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  1. Statistics and common sense
    Autor*in: Hanaki, Nobuyuki; Magnus, Jan R.; Yoo, Donghoon
    Erschienen: November 2021
    Verlag:  The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, Osaka, Japan

    Common sense is a dynamic concept and it is natural that our (statistical) common sense lags behind the development of statistical science. What is not so easy to understand is why common sense lags behind as much as it does. We conduct a survey... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 198
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Common sense is a dynamic concept and it is natural that our (statistical) common sense lags behind the development of statistical science. What is not so easy to understand is why common sense lags behind as much as it does. We conduct a survey among Japanese students and try to understand why some probabilistic and statistical questions that baffled great minds a few hundred years are now easy, while other (relatively straightforward) questions are not only difficult but even counter-intuitive.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/248609
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / The Institute of Social and Economic Research ; no. 1150
    Schlagworte: probability; statistical methods; experiment; common knowledge
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 24 Seiten)
  2. Partial consensus in large games and markets
    Autor*in: Desgranges, Gabriel; Ghosal, Sayantan
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  [Adam Smith Business School], [Glasgow]

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VS 536
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series / University of Glasgow, Adam Smith Business School ; paper no. 2021, 02 (February 2021)
    Schlagworte: p-consensus; p-stability; common knowledge; rationalizability; heterogenous beliefs; coordination; games; markets
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 43 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Statistics and common sense
    Autor*in: Hanaki, Nobuyuki; Magnus, Jan R.; Yoo, Donghoon
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Common sense is a dynamic concept and it is natural that our (statistical) common sense lags behind the development of statistical science. What is not so easy to understand is why common sense lags behind as much as it does. We conduct a survey... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 432
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Common sense is a dynamic concept and it is natural that our (statistical) common sense lags behind the development of statistical science. What is not so easy to understand is why common sense lags behind as much as it does. We conduct a survey among Japanese students and try to understand why some probabilistic and statistical questions that baffled great minds a few hundred years are now easy, while other (relatively straightforward) questions are not only difficult but even counter-intuitive.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/248788
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; TI 2021, 106
    Schlagworte: probability; statistical methods; experiment; common knowledge
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 25 Seiten)
  4. Communication under Ambiguity
    Autor*in: Dominiak, Adam; Gersbach, Hans
    Erschienen: 04 March 2024
    Verlag:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

    We study communication in ambiguous environments. Agents communicate individual decisions sequentially. Based on the signal that an agent receives, she revises her private information. When signals are ambiguous, we show that agents may agree to... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Verlag (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)

    Standort:
    Universität Potsdam, Universitätsbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    uneingeschränkte Fernleihe, Kopie und Ausleihe

     

    We study communication in ambiguous environments. Agents communicate individual decisions sequentially. Based on the signal that an agent receives, she revises her private information. When signals are ambiguous, we show that agents may agree to disagree forever. Although the learning process converges, leading to common knowledge of the individual decisions, the decisions differ no matter how long the communication lasts. Such persistent disagreements are precluded in Bayesian frameworks endowed with a common prior. When communication is private and nobody is excluded from it, we show that ambiguity-free communication is a necessary and sufficient condition for a consensus to emerge. However, when communication is public, ambiguity-free communication is only sufficient for reaching a consensus. We apply our model to economic forecasting, providing an alternative account for persistently disagreeing forecasters. Finally, we outline an "advisor's dilemma" and explain why deliberation in democracy may never end.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; DP18880
    Schlagworte: Ambiguity; beliefs; common prior; common knowledge; disagree-ment; consensus; communication; fair protocol; updating; learning; forecasting
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 62 Seiten)
  5. Communication under Ambiguity
    Autor*in: Dominiak, Adam; Gersbach, Hans
    Erschienen: 04 March 2024
    Verlag:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

    We study communication in ambiguous environments. Agents communicate individual decisions sequentially. Based on the signal that an agent receives, she revises her private information. When signals are ambiguous, we show that agents may agree to... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Verlag (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)

    Standort:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    LZ 161
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Bibliotheks-und Informationssystem der Carl von Ossietzky Universität Oldenburg (BIS)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Universität Potsdam, Universitätsbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We study communication in ambiguous environments. Agents communicate individual decisions sequentially. Based on the signal that an agent receives, she revises her private information. When signals are ambiguous, we show that agents may agree to disagree forever. Although the learning process converges, leading to common knowledge of the individual decisions, the decisions differ no matter how long the communication lasts. Such persistent disagreements are precluded in Bayesian frameworks endowed with a common prior. When communication is private and nobody is excluded from it, we show that ambiguity-free communication is a necessary and sufficient condition for a consensus to emerge. However, when communication is public, ambiguity-free communication is only sufficient for reaching a consensus. We apply our model to economic forecasting, providing an alternative account for persistently disagreeing forecasters. Finally, we outline an "advisor's dilemma" and explain why deliberation in democracy may never end.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; DP18880
    Schlagworte: Ambiguity; beliefs; common prior; common knowledge; disagree-ment; consensus; communication; fair protocol; updating; learning; forecasting
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 62 Seiten)
  6. Natural instability of equilibrium prices
    Autor*in: Levando, Dmitry V.; Sakharov, Maxim
    Erschienen: [2018]
    Verlag:  Department of Economics, Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, Venice Italy

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / Ca' Foscari University of Venice, Department of Economics ; 2018, no. 01
    Schlagworte: Strategic market games; ill-posed problems; common knowledge; rational expectations; efficient market; price fluctuations
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 39 Seiten), Illustrationen