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  1. On the persistence of dishonesty
    Autor*in: Bortolotti, Stefania; Kölle, Felix; Wenner, Lukas
    Erschienen: August 2021
    Verlag:  ECONtribute, Bonn

    In social and economic interactions, individuals often exploit informational asymmetries and behave dishonestly to pursue private ends. In many of these situations the costs and benefits from dishonest behavior do not accrue immediately and at the... mehr

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    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 711
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    In social and economic interactions, individuals often exploit informational asymmetries and behave dishonestly to pursue private ends. In many of these situations the costs and benefits from dishonest behavior do not accrue immediately and at the same time. In this paper, we experimentally investigate the role of time on dishonesty. Contrary to our predictions, we find that neither delaying the gains from cheating, nor increasing temporal engagement with one's own unethical behavior reduces the likelihood of cheating. Furthermore, allowing for a delay between the time when private information is obtained and when it is reported does not affect cheating in our experiment.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/244345
    Schriftenreihe: ECONtribute discussion paper ; no. 111
    Schlagworte: Dishonesty; cheating; delay; discounting; experiment
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 28 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Persuasion and pricing
    dynamic trading with hard evidence
    Autor*in: Eső, Péter; Wallace, Christopher
    Erschienen: August 2016
    Verlag:  Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications, Department of Economics, University of Warwick, Coventry, United Kingdom

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    Verlag (kostenfrei)
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    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VS 701
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper series / Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications ; no: 24
    Schlagworte: Persuasion; trading games; bargaining; hard evidence; information disclosure; skimming; settling; delay
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 29 Seiten), Illustrationen