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  1. Self-respecting worker in the gig economy
    a dynamic principal-agent model
    Autor*in: Bihary, Zsolt; Csóka, Péter; Kerényi, Péter; Szimayer, Alexander
    Erschienen: 2021
    Verlag:  Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Budapest

    We introduce a dynamic principal-agent model to understand the nature of contracts between an employer and an independent gig worker. We model the worker’s self-respect with an endogenous participation constraint; he accepts a job offer if and only... mehr

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 151
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    We introduce a dynamic principal-agent model to understand the nature of contracts between an employer and an independent gig worker. We model the worker’s self-respect with an endogenous participation constraint; he accepts a job offer if and only if its utility is at least as large as his reference value, which is based on the average of previously realized wages. If the dynamically changing reference value capturing the worker’s demand is too high, then no contract is struck until the reference value hits a threshold. Below the threshold, contracts are offered and accepted, and the worker’s wage demand follows a stochastic process. We apply our model to different labor market structures and investigate first-best and second-best solutions. We show that a far-sighted employer may sacrifice instantaneous profit to regulate the agent’s demand. Employers who can afford to stall production due to a lower subjective discount rate will obtain higher profits. Our model captures the worker’s bargaining power by a vulnerability parameter that measures the rate at which his wage demand decreases when unemployed. With a low vulnerability parameter, the worker can afford to go unemployed and need not take a job at all costs. Conversely, a worker with high vulnerability can be exploited by the employer, and in this case our model also exhibits self-exploitation.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/237572
    Schriftenreihe: KRTK KTI working papers ; KRTK KTI WP - 2021, 29 (June 2021)
    Schlagworte: Contingent work; vulnerability; contract theory; stochastic control theory; endogenous participation constraint
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 43 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. CEO compensation
    evidence from the field
    Autor*in: Edmans, Alex; Gosling, Tom; Jenter, Dirk
    Erschienen: June 2021
    Verlag:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    We survey directors and investors on the objectives, constraints, and determinants of CEO pay. 67% of directors would sacrifice shareholder value to avoid controversy on CEO pay, implying they face significant constraints other than participation and... mehr

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 63
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    We survey directors and investors on the objectives, constraints, and determinants of CEO pay. 67% of directors would sacrifice shareholder value to avoid controversy on CEO pay, implying they face significant constraints other than participation and incentive compatibility. These constraints lead to lower pay levels and more one-size-fits-all structures. Shareholders are the main source of constraints, suggesting directors and investors disagree on how to maximize value. Respondents view intrinsic motivation and reputation as stronger motivators than incentive pay. They believe pay matters to CEOs not to finance consumption, but because it affects perceptions of fairness. The need to fairly recognize the CEO’s contribution explains why flow pay responds to performance, even though CEOs’ equity holdings already provide substantial consumption incentives, and why peer firm pay matters beyond retention concerns. Fairness also matters to investors, with shareholder returns an important reference point. This causes CEO pay to be affected by external risks, in contrast to optimal risk sharing.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/236704
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo working paper ; no. 9162 (2021)
    Schlagworte: executive compensation; contract theory; CEO incentives; fairness; survey
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 67 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Study-work trade-off in contests with capacity-constrained students
    Autor*in: Anastasiia, Altunina
    Erschienen: August 2022
    Verlag:  National Research University, Higher School of Economic, [Moscow]

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; 259/EC/2022
    Schlagworte: contest theory; signaling; contract theory; education trajectories
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 41 Seiten)
  4. Motivating versus funding
    Autor*in: Quérou, Nicolas; Soubeyran, Antoine; Soubeyran, Raphaël
    Erschienen: [2015]
    Verlag:  Unite de formation et de recherche d'economie, Montpellier

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VS 333 (2015,11)
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    keine Fernleihe
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    Hinweise zum Inhalt
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Auflage/Ausgabe: This version: september 2017
    Schriftenreihe: Document de recherche / Laboratoire montpelliérain d'économie théorique et appliquée ; DR no 2015, 11
    Schlagworte: moral hazard; funding; wealth constraint; contract theory; venture capital; payments for ecosystem services
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 34 Seiten)
  5. Designing contracts for the global fund
    lessons from the theory of incentives
    Autor*in: Wren-Lewis, Liam
    Erschienen: February 2016
    Verlag:  Center for Global Development, Washington, DC

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / Center for Global Development ; 425
    Schlagworte: contracts; Global Fund; contract theory; theory of incentives
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 38 Seiten), Illustrationen