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  1. How clientelism undermines state capacity
    evidence from Mexican municipalities
    Autor*in: De La O, Ana L.
    Erschienen: November 2021
    Verlag:  United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research, Helsinki, Finland

    Does clientelism perpetuate the weak state capacity that characterizes many young democracies? Prior work explains that clientelist parties skew public spending to private goods and under-supply public goods. Building on these insights, this article... mehr

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    Does clientelism perpetuate the weak state capacity that characterizes many young democracies? Prior work explains that clientelist parties skew public spending to private goods and under-supply public goods. Building on these insights, this article argues that clientelism creates a bureaucratic trap. Governments that rely on clientelism invest in labour-intensive, low-skilled bureaucracies that can design and implement relatively more straightforward distributive policies. Although such bureaucracies are useful to win some elections, they cannot resolve more complex social problems, so economic and human development is hindered. Empirically, the article examines the wage structure of municipal bureaucracies as a proxy for the personnel's human capital in Mexico between 2012 and 2016. During this period, turnover in the party in power in municipalities was frequent, a situation that also allows investigating how resilient the bureaucratic trap is to increased competition. The results show that all parties invest in labour-intensive, lowskilled bureaucracies. However, the bureaucratic trap has a different grip on the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), a quintessential clientelist party, compared to other parties. After an electoral turnover, other parties invest more in their bureaucracies' human capital, and the PRI does not. While prior work has proposed other clientelism-induced negative equilibria, this article offers a more direct path from clientelism to state capacity. The results help explain why more fiscal resources, political competition, and demand-side strategies to fight vote buying are insufficient and underscore the importance of civil service reform to tame clientelism.

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
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    ISBN: 9789292671099
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/248383
    Schriftenreihe: WIDER working paper ; 2021, 169
    Schlagworte: clientelism; state capacity; bureaucratic capacity; turnover; political competition
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 22 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Contract clientelism
    how infrastructure contracts fund vote-buying
    Autor*in: Holland, Alisha C.; Freeman, Will
    Erschienen: October 2021
    Verlag:  United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research, Helsinki, Finland

    Where does the money come from to buy votes? We argue that an important source of funds for vote-buying comes from 'contract clientelism', or the provision of public contracts to private firms in exchange for campaign donations. Using quantitative... mehr

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    Where does the money come from to buy votes? We argue that an important source of funds for vote-buying comes from 'contract clientelism', or the provision of public contracts to private firms in exchange for campaign donations. Using quantitative data on Colombian infrastructure contracts, we demonstrate that municipalities exhibit an 'electoral contracting cycle' in which incumbents assign low-quality contracts while on the campaign trail. Contract manipulations are more common in municipalities with higher reports of clientelist activity. Qualitative evidence from two Colombian cities, Barranquilla and Santa Marta, reinforce that infrastructure contractors provide a critical source of campaign finance and can create subnational political monopolies. The main contribution is to question the classic tension between clientelistic distribution and public goods provision. Politicians need to assign public contracts to secure funds for clientelistic handouts but, in so doing, they often promote low-quality public goods and weaken local states.

     
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    ISBN: 9789292670955
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/248369
    Schriftenreihe: WIDER working paper ; 2021, 155
    Schlagworte: public contracts; campaign finance; vote-buying; clientelism; infrastructure; Colombia; public goods
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 28 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Technology and clientelist politics in India
    Autor*in: Wilkinson, Steven I.
    Erschienen: October 2021
    Verlag:  United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research, Helsinki, Finland

    This paper argues that new computer, smartphone, and universal ID technologies are reducing the incentives for political clientelism in the delivery of social programmes in India, especially by allowing party leaders to bypass local brokers to... mehr

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    German Institute for Global and Area Studies, Bibliothek
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    This paper argues that new computer, smartphone, and universal ID technologies are reducing the incentives for political clientelism in the delivery of social programmes in India, especially by allowing party leaders to bypass local brokers to credit-claim for better service delivery and allowing politicians to deliver programmatic service delivery much more efficiently than in the past, with fewer diversions. Politicians are responding to these changed incentives, not surprisingly, by investing more money in large social programmes, supporting technological efforts to improve their efficiency, and increasing campaign expenditures to advertise these improvements and link them to party leaders at the expense of local brokers who used to monopolize these local party- voter linkages.

