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  1. It's Payback time
    new insights on cooperation in the repeated prisoners' dilemma
    Autor*in: Bigoni, Maria; Casari, Marco; Salvanti, Andrea; Skrzypacz, Andrzej; Spagnolo, Giancarlo
    Erschienen: 17 January 2022
    Verlag:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    LZ 161
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    Standort:
    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; DP16912
    Schlagworte: Asymmetric strategies; Imperfect Monitoring; indefinitely repeated games; Riskdominance; Strategic risk
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 23 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. It's payback time: new insights on cooperation in the repeated prisoners' dilemma
    Autor*in: Bigoni, Maria; Casari, Marco; Salvanti, Andrea; Skrzypacz, Andrzej; Spagnolo, Giancarlo
    Erschienen: January 2022
    Verlag:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    In an experiment on the repeated prisoner’s dilemma where intended actions are implemented with noise, Fudenberg et al. (2012) observe that non-equilibrium strategies of the "tit-for-tat" family are largely adopted. Furthermore, they do not find... mehr

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    In an experiment on the repeated prisoner’s dilemma where intended actions are implemented with noise, Fudenberg et al. (2012) observe that non-equilibrium strategies of the "tit-for-tat" family are largely adopted. Furthermore, they do not find support for risk dominance of TFT as a determinant of cooperation. This comment introduces the "Payback" strategy, which is similar to TFT but is sustainable in equilibrium. Using the data from the original article, we show that Payback captures most of the empirical support previously attributed to TFT, and that the risk dominance criterion based on Payback can explain the observed cooperation patterns.

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/250684
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 15023
    Schlagworte: asymmetric strategies; imperfect monitoring; indefinitely repeated games; risk dominance; strategic risk
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 22 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Social preferences under the shadow of the future
    Autor*in: Kölle, Felix; Quercia, Simone; Tripodi, Egon
    Erschienen: [2023]
    Verlag:  Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190, [München]

    Social interactions predominantly take place under the shadow of the future. Previous literature explains cooperation in indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma as predominantly driven by self-interested strategic considerations. This paper provides... mehr

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Social interactions predominantly take place under the shadow of the future. Previous literature explains cooperation in indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma as predominantly driven by self-interested strategic considerations. This paper provides a causal test of the importance of social preferences for cooperation, varying the composition of interactions to be either homogeneous or heterogeneous in terms of these preferences. Through a series of pre-registered experiments (N = 1,074), we show that groups of prosocial individuals achieve substantially higher levels of cooperation. The cooperation gap between prosocial and selfish groups persists even when the shadow of the future is increased to make cooperation attractive for the selfish and when common knowledge about group composition is removed.

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/282098
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / Rationality & Competition, CRC TRR 190 ; no. 406 (June 30, 2023)
    Schlagworte: cooperation; indefinitely repeated games; prisoner's dilemma; social preferences; experiment
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 62 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Social preferences under the shadow of the future
    Autor*in: Kölle, Felix; Quercia, Simone; Tripodi, Egon
    Erschienen: June 2023
    Verlag:  CESifo, Munich, Germany

    Social interactions predominantly take place under the shadow of the future. Previous literature explains cooperation in indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma as predominantly driven by self-interested strategic considerations. This paper provides... mehr

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    Verlag (kostenfrei)
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 63
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    Social interactions predominantly take place under the shadow of the future. Previous literature explains cooperation in indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma as predominantly driven by self-interested strategic considerations. This paper provides a causal test of the importance of social preferences for cooperation, varying the composition of interactions to be either homogeneous or heterogeneous in terms of these preferences. Through a series of pre-registered experiments (N = 1,074), we show that groups of prosocial individuals achieve substantially higher levels of cooperation. The cooperation gap between prosocial and selfish groups persists even when the shadow of the future is increased to make cooperation attractive for the selfish and when common knowledge about group composition is removed.

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/279284
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo working papers ; 10534 (2023)
    Schlagworte: cooperation; indefinitely repeated games; prisoner’s dilemma; social preferences; experiment
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 63 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. Do economic inequalities affect long-run cooperation?
    Autor*in: Camera, Gabriele; Deck, Cary A.; Porter, David P.
    Erschienen: August 29, 2016
    Verlag:  [Chapman University, Economic Science Institute], [Orange, CA]

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: [Working papers / Chapman University, Economic Science Institute ; 16,18]
    Schlagworte: experiments; indefinitely repeated games; social norms; social dilemmas
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 35 Seiten), Illustrationen