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  1. The right person for the right job: workers' prosociality as a screening device
    Autor*in: Bigoni, Maria; Ploner, Matteo; Vu, Thi-Thanh-Tam
    Erschienen: October 2021
    Verlag:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    The impact of workers' non-pecuniary motivation on their productivity is a fundamental issue in labor economics. Previous studies indicate that prosocially motivated workers may perform better when assigned to jobs having socially desirable... mehr

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    The impact of workers' non-pecuniary motivation on their productivity is a fundamental issue in labor economics. Previous studies indicate that prosocially motivated workers may perform better when assigned to jobs having socially desirable implications - even if effort is non contractible and they are offered a low-powered fixed-compensation scheme - as compared to a standard job with an effort-contingent payment. This suggests that profit maximizing employers should assign workers to different jobs, based on workers' prosociality. We run an experiment to explore the link between workers' prosociality and their level of effort under a prosocial and a standard job, and show that employers actually exploit the information on workers' prosociality to assign them the type of job that would be most profitable from the firm's perspective.

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/250440
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 14779
    Schlagworte: dictator game; incentives; laboratory experiment; principal-agent game; real-effort task
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 46 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Respecting entitlements in legislative bargaining - a matter of preference or necessity?
    Autor*in: Gantner, Anita; Oexl, Regine
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  Research platform Empirical and Experimental Economics, University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck, Austria

    In division problems with entitlements, we investigate whether fairness concerns overrule strategic behavior and inhibit full use of the decision-making power. In a lab experiment where entitlements are derived from costly contributions, we vary... mehr

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    In division problems with entitlements, we investigate whether fairness concerns overrule strategic behavior and inhibit full use of the decision-making power. In a lab experiment where entitlements are derived from costly contributions, we vary bargaining power by using either the majority rule or the dictator rule to find a division allocation. We apply very coarse measures for assessing whether entitlements are respected under both rules. For inexperienced subjects, we find a large number of proposals in which all partners receive positive amounts. With experience, however, over one third of proposers leave at most the crumbs for both partners (dictator) or one of them (majority bargaining). Past individual observations of such 'extreme' outcomes increase the likelihood of own 'extreme' proposals not only under the majority rule, but also under the dictator rule, where no learning of strategic behavior is expected. In heterogeneous groups, where partners bring in different contributions, about 50% of proposals do not reflect an ordinal comparison of the partners' entitlements. Overall, this shows significant limits in people's preferences for fairness.

     
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    hdl: 10419/250147
    Schriftenreihe: Working papers in economics and statistics ; 2021, 25
    Schlagworte: Verhandlungstheorie; Experiment; Abstimmungsregel; Ultimatumspiel; Ethik; Gesetzgebung; majority bargaining; dictator game; entitlements
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 40 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. I win it's fair, you win it's not
    selective heeding of merit in ambiguous settings
    Autor*in: Kandul, Serhiy; Nikolaychuk, Olexandr
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  Friedrich Schiller University Jena, Jena, Germany

    One's willingness to accept an outcome or even to correct it depends on whether or not the underlying procedure is deemed legitimate. We manipulate the role allocation procedure in the dictator game to illustrate that this belief is not independent... mehr

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    One's willingness to accept an outcome or even to correct it depends on whether or not the underlying procedure is deemed legitimate. We manipulate the role allocation procedure in the dictator game to illustrate that this belief is not independent of the outcome and is self-serving in its nature. Our findings suggest that there may be some positive level of dissatisfaction with virtually any social outcome in the populace without there being anything wrong as far as the underlying procedure. We also discuss the perceptions of fairness and merit as potential drivers of the observed behavioral phenomenon.

