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  1. I win it's fair, you win it's not
    selective heeding of merit in ambiguous settings
    Autor*in: Kandul, Serhiy; Nikolaychuk, Olexandr
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  Friedrich Schiller University Jena, Jena, Germany

    One's willingness to accept an outcome or even to correct it depends on whether or not the underlying procedure is deemed legitimate. We manipulate the role allocation procedure in the dictator game to illustrate that this belief is not independent... mehr

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    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 78
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    One's willingness to accept an outcome or even to correct it depends on whether or not the underlying procedure is deemed legitimate. We manipulate the role allocation procedure in the dictator game to illustrate that this belief is not independent of the outcome and is self-serving in its nature. Our findings suggest that there may be some positive level of dissatisfaction with virtually any social outcome in the populace without there being anything wrong as far as the underlying procedure. We also discuss the perceptions of fairness and merit as potential drivers of the observed behavioral phenomenon.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/243073
    Schriftenreihe: Jena economic research papers ; # 2021, 002
    Schlagworte: fairness; entitlement; merit; redistribution; procedural preferences; dictator game
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 29 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. How to protect entitlements
    an experiment
    Autor*in: Bar-Gill, Oren; Engel, Christoph
    Erschienen: 04/2017
    Verlag:  Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA

    In a full-information, zero transactions costs world, the degree of protection afforded to an entitlement does not affect the likelihood of efficient trade. In reality, imperfect information is often inevitable. Specifically, a party will usually... mehr

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    Standort:
    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    In a full-information, zero transactions costs world, the degree of protection afforded to an entitlement does not affect the likelihood of efficient trade. In reality, imperfect information is often inevitable. Specifically, a party will usually have incomplete information about fairness norms held by the other party – fairness norms that affect the other party's willingness to pay (WTP) or willingness to accept (WTA). Importantly, these fairness norms may depend on how strongly the entitlement is protected. We experimentally test the effect of the degree of protection on the parties' WTP and WTA and on the likelihood of efficient trade by varying the legal remedy for infringing upon the owner's entitlement. We show that our participants can be divided into three groups corresponding to three different fairness norms: negative types whose WTP and WTA are decreasing in the strength of the legal remedy; positive types whose WTP and WTA are increasing in the strength of the legal remedy; and flat types whose WTP and WTA do not depend on the strength of the legal remedy. We find that type is role-dependent, such that a higher WTP and a lower WTA – the combination most conducive to efficient trade – is obtained with a weaker legal remedy

     
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    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / Harvard John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business ; no. 901
    MPI Collective Goods Preprint ; No. 2017/05
    Schlagworte: property rule; liability rule; damages; compensation; Coase theorem; bargaining,fairness; equality; desert; entitlement; taking
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 26 Seiten), Illustrationen