     
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    ISBN: 9789292670931
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/248367
    Schriftenreihe: WIDER working paper ; 2021, 153
    Schlagworte: Informationstechnik; Kommunikationstechnik; Information; Kommunikation; Wirkung; Auswirkung; Klientelismus; Entwicklung; Wirtschaftsplanung; Kommunikationspolitik; Informationspolitik; Kampagne; Politiker; clientelism; India; technologies; social programmes; service delivery
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 20 Seiten)
  4. Voter coercion and pro-poor redistribution in rural Mexico
    Autor*in: Filipovich, Dragan; Niño-Zarazúa, Miguel; Santillán Hernández, Alma Sofia
    Erschienen: August 2021
    Verlag:  United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research, Helsinki, Finland

    Voter coercion is a recurrent threat to pro-poor redistribution in young democracies. In this study we focus on Mexico's paradigmatic Progresa-Oportunidades-Prospera (POP) programme. We investigate whether local mayors exploited POP to coerce voters,... mehr

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    Voter coercion is a recurrent threat to pro-poor redistribution in young democracies. In this study we focus on Mexico's paradigmatic Progresa-Oportunidades-Prospera (POP) programme. We investigate whether local mayors exploited POP to coerce voters, and if so, what effect these actions had on the municipal incumbent's vote. For identification of vote coercion, we exploit the fact that the so-called 'enlaces municipales'-a municipal liaison officer that under strict apolitical rules acted as the link between the municipal administration and POP-were discontinued in 2008, but then restored in 2010. Our empirical strategy relies on an innovative 'difference-in-differencesin-discontinuities' design, which allows us to compare how election results in competitive electoral districts before and after the discontinuation and restoration of enlaces differed between communities with and without POP. Overall, we find that in close elections, the discontinuation of enlaces increased the vote share to the incumbent by approximately 10.5 per cent, while their restoration decreased that vote share by 6.4 per cent. The results suggest that the discontinuation of enlaces created a rules-free environment that allowed local incumbents to coerce beneficiaries to achieve an electoral gain. A review of the existing ethnographic literature on the role of enlaces in POP's operations provides further evidence to support our findings. Our study underscores the importance of implementing clear and well-designed rules to prevent the political capture of social policies.

     
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    ISBN: 9789292670818
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/248355
    Schriftenreihe: WIDER working paper ; 2021, 141
    Schlagworte: voter coercion; clientelism; conditional cash transfers; rural poverty; Mexico
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 44 Seiten)
  5. Social ties, clientelism, and the poor's expectations of future service provision
    receiving more, expecting less?
    Autor*in: Jöst, Prisca; Lust-Okar, Ellen
    Erschienen: August 2021
    Verlag:  United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research, Helsinki, Finland

    Are candidates who hand out clientelistic goods at election time less likely to provide services once they take office? This paper examines the poor's expectations of future service provision by candidates who hand out money and other goods versus... mehr

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    Are candidates who hand out clientelistic goods at election time less likely to provide services once they take office? This paper examines the poor's expectations of future service provision by candidates who hand out money and other goods versus those who do not. We hypothesize that the poor's expectations should depend on the density of social ties. To test this hypothesis, we use hierarchical models to analyse observational data and two conjoint experiments embedded in a unique survey of Kenyans, Malawians, and Zambians. The heavily clustered sampling design allows the investigation of community- and individual-level factors, while the large sample size allows us to focus on a subsample of over 14,000 poor respondents. In socially dense communities, we find that monetary handouts signal the candidate's ability to provide future services; in less socially dense areas, such handouts appear to be viewed as in lieu of future services. Greater information flows in socially dense communities may help poor voters to monitor candidates and hold them accountable. It is important to consider how communities' experiences with clientelism affect expectations of service provision. Development practitioners need to understand how social context affects not only the likelihood of vote-buying but also the distributive effects of clientelism.