     
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    hdl: 10419/243073
    Schriftenreihe: Jena economic research papers ; # 2021, 002
    Schlagworte: fairness; entitlement; merit; redistribution; procedural preferences; dictator game
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 29 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Gender differences in preferences of adolescents
    evidence from a large-scale classroom experiment
    Autor*in: Horn, Dániel; Kiss, Hubert János; Lénárd, Tünde
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Budapest

    In this study, we estimate unadjusted and adjusted gender gap in time preference, risk attitudes, altruism, trust, trustworthiness, cooperation and competitiveness using data on 1088 high-school students from 53 classes. These data, collected by... mehr

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    In this study, we estimate unadjusted and adjusted gender gap in time preference, risk attitudes, altruism, trust, trustworthiness, cooperation and competitiveness using data on 1088 high-school students from 53 classes. These data, collected by running incentivized experiments in Hungarian classrooms, are linked to an administrative data source on the students’ standardized test scores, grades and family background. We find that after taking into account class fixed effects, females are significantly more altruistic (both with classmates and schoolmates), but are less present-biased, less risk tolerant, less trusting, less trustworthy and less competitive than males. At the same time we do not observe significant gender differences in patience, time inconsistency and cooperation at the 5% significance level. We also show that these initial gender differences do not change even if we control for age, family background, cognitive skills and school grades in a regression framework. Moreover, the gender gap also remains in all but one of these preferences even if we control for the other preference domains, suggesting that only risk preferences are confounded by the other preferences, at least as the gender gap in these preferences is concerned.

     
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    hdl: 10419/237547
    Schriftenreihe: CERS-IE working papers ; CERS-IE WP - 2021, 3 (January 2021)
    Schlagworte: adolescents; altruism; competitiveness; cooperation; dictator game; patience; present bias; public goods game; risk preferences; social preferences; time inconsistency; time preferences; trust; trustworthiness
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 57 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. The unintended side effects of regulating charities
    donors penalise administrative burden almost as much as overheads
    Autor*in: Samahita, Margaret; Lades, Leonhard K.
    Erschienen: 2021
    Verlag:  UCD School of Economics, University College Dublin, Dublin

    Recent experimental evidence suggests that donors are averse to giving to charities with high overhead ratios. This paper asks whether donors are also averse to giving to charities spending a high share of the donations on unavoidable administrative... mehr

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    Recent experimental evidence suggests that donors are averse to giving to charities with high overhead ratios. This paper asks whether donors are also averse to giving to charities spending a high share of the donations on unavoidable administrative expenses. The results of an experiment with a nationally representative sample (n = 1, 032) suggest that donors dislike paying for administrative burden almost as much as for overhead. While donors care primarily about how much of their donations are used for program-related services, donors seem to have a weak preference for charities to spend their donations on administrative burden rather than on overheads. Government subsidies that help alleviate charities' administrative burden can reduce donors' aversion to give to charities with high administrative expenses. Overall, we show that regulations that aim to increase transparency and accountability in the charity sector can have the unintended side effect of reducing charitable giving.

     
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    hdl: 10197/11955
    hdl: 10419/237584
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series / UCD Centre for Economic Research ; WP21, 06 (February 2021)
    Schlagworte: charitable giving; administrative burden; overhead aversion; information; dictator game; online experiment
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 66 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. High incentives without high cost
    the role of (perceived) stake sizes in dictator games
    Autor*in: Hopp, Daniel
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  [CAWM], [Münster]

    The external validity of dictator games conducted in a lab is often questioned due to the use of small stake sizes that do not correspond to real-world settings. A potential solution to this problem is based on how participant perceptions of stake... mehr

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    The external validity of dictator games conducted in a lab is often questioned due to the use of small stake sizes that do not correspond to real-world settings. A potential solution to this problem is based on how participant perceptions of stake sizes are affected by their numerical representation. In this paper, I vary the stake size and its numerical representation to examine whether the illusion of large stakes can be created convincingly by implementing inflated numbers through an experimental currency. The share allocated to the recipient does not differ across treatments in this large-sample online experiment. This finding demonstrates that neither an increase in stake size nor a change in its numerical representation influence the share allocated to the recipient in a dictator game.

