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  1. Market concentration and incentives to collude in Cournot oligopoly experiments
    Autor*in: Hanaki, Nobuyuki; Masiliūnas, Aidas
    Erschienen: April 2021
    Verlag:  The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, Osaka, Japan

    Multiple Cournot oligopoly experiments found more collusive behavior in markets with fewer firms (Huck et al., 2004; Horstmann et al., 2018). This result could be explained by a higher difficulty to coordinate or by lower incentives to collude in... mehr

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    DS 198
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    Multiple Cournot oligopoly experiments found more collusive behavior in markets with fewer firms (Huck et al., 2004; Horstmann et al., 2018). This result could be explained by a higher difficulty to coordinate or by lower incentives to collude in markets with more firms. We show that the Quantal Response Equilibrium can explain how the change in incentives alone could result in more collusive output in smaller markets. We propose a new method to manipulate the group size while keeping constant the locations of key outcomes, payoffs at these outcomes and the incentives to collude. Experiments using this normalized payoff function find that the number of firms has no direct effect on the average output or profit. We conclude that higher rates of aggregate collusion in markets with fewer firms are driven by the changes in incentives or focality rather than purely the number of firms. These findings imply that antitrust policies aimed at preventing collusion should focus on incentives rather than on the market concentration.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/234942
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / The Institute of Social and Economic Research ; no. 1131
    Schlagworte: experiment; oligopoly; collusion; group size; Quantal Response Equilibrium
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 65 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Dishonesty as a collective-risk social dilemma
    Autor*in: Jiang, Shuguang; Villeval, Marie-Claire
    Erschienen: December 2022
    Verlag:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    We study cheating as a collective-risk social dilemma in a group setting in which individuals are asked to report their actual outcomes. Misreporting their outcomes increases the individual's earnings but when the sum of claims in the group reaches a... mehr

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    We study cheating as a collective-risk social dilemma in a group setting in which individuals are asked to report their actual outcomes. Misreporting their outcomes increases the individual's earnings but when the sum of claims in the group reaches a certain threshold, a risk of collective sanction affects all the group members, regardless of their individual behavior. Because of the pursuit of selfish interest and a lack of coordination with other group members, the vast majority of individuals eventually earn less than the reservation payoff from honest reporting in the group. Over time, most groups are trapped in a "Tragedy of Dishonesty", despite the presence of moral costs of lying. The risk of collective sanction is triggered less frequently in small groups than in large ones, while priming a collectivist mindset has little effect on lying.

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/272440
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 15813
    Schlagworte: dishonesty; public bad; group size; collectivism; individualism; experiment
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 49 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Fairness and inequality in institution formation
    Autor*in: Detemple, Julian; Kosfeld, Michael
    Erschienen: [2023]
    Verlag:  Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE, Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe, [Frankfurt am Main]

    A key solution for public good provision is the voluntary formation of institutions that commit players to cooperate. Such institutions generate inequality if some players decide not to participate but cannot be excluded from cooperation benefits.... mehr

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    A key solution for public good provision is the voluntary formation of institutions that commit players to cooperate. Such institutions generate inequality if some players decide not to participate but cannot be excluded from cooperation benefits. Prior research with small groups emphasizes the role of fairness concerns with positive effects on cooperation. We show that effects do not generalize to larger groups: if group size increases, groups are less willing to form institutions generating inequality. In contrast to smaller groups, however, this does not increase the number of participating players, thereby limiting the positive impact of institution formation on cooperation.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/277761
    Schriftenreihe: SAFE working paper ; no. 402 (September 2023)
    Schlagworte: Institution formation; group size; social dilemma; social preferences
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 67 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Fairness and inequality in institution formation
    Autor*in: Detemple, Julian; Kosfeld, Michael
    Erschienen: September 2023
    Verlag:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    A key solution for public good provision is the voluntary formation of institutions that commit players to cooperate. Such institutions generate inequality if some players decide not to participate but cannot be excluded from cooperation benefits.... mehr

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 4
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    A key solution for public good provision is the voluntary formation of institutions that commit players to cooperate. Such institutions generate inequality if some players decide not to participate but cannot be excluded from cooperation benefits. Prior research with small groups emphasizes the role of fairness concerns with positive effects on cooperation. We show that effects do not generalize to larger groups: if group size increases, groups are less willing to form institutions generating inequality. In contrast to smaller groups, however, this does not increase the number of participating players, thereby limiting the positive impact of institution formation on cooperation.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/282591
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 16464
    Schlagworte: institution formation; group size; social dilemma; social preferences
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 67 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. Fairness and inequality in institution formation
    Autor*in: Detemple, Julian; Kosfeld, Michael
    Erschienen: 20 September 2023
    Verlag:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Standort:
    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; DP18473
    Schlagworte: Institution formation; group size; social dilemma; social preferences
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 68 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Using the strategy method and elicited beliefs to explain group size and MPCR effects in public good experiments
    Autor*in: Gächter, Simon; Mariño Fages, Diego
    Erschienen: November 2023
    Verlag:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

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    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/282732
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 16605
    Schlagworte: public goods; group size; MPCR; strategy method; ABC approach; conditional cooperation; experiments
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 63 Seiten), Illustrationen