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  1. The effect of random shocks on reciprocal behavior in dynamic principal-agent settings
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  Research platform Empirical and Experimental Economics, University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck, Austria

    Previous work has shown that unobservable random shocks on output have a detrimental effect on effort provision in short-term ('static') employment relationships. Given the prevalence of long-term ('dynamic') relationships in firms, we investigate... mehr

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    Previous work has shown that unobservable random shocks on output have a detrimental effect on effort provision in short-term ('static') employment relationships. Given the prevalence of long-term ('dynamic') relationships in firms, we investigate whether the impact of shocks is similarly pronounced in gift-exchange relationships where the same principalagent pair interacts repeatedly. In dynamic relationships, shocks have a significantly less pronounced negative effect on the agent's effort provision than in static relationships. In an attempt to identify the drivers for our results we find that the combination of a repeatedgame effect and a noise-canceling effect is required to avoid the detrimental effects of unobservable random shocks on effort provision.

     

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    Sprache: Englisch
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/250149
    Schriftenreihe: Working papers in economics and statistics ; 2021, 27
    Schlagworte: Gift exchange; principal agent model; incomplete contracts; random shocks; reciprocity; laboratory experiments; long-term contracts
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 56 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Socially responsible investment
    ex-ante contracting or ex-post bargaining
    Erschienen: September 28, 2021
    Verlag:  Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University, Kobe, Japan

    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    W 1634 (2021,20)
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    Sprache: Englisch
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    Auflage/Ausgabe: Revised: August 20, 2021
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper series / Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University ; DP 2021, 20
    Schlagworte: social responsible investment; esg; multitask; hold-up; incomplete contracts; social impact bonds; sustainability-linked bonds
    Umfang: 42 Seiten, 1 ungezählte Seite, Illustrationen
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    "This paper was originally titled "Contract duration and socially responsible investment"" - Fußnote Seite 1

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  3. Contract duration and socially responsible investment
    Erschienen: May 11, 2021
    Verlag:  Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University, Kobe, Japan

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    Auflage/Ausgabe: Revised: Feb 18, 2021
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper series / Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University ; DP 2021, 14
    Schlagworte: social responsible investment; esg; multitask; hold-up; incomplete contracts; social impact bonds; sustainability-linked bonds
    Umfang: 34 Seiten
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  4. Corporate Social Responsibility along the global value chain
    Erschienen: December 2021
    Verlag:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    Firms are under increasing pressure to meet stakeholders’ demand for Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) along their global value chains. We study the incentives for and investments in CSR at different stages of the production process. We analyze a... mehr

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    Firms are under increasing pressure to meet stakeholders’ demand for Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) along their global value chains. We study the incentives for and investments in CSR at different stages of the production process. We analyze a model of sequential production with incomplete contracts where CSR by independent suppliers differentiates the final product in the eyes of caring consumers. The model predicts an increasing CSR profile for suppliers along the value chain: from upstream suppliers with low CSR to downstream suppliers with higher CSR. We confirm this prediction using Indian firm-level data. We compute a firm’s value chain position combining product-level information in our data with the World Input-Output Database. We find that more downstream firms have higher CSR expenditures as measured by a combination of staff welfare spending and social community spending.

     

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    hdl: 10419/252015
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo working paper ; no. 9498 (2021)
    Schlagworte: corporate social responsibility; global value chains; incomplete contracts; property rights theory; GVC positioning; India; emerging markets
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 55 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. Technology transfer in global value chains
    Autor*in: Sampson, Thomas
    Erschienen: January 2022
    Verlag:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    Firm-to-firm relationships in global value chains create opportunities for North-South technology diffusion. This paper studies technology transfer in value chains when contracts are incomplete and input production technologies are imperfectly... mehr

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    Firm-to-firm relationships in global value chains create opportunities for North-South technology diffusion. This paper studies technology transfer in value chains when contracts are incomplete and input production technologies are imperfectly excludable. The paper introduces a new taxonomy of value chains based on whether or not the headquarters firm benefits from imitation of its supplier’s technology. In inclusive value chains, where imitation is beneficial, the headquarters firm promotes technology diffusion. By contrast, in exclusive value chains headquarters seeks to limit supplier imitation. The paper analyzes how this distinction affects the returns to offshoring, the welfare effects of technical change and the social efficiency of knowledge sharing. Weaker intellectual property rights over input production technologies raise welfare when value chains are inclusive, but have the opposite effect under exclusive value chains.