     
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    hdl: 10419/233116
    Schriftenreihe: [CAWM discussion paper] ; [123]
    Schlagworte: dictator game; stake size; numerosity
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 14 Seiten), Illustrationen
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    Erscheinungsort, Verlag, monografische Reihe und deren Zählung von der Frontdoor
  7. Is generosity time-inconsistent?
    present bias across individual and social context
    Autor*in: Kölle, Felix; Wenner, Lukas
    Erschienen: April 2021
    Verlag:  ECONtribute, Bonn

    We investigate dynamically inconsistent time preferences across contexts with and without interpersonal trade-offs. In a longitudinal experiment participants make a series of intertemporal allocation decisions of real-effort tasks between themselves... mehr

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    We investigate dynamically inconsistent time preferences across contexts with and without interpersonal trade-offs. In a longitudinal experiment participants make a series of intertemporal allocation decisions of real-effort tasks between themselves and another person. Our results reveal that agents are present-biased when making choices that only affect themselves but not when choosing for others. Despite this asymmetry, we find no evidence for time-inconsistent generosity, i.e., when choices involve trade-offs between own and other’s consumption. Structural estimations reveal no individual-level correlation of present bias across contexts. Discounting in social situations thus seems to be conceptually different from discounting in individual situations.

     
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    hdl: 10419/237322
    Schriftenreihe: ECONtribute discussion paper ; no. 077
    Schlagworte: Present bias; altruism; stability; real effort; dictator game; intertemporal choice
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 92 Seiten), Illustrationen
  8. Ethnic disparity in altruism towards reforestation
    a social preference experiment in Mindoro, Philippines
    Autor*in: Molina, Imelda Revilla; Castillo, Katelyn; Puzon, Klarizze Anne Martin
    Erschienen: April 2021
    Verlag:  United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research, Helsinki, Finland

    This paper presents a framed field experiment on ecological altruism in Mindoro, Philippines. Behavioural differences between ethnic groups in Mindoro-the Tagalogs and the Mangyans-were investigated. We designed a two-part donation task (i.e.... mehr

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    This paper presents a framed field experiment on ecological altruism in Mindoro, Philippines. Behavioural differences between ethnic groups in Mindoro-the Tagalogs and the Mangyans-were investigated. We designed a two-part donation task (i.e. dictator game) where the recipient of the donation was a local reforestation project. There were two treatments: participants played either the giving game (GG) or the taking game (TG). In the first part (GG), respondents were asked how much they will donate towards reforestation; in the second part (TG), respondents were asked how much money they will take away from the project and keep for themselves. The second part was the same as the first, but participants were asked what they will do if a hypothetical partner, who was either the same or different ethnicity, donated half of the initial endowment to reforestation. Results indicate that Mangyans, who are predominantly farmers, tend to give more in the TG than the GG. Tagalog respondents were not sensitive to framing. Finally, other-ethnicity dynamics did not have a strong effect.

     
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    ISBN: 9789292670115
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/243399
    Schriftenreihe: WIDER working paper ; 2021, 73
    Schlagworte: framed field experiment; reforestation; dictator game; framing
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 18 Seiten), Illustrationen
  9. Group identification and giving
    in-group love, out-group hate and their crowding out
    Autor*in: Heap, Shaun Hargreaves; Levi, Eugenio; Ramalingam, Abhijit
    Erschienen: 2021-03-11
    Verlag:  Masaryk University, Brno

    Using a dictator game experiment, we examine whether the introduction of group identities affects giving. Group identities can activate feelings of in-group love and out-group hate to create an in-group bias. In addition, group identities may spawn... mehr

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    Using a dictator game experiment, we examine whether the introduction of group identities affects giving. Group identities can activate feelings of in-group love and out-group hate to create an in-group bias. In addition, group identities may spawn social sanctions that are designed to reinforce this in-group bias. We find that the aggregate effect on giving of group identities alone tends to be positive but depends on the relative size of two sub-sets of the subject pool: those who exhibit an in-group bias and those who do not. With the latter, the introduction of group identities has no effect on giving. With the former, the in-group bias arises from both in-group love and out-group hate and with interactions skewed towards own group members, in-group love will dominate to produce an increase in gifts. Sanctions too depend for their aggregate effect on the relative size of these two sub-sets in the population, but in the opposite way. This is because in-group biased preferences are crowded-in by the sanctions among the hitherto equal givers and in-group biased preferences are crowded-out among those who would otherwise exhibit the in-group bias.

