe: ERID working paper ; Number 201
    Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) Working Paper ; No. 201
    Schlagworte: delegation; organizational procedures; money burning
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 21 Seiten)