     

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    hdl: 10419/252049
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo working paper ; no. 9532 (2022)
    Schlagworte: technology transfer; global value chains; incomplete contracts; intellectual property rights; imitation
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 52 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Technology transfer in global value chains
    Autor*in: Sampson, Thomas
    Erschienen: [2022]
    Verlag:  Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science, London

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    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / Centre for Economic Performance ; no. 1826 (February 2022)
    Schlagworte: technology transfer; global value chains; incomplete contracts; intellectual property rights; imitation
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 53 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. The organizational economics of school chains
    Erschienen: July 2022
    Verlag:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    Although school autonomy is often advocated as a way to improve student achievement, many countries are experiencing a counterbalancing trend: the emergence of 'chains' that bind schools together into structures with varying degrees of... mehr

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    Although school autonomy is often advocated as a way to improve student achievement, many countries are experiencing a counterbalancing trend: the emergence of 'chains' that bind schools together into structures with varying degrees of centralization. Despite their prominence, no evidence exists on the determinants and effects of differences in the organizational set-up of school chains. Our work aims to fill this gap. We use some of the key insights of the organizational economics of firms to study the organization of school chains. We match survey information on decentralization decisions of procurement activities for approximately 400 chains and 2,000 schools in England to student-, school and market-level administrative records. We find that chains with a larger share of schools whose leadership background is aligned with the chain board's expertise, younger chains, and chains that are closer to the market value-added (productivity) frontier decentralize more. We find instead no association between the value-added heterogeneity of the markets in which chains operate and their decision to delegate. We also investigate the link between the structures of chains and their students' performance. We find no association between decentralization and performance. This is consistent with the intuition that chains choose their organization in ways that maximize output (i.e., students' learning) and so the equilibrium relationship between performance and organizational set-up is flat.

     

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    hdl: 10419/263658
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 15442
    Schlagworte: school chains; school autonomy; organizational economics; incomplete contracts
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 53 Seiten), Illustrationen
  8. Multinational firms' organisational dynamics
    competition intensity and the ownership decision under uncertainty
    Erschienen: February 25, 2021
    Verlag:  Verein für Socialpolitik, [Köln]

    I analyse firms organisational choices when they face uncertainty about institutional conditions in foreign locations with heterogeneous final good producers and incomplete contracts. As firms learn about the conditions abroad, the increasing... mehr

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    I analyse firms organisational choices when they face uncertainty about institutional conditions in foreign locations with heterogeneous final good producers and incomplete contracts. As firms learn about the conditions abroad, the increasing offshoring activity increases competition in the final goods market, leading to a progressive vertical disintegration of the supply chains. Initially, the firms that decide to explore offshoring potential choose integration. As competition in final good markets intensifies, the least productive ones among them switch sequentially to arm's length trade. In the fully domestic supply chains, the increasing competition promotes a sequential disintegration of the domestic intermediate input suppliers. I test for the predictions of the model using sectorallevel data for the US manufacturing sectors.

     

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    hdl: 10419/242389
    Schriftenreihe: Jahrestagung 2021 / Verein für Socialpolitik ; 61
    Schlagworte: Firm theory; multinational firms; incomplete contracts; global sourcing; uncertainty; sequential offshoring; information externalities; learning; competition; outsourcing; forward and backward integration; FDI
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 104 Seiten), Illustrationen
  9. The costs and benefits of rules of origin in modern free trade agreements
    Erschienen: August 2022
    Verlag:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    We study the welfare impact of rules of origin in free trade agreements where final-good producers source customized inputs from suppliers within the trading bloc. We employ a property-rights framework that features hold-up problems in suppliers'... mehr

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    We study the welfare impact of rules of origin in free trade agreements where final-good producers source customized inputs from suppliers within the trading bloc. We employ a property-rights framework that features hold-up problems in suppliers' decisions to invest, and where underinvestment is more severe for higher productivity firms. A rule of origin offers preferred market access for final goods if a sufficiently high fraction of inputs used in the production process is sourced within the trading bloc. Such a rule alters behavior for only a subset of suppliers, as some (very-high-productivity) suppliers comply with the rule in an unconstrained way and some (very-low-productivity) suppliers choose not to comply. For those suppliers it does affect, the rule increases investment, but it also induces excessive sourcing (for given investment) within the trading bloc. From a social standpoint, it is best to have a rule that affects high-productivity suppliers. The reason is that the marginal net welfare gain from tightening the rule increases with productivity. Therefore, when industry productivity is high, a strict rule of origin is socially desirable; in contrast, when industry productivity is low, no rule of origin is likely to help. Regardless of the case, a sufficiently strict rule can (weakly) ensure welfare gains.