     
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    hdl: 10419/237416
    Schriftenreihe: MUNI ECON ; n. 2021, 07
    Schlagworte: dictator game; in-group love; out-group hate; crowding-out
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 33 Seiten), Illustrationen
  10. Comparing data gathered in an online and a laboratory experiment using the trustlab platform
    Autor*in: Hanaki, Nobuyuki; Hoshino, Takayuki; Kubota, Kohei; Murtin, Fabrice; Ōgaki, Masao; Ōtake, Fumio; Okuyama, Naoko
    Erschienen: June 2022
    Verlag:  The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, Osaka, Japan

    This paper compares the results of an experiment conducted both in the laboratory and online with participants recruited from the same subject pool using the Trustlab platform. This platform has been used to obtain incentivized and internationally... mehr

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    This paper compares the results of an experiment conducted both in the laboratory and online with participants recruited from the same subject pool using the Trustlab platform. This platform has been used to obtain incentivized and internationally comparable behavioral economics measures of altruism, cooperation, reciprocity, trust, and trustworthiness, employing representative samples in many countries. We find little significant difference between the results from sessions conducted in the laboratory and online. While the existing literature shows that the choice between laboratory and online experiments can cause differences in results in some cases, our findings support the hypothesis that they do not cause differences in the behavioral economics measures when using the Trustlab platform.

     
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    hdl: 10419/263305
    Auflage/Ausgabe: Revised June 2022
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / The Institute of Social and Economic Research ; no. 1168
    Schlagworte: dictator game; trust game; public goods game
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 24 Seiten), Illustrationen
  11. Weighting the waiting
    intertemporal social preferences
    Autor*in: Rohde, Kirsten I. M.; Exel, Job van; Hulsen, Merel A. J. van
    Erschienen: [2022]
    Verlag:  Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    This paper studies intertemporal social preferences. We introduce intertemporal dictator and ultimatum games where players decide on the timing of monetary payoffs. The setting is twodimensional rather than one-dimensional, in the sense that... mehr

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    This paper studies intertemporal social preferences. We introduce intertemporal dictator and ultimatum games where players decide on the timing of monetary payoffs. The setting is twodimensional rather than one-dimensional, in the sense that inequalities can arise in the time as well as in the social dimension. The results of our experiment show that for equal monetary payoffs, decisions regarding waiting time show similar patterns as decisions regarding monetary payoffs in the standard games. Moreover, decisions regarding waiting time depend on inequalities in monetary payoffs in a systematic way, with this dependence being more pronounced in ultimatum than in dictator games.

     
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    hdl: 10419/263943
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; TI 2022, 023
    Schlagworte: Social preferences; time preferences; dictator game; ultimatum game
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 48 Seiten), Illustrationen
  12. How does group-decision making affect subsequent individual behavior?
    Autor*in: Doerrenberg, Philipp; Feldhaus, Christoph
    Erschienen: January 2022
    Verlag:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    Do groups and individuals behave differently in dictator games with varying deservingness of the recipient? Does the involvement in group-decision making affect the decisions of group members in subsequent individual decisions? We address these... mehr

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    Do groups and individuals behave differently in dictator games with varying deservingness of the recipient? Does the involvement in group-decision making affect the decisions of group members in subsequent individual decisions? We address these questions using a controlled dictator-game experiment and find the following main results. First, groups and individuals are not different w.r.t. their dictator-game decisions and recipient deservingness does not have a different effect on groups than on individuals. Second, participants who were previously part of a group decision process are more generous in a subsequent individual-level decision than participants who previously made individual decisions. We exploit the chat protocols of group discussions to shed light on the mechanism behind this result. Consistent with moral balancing, we show that the effect of group-decision making on subsequent individual decisions is driven by subjects who intent to make good for the initial group decision.