     
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    ISBN: 9789292670788
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/248352
    Schriftenreihe: WIDER working paper ; 2021, 138
    Schlagworte: vote-buying; clientelism; social ties; poverty; service provision
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 49 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Clientelistic politics and pro-poor targeting
    rules versus discretionary budgets
    Autor*in: Mookherjee, Dilip; Nath, Anusha
    Erschienen: July 2021
    Verlag:  United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research, Helsinki, Finland

    Past research has provided evidence of clientelistic politics in delivery of programme benefits by local governments, or gram panchayats (GPs), and manipulation of GP programme budgets by legislators and elected officials at upper tiers in West... mehr

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    Past research has provided evidence of clientelistic politics in delivery of programme benefits by local governments, or gram panchayats (GPs), and manipulation of GP programme budgets by legislators and elected officials at upper tiers in West Bengal, India. Using household panel survey data spanning 1998-2008, we examine the consequences of clientelism for distributive equity. We find that targeting of anti-poverty programmes was progressive both within and across GPs and is explained by greater 'vote responsiveness' of poor households to receipt of welfare benefits. Across-GP allocations were more progressive than those of a rule-based formula recommended by the Third State Finance Commission based on GP demographic characteristics. Moreover, alternative formulae for across-GP budgets obtained by varying weights on GP characteristics used in the State Finance Commission formula would have only marginally improved pro-poor targeting. Hence, there is not much scope for improving pro-poor targeting of private benefits by transitioning to formula-based budgeting.

     
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    ISBN: 9789292670658
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/248339
    Schriftenreihe: WIDER working paper ; 2021, 125
    Schlagworte: clientelism; governance; targeting; budgeting
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 25 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. Poverty, social networks, and clientelism
    Autor*in: Ravanilla, Nico; Hicken, Allen
    Erschienen: September 2021
    Verlag:  United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research, Helsinki, Finland

    Why are the poor susceptible to clientelism, and what factors shield them from the influence of vote buying? We explore the role of both formal and informal social networks in shaping the likelihood of being targeted with private inducements. We... mehr

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    Why are the poor susceptible to clientelism, and what factors shield them from the influence of vote buying? We explore the role of both formal and informal social networks in shaping the likelihood of being targeted with private inducements. We argue that when the poor lack access to formal social networks, they become increasingly reliant on vote buying channelled through informal networks. To test our theory, we build the informal, family-based network linkages between voters and local politicians spanning a city in the Philippines. We then collect survey data on formal network connections, electoral handouts, and voting behaviour of 900 voters randomly drawn from these family networks. We show first that campaigns disproportionately target poorer voters. We then show that familial ties further influence targeting among poor voters. Finally, we show that access to formal networks such as workers' associations mitigate voter fears of punishment for failing to reciprocate.

     
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    ISBN: 9789292670849
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    hdl: 10419/248358
    Schriftenreihe: WIDER working paper ; 2021, 144
    Schlagworte: social networks; poor; vote buying; clientelism; voting behaviour; Philippines
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 24 Seiten), Illustrationen
  8. Weapons of discontent?
    sketching a research agenda on social accountability in the Arab Middle East and North Africa
    Autor*in: Vloeberghs, Ward; Bergh, Sylvia I.
    Erschienen: March 2021
    Verlag:  Institute of Social Studies, Erasmus, The Hague, The Netherlands

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    hdl: 1765/135292
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / Institute of Social Studies ; no. 671
    Schlagworte: Activism; advocacy; Arab world; authoritarianism; brokers; citizen engagement; civil society; clientelism; corruption; empowerment; MENA; participatory governance; service delivery; social accountability; state-society relations; transparency
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 33 Seiten), Illustrationen
  9. Clientelism and development: is there a poverty trap?
    Autor*in: Stokes, Susan Carol
    Erschienen: June 2021
    Verlag:  United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research, Helsinki, Finland

    There are sound theoretical reasons to expect clientelism to suppress economic growth: politicians who garner support by offering employment to voters and grassroots party members can do so more effectively when the voters' participation constraint... mehr