     

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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/265955
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo working paper ; no. 9920 (2022)
    Schlagworte: hold-up problem; sourcing; incomplete contracts; regionalism
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 57 Seiten), Illustrationen
  10. Socially responsible investment
    ex-ante contracting or ex-post bargaining
    Erschienen: [2022]
    Verlag:  Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University, Kobe, Japan

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    Auflage/Ausgabe: Revised March 4, 2021
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper series / Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University ; DP 2021, 20
    Schlagworte: social responsible investment; esg; multitask; hold-up; incomplete contracts; social impact bonds; sustainability-linked bonds
    Umfang: 38 Seiten, 1 ungezählte Seite, Illustrationen
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    "This paper was originally titled "Contract duration and socially responsible investment"" - Fußnote Seite 1

    "Revised: March 3, 2022" - Seite 1

  11. Socially responsible investment
    ex-ante contracting or ex-post bargaining
    Erschienen: [2022]
    Verlag:  Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University, Kobe, Japan

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    Auflage/Ausgabe: Revised May 6, 2022
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper series / Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University ; DP 2021, 20
    Schlagworte: social responsible investment; esg; multitask; hold-up; incomplete contracts; social impact bonds; sustainability-linked bonds
    Umfang: 36 Seiten, 1 ungezählte Seite, Illustrationen
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    "This paper was originally titled "Contract duration and socially responsible investment"" - Fußnote Seite 1

    "Revised: March 9, 2022" - Seite 1

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  12. The costs and benefits of rules of origin in modern free trade agreements
    Erschienen: [2022]
    Verlag:  Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science, London

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    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / Centre for Economic Performance ; no. 1867 (August 2022)
    Schlagworte: hold-up problem; sourcing; incomplete contracts; regionalism
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 58 Seiten), Illustrationen
  13. Facility management services in UK hospitals
    in-house or outsourcing
    Erschienen: Dec. 2023
    Verlag:  University of Luxemborg, Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance, Luxembourg

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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10993/58900
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; 2023, 15
    Schlagworte: Private finance initiatives; foundation trusts; hospitals; facility management services outsourcing; moral hazard; incomplete contracts; bundling
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 48 Seiten), Illustrationen
  14. Incentive contracts crowd out voluntary cooperation
    evidence from gift-exchange experiments
    Erschienen: March 2024
    Verlag:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    Explicit and implicit incentives and opportunities for mutually beneficial voluntary cooperation co-exist in many contractual relationships. In a series of eight laboratory gift-exchange experiments, we show that incentive contracts can lead to... mehr

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    Explicit and implicit incentives and opportunities for mutually beneficial voluntary cooperation co-exist in many contractual relationships. In a series of eight laboratory gift-exchange experiments, we show that incentive contracts can lead to crowding out of voluntary cooperation even after incentives have been abolished. This crowding out occurs also in repeated relationships, which otherwise strongly increase effort compared to one-shot interactions. Using a unified econometric framework, we unpack these results as a function of positive and negative reciprocity, as well as the principals' wage offer and the incentive-compatibility of the contract. Crowding out is mostly due to reduced wages and not a change in reciprocal wage-effort relationships. Our systematic analysis also replicates established results on gift exchange, incentives, and crowding out of voluntary cooperation while exposed to incentives. Overall, our findings show that the behavioral consequences of explicit incentives strongly depend on the features of the situation in which they are embedded.

     

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    hdl: 10419/295895
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 16872
    Schlagworte: principal-agent games; gift-exchange experiments; incomplete contracts; explicit incentives; implicit incentives; repeated games; crowding out
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 60 Seiten), Illustrationen
  15. Blockchain: the birth of decentralized governance
    Erschienen: April 2018
    Verlag:  Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Department of Economics and Business, Barcelona

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    Schriftenreihe: Economics working paper series ; no. 1608
    Schlagworte: blockchain; platforms; networks; hold‐up; coordination; relational capital; incomplete contracts; decentralized governance
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 39 Seiten), Illustrationen
  16. Blockchain
    the birth of decentralized governance
    Erschienen: April 2018
    Verlag:  GSE, Graduate School of Economics, Barcelona

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    Schriftenreihe: Barcelona GSE working paper series ; no 1038
    Schlagworte: blockchain; platforms; networks; hold‐up; coordination; relational capital; incomplete contracts; decentralized governance
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 39 Seiten), Illustrationen
  17. The extrinsic motivation of freedom at work
    Autor*in: Tan, Teck Yong
    Erschienen: 2017
    Verlag:  EGC, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

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    Schriftenreihe: EGC report ; no: 2017, 15
    Schlagworte: Freedom at work; incomplete contracts; ratchet effect; strategic ignorance; innovation; asymmetric information
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 71 Seiten), Illustrationen