     
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    hdl: 10419/252030
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo working paper ; no. 9513 (2022)
    Schlagworte: group-decision making; dictator game; recipient deservingness; moral balancing
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 46 Seiten), Illustrationen
  13. Moral motive selection in the lying-dictator game
    Autor*in: Barron, Kai; Stüber, Robert; Veldhuizen, Roel van
    Erschienen: August 2022
    Verlag:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    An extensive literature documents that people are willing to sacrifice personal material gain to adhere to a moral motive. Yet, less is known about what happens when moral motives are in conflict. We hypothesize that individuals engage in what we... mehr

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    An extensive literature documents that people are willing to sacrifice personal material gain to adhere to a moral motive. Yet, less is known about what happens when moral motives are in conflict. We hypothesize that individuals engage in what we term "motive selection," namely adhering to the moral motive that aligns with their self-interest. We test this hypothesis using a laboratory experiment that induces a conflict between two of the most-studied moral motives: fairness and truth-telling. In line with our hypothesis, our results show that individuals prefer to adhere to the moral motive that is more aligned with their self-interest.

     
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    hdl: 10419/265946
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo working paper ; no. 9911 (2022)
    Schlagworte: motivated reasoning; dictator game; lying game; motives; moral dilemmas
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 64 Seiten), Illustrationen
  14. Moral motive selection in the lying dictator game
    Autor*in: Barron, Kai; Stüber, Robert; Veldhuizen, Roel van
    Erschienen: September 2022
    Verlag:  Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Lund

    An extensive literature documents that people are willing to sacrifice personal material gain to adhere to a moral motive. Yet, less is known about what happens when moral motives are in conflict. We hypothesize that individuals engage in what we... mehr

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    An extensive literature documents that people are willing to sacrifice personal material gain to adhere to a moral motive. Yet, less is known about what happens when moral motives are in conflict. We hypothesize that individuals engage in what we term "motive selection," namely adhering to the moral motive that aligns with their self-interest. We test this hypothesis using a laboratory experiment that induces a conflict between two of the most-studied moral motives: fairness and truth-telling. In line with our hypothesis, our results show that individuals prefer to adhere to the moral motive that is more aligned with their self-interest.

     
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    hdl: 10419/273646
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / Department of Economics, Lund University ; 2022, 16
    Schlagworte: Motivated reasoning; dictator game; lying game; motives; moral dilemmas
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 63 Seiten), Illustrationen
  15. Ignorance, intention and stochastic outcomes
    Autor*in: Friedrichsen, Jana; Momsen, Katharina; Piasenti, Stefano
    Erschienen: February 26, 2021
    Verlag:  Verein für Socialpolitik, [Köln]

    In sequential interactions, both the first mover's intention and the outcome of his choice may influence the second mover's action. While outcomes are typically observable, intentions are more likely to be hidden, leaving potential wiggle room for... mehr

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    In sequential interactions, both the first mover's intention and the outcome of his choice may influence the second mover's action. While outcomes are typically observable, intentions are more likely to be hidden, leaving potential wiggle room for the second mover when deciding on a reciprocating action. We employ a controlled experiment to investigate how intentions and outcome affect second mover actions and whether second movers use hidden information as an excuse to behave more selfishly. We find that second movers react both to the intention of the first mover and to the achieved outcome when they are fully informed about both, but the effect is stronger for intentions than outcomes. When intentions are not revealed by default, second movers select into information based on their inclination to behave more prosocially. While information avoidance is frequent and selfishness is higher with hidden information, we do not find evidence of a strategic exploitation of moral wiggle room.

     
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    hdl: 10419/242403
    Schriftenreihe: Jahrestagung 2021 / Verein für Socialpolitik ; 108
    Schlagworte: information avoidance; dictator game; public good game; moral wiggleroom; intentions; reciprocity
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 40 Seiten), Illustrationen
  16. Applying Adam Smiths theory of moral sentiments to elicited social norms
    giving and taking in dictator games
    Autor*in: Serdarevic, Nina; Tjøtta, Sigve
    Erschienen: [2022]
    Verlag:  [Department of Economics, University of Bergen], [Bergen]

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    Schriftenreihe: Working papers in economics / Department of Economics, University of Bergen ; no. 22, 03
    Schlagworte: social norms; elicitation of social norms; dictator game; representative experiment
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 39 Seiten), Illustrationen
  17. Picture this: social distance and the mistreatment of migrant workers
    Autor*in: Barsbai, Toman; Bartoš, Vojtěch; Licuanan, Victoria S.; Steinmayr, Andreas; Tiongson, Erwin R.; Yang, Dean
    Erschienen: [2022]
    Verlag:  Kiel Institute for the World Economy, [Kiel]

    We experimentally study an intervention to reduce mistreatment of Filipino overseas domestic workers (DWs) by their employers. Encouraging DWs to show their employers a family photo while providing a small gift when starting employment reduced DW... mehr

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    We experimentally study an intervention to reduce mistreatment of Filipino overseas domestic workers (DWs) by their employers. Encouraging DWs to show their employers a family photo while providing a small gift when starting employment reduced DW mistreatment, increased their job satisfaction, and increased the likelihood of contract extension. While generally unaware of the intervention, DWs' families staying behind become more positive about international labor migration. An online experiment with potential employers suggests that the effect operates through a reduction in employers' perceived social distance from their employees. A simple intervention can protect migrant workers without requiring destination country policy reforms.

     
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    hdl: 10419/268254
    Schriftenreihe: Kiel working paper ; no. 2237 (December 2022)
    Schlagworte: temporary labor migration; working conditions; contract enforcement; dictator game
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 60 Seiten), Illustrationen
  18. Picture this: social distance and the mistreatment of migrant workers
    Autor*in: Barsbai, Toman; Bartoš, Vojtěch; Licuanan, Victoria S.; Steinmayr, Andreas; Tiongson, Erwin R.; Yang, Dean
    Erschienen: December 2022
    Verlag:  CESifo, Munich, Germany

    We experimentally study an intervention to reduce mistreatment of Filipino overseas domestic workers (DWs) by their employers. Encouraging DWs to show their employers a family photo while providing a small gift when starting employment reduced DW... mehr

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    We experimentally study an intervention to reduce mistreatment of Filipino overseas domestic workers (DWs) by their employers. Encouraging DWs to show their employers a family photo while providing a small gift when starting employment reduced DW mistreatment, increased their job satisfaction, and increased the likelihood of contract extension. While generally unaware of the intervention, DWs' families staying behind become more positive about international labor migration. An online experiment with potential employers suggests that the effect operates through a reduction in employers' perceived social distance from their employees.

     
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    hdl: 10419/271821
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo working papers ; 10177 (2022)
    Schlagworte: temporary labor migration; working conditions; contract enforcement; dictator game
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 61 Seiten), Illustrationen
  19. Mind the framing when studying social preferences in the domain of losses
    Autor*in: Antinyan, Armenak; Corazzini, Luca; Fišar, Miloš; Reggiani, Tommaso
    Erschienen: 2022
    Verlag:  Masaryk University, Brno

    There has been an increasing interest in altruistic behaviour in the domain of losses recently. Nevertheless, there is no consensus in whether the monetary losses make individuals more generous or more selfish. Although almost all relevant studies... mehr

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    There has been an increasing interest in altruistic behaviour in the domain of losses recently. Nevertheless, there is no consensus in whether the monetary losses make individuals more generous or more selfish. Although almost all relevant studies rely on a dictator game to study altruistic behaviour, the experimental designs of these studies differ in how the losses are framed, which may explain the diverging findings. Utilizing a dictator game, this paper studies the impact of loss framing on altruism. The main methodological result is that the dictators' prosocial behaviour is sensitive to the loss frame they are embedded in. More specifically, in a dictator game in which the dictators have to share a loss between themselves and a recipient, the monetary allocations of the dictators are more benevolent than in a standard setting without a loss and in a dictator game in which the dictators have to share what remains of their endowments after a loss. These differences are explained by the different social norms that the respective loss frames invoke.

     
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    hdl: 10419/267973
    Schriftenreihe: MUNI ECON ; n. 2022, 11
    Schlagworte: loss; framing; altruism; dictator game; experiment; social norms
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 34 Seiten), Illustrationen
  20. Picture this: social distance and the mistreatment of migrant workers
    Autor*in: Barsbai, Toman; Bartoš, Vojtěch; Licuanan, Victoria S.; Steinmayr, Andreas; Tiongson, Erwin R.; Yang, Dean
    Erschienen: [2022]
    Verlag:  Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck, Austria

    International migrant workers are vulnerable to abuses by their employers. We implemented a randomized controlled trial of an intervention to reduce mistreatment of Filipino women working as domestic workers (DWs) by their household employers in Hong... mehr

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    International migrant workers are vulnerable to abuses by their employers. We implemented a randomized controlled trial of an intervention to reduce mistreatment of Filipino women working as domestic workers (DWs) by their household employers in Hong Kong and Saudi Arabia. The intervention - encouraging DWs to show their employers a photo of their family while providing a small gift when starting employment - caused DWs to experience less mistreatment, have higher satisfaction with the employer, and be more likely to stay with the employer. DWs' families in the Philippines also come to view international labor migration more positively, while they generally remain unaware of the intervention. An online experiment with potential employers in Hong Kong and the Middle East suggests that a mechanism behind the treatment effect is a reduction in the employer's perceived social distance from the employee. A simple intervention can thus help to protect migrant workers without requiring public policy changes in the destination country.

     
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    hdl: 10419/273690
    Schriftenreihe: Working papers in economics and statistics ; 2022, 17
    Schlagworte: temporary labor migration; working conditions; contract enforcement; dictator game
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 66 Seiten), Illustrationen
  21. Mind the framing when studying social preferences in the domain of losses
    Autor*in: Antinyan, Armenak; Corazzini, Luca; Fišar, Miloš; Reggiani, Tommaso
    Erschienen: October 2022
    Verlag:  Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University, Cardiff, United Kingdom

    There has been an increasing interest in altruistic behaviour in the domain of losses recently. Nevertheless, there is no consensus in whether the monetary losses make individuals more generous or more selfish. Although almost all relevant studies... mehr

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    There has been an increasing interest in altruistic behaviour in the domain of losses recently. Nevertheless, there is no consensus in whether the monetary losses make individuals more generous or more selfish. Although almost all relevant studies rely on a dictator game to study altruistic behaviour, the experimental designs of these studies differ in how the losses are framed, which may explain the diverging findings. Utilizing a dictator game, this paper studies the impact of loss framing on altruism. The main methodological result is that the dictators' prosocial behaviour is sensitive to the loss frame they are embedded in. More specifically, in a dictator game in which the dictators have to share a loss between themselves and a recipient, the monetary allocations of the dictators are more benevolent than in a standard setting without a loss and in a dictator game in which the dictators have to share what remains of their endowments after a loss. These differences are explained by the different social norms that the respective loss frames invoke.

     
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    hdl: 10419/284159
    Schriftenreihe: Cardiff economics working papers ; no. E2022, 16
    Schlagworte: loss; framing; altruism; dictator game; experiment; social norms
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 30 Seiten), Illustrationen
  22. Ignorance, intention and stochastic outcomes
    Autor*in: Friedrichsen, Jana; Momsen, Katharina; Piasenti, Stefano
    Erschienen: [2022]
    Verlag:  Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190, [München]

    In sequential interactions, both the agent’s intention and the outcome of his choice may influence the principal’s action. While outcomes are typically observable, intentions are more likely to be hidden, leaving potential wiggle room for the... mehr

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    In sequential interactions, both the agent’s intention and the outcome of his choice may influence the principal’s action. While outcomes are typically observable, intentions are more likely to be hidden, leaving potential wiggle room for the principal when deciding on a reciprocating action. We employ a controlled experiment to investigate how intentions and outcome affect the principal’s actions and whether principals use hidden information as an excuse to behave more selfishly. We find that principals react mainly to the intention of the agent. When intentions are not revealed by default, principals tend to select into information based on their inclination to behave more prosocially. While information avoidance is frequent and selfishness is higher with hidden information, we do not find evidence of a strategic exploitation of moral wiggle room.

     
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    hdl: 10419/282022
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / Rationality & Competition, CRC TRR 190 ; no. 330 (June 21, 2022)
    Schlagworte: information avoidance; dictator game; moral wiggle room; intentions; reciprocity
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 53 Seiten), Illustrationen