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    There are sound theoretical reasons to expect clientelism to suppress economic growth: politicians who garner support by offering employment to voters and grassroots party members can do so more effectively when the voters' participation constraint is met with low wages. Hence, clientelism can become a poverty trap. Yet in many countries, the heyday of political clientelism coincided with periods of rapid economic growth. I offer preliminary evidence of this coincidence of clientelism and economic growth in several OECD countries, at earlier stages of development. An explanation is that clientelism can be a product of industrialization, urbanization, and economic growth. This growth may persist, despite patron-politicians' incentives to keep the poor in poverty. As private-sector wages edge up, the patron-politician cannot offer a wage that satisfies the voter- worker's participation constraint, and the political relationship between them unravels.

     
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    ISBN: 9789292670313
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    hdl: 10419/243417
    Schriftenreihe: WIDER working paper ; 2021, 91
    Schlagworte: clientelism; political competition; public policy; poverty trap
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 18 Seiten)
  10. Clientelistic politics and pro-poor targeting
    rules versus discretionary budgets
    Autor*in: Mookherjee, Dilip; Nath, Anusha
    Erschienen: 2021
    Verlag:  Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Minneapolis, MN

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    Schriftenreihe: Staff report / Research Division, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis ; no. 624 (May 2021)
    Schlagworte: clientelism; governance; targeting; budgeting
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 29 Seiten), Illustrationen
  11. Clientelistic politics and pro-poor targeting
    rules versus discretionary budgets
    Autor*in: Mookherjee, Dilip; Nath, Anusha
    Erschienen: 2021
    Verlag:  Boston University - Department of Economics, [Boston, MA]

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    Schriftenreihe: [IED working papers] ; 360
    Schlagworte: clientelism; governance; targeting; budgeting
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 29 Seiten), Illustrationen
  12. Out of communal land: clientelism through delegation of agricultural tenancy contracts
    Autor*in: Kurosaki, Takashi; Paul, Saumik; Witoelar, Firman
    Erschienen: April 2021
    Verlag:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    Do local institutions influence the nature of political clientelist exchange? We find a positive answer in the context of a village institution prevalent in Java since the Dutch colonial rule, where democratically elected village heads receive... mehr

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    Do local institutions influence the nature of political clientelist exchange? We find a positive answer in the context of a village institution prevalent in Java since the Dutch colonial rule, where democratically elected village heads receive usufruct rights over a piece of communal village land (bengkok land) as a compensation for their service in lieu of salary. To formulate how limited-term private ownership of bengkok land promotes clientelism, we model a timely delegation of agricultural tenancy contracts to villagers-cum-voters as an incumbent re-election strategy. Based on a household survey fielded in 2018 across 130 villages in Java, Indonesia, we find that the chances of a bengkok plot being rented out increase by 6 percentage points as the time of the next election becomes closer by one year, and sharecropping is preferred to a fixed-rental contract as the election approaches. The empirical results are statistically significant and remain largely unchanged against a series of robustness checks. We also find suggestive evidence of short-term efficiency loss from clientelist politics over bengkok land.

     
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    hdl: 10419/236294
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 14263
    Schlagworte: tanah bengkok; political budget cycle; clientelism; agricultural tenancy; electoral competition; Indonesia
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 52 Seiten), Illustrationen
  13. The weak state trap
    Autor*in: Fergusson, Leopoldo; Molina, Carlos; Robinson, James A.
    Erschienen: [2020]
    Verlag:  CEDE, Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Económico, Bogotá, D.C., Colombia

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    hdl: 1992/41137
    Schriftenreihe: Documentos CEDE ; 2020, no. 25 (julio de 2020)
    Schlagworte: Fragiler Staat; Politische Instabilität; Patronage; Steuervermeidung; Kolumbien; State capacity; tax evasion; clientelism; vote buying; social desirability bias; list experiments
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 53 Seiten), Illustrationen
  14. Born in the right place?
    health ministers, foreign aid and infant mortality
    Autor*in: Widmer, Philine; Zurlinden, Noémie
    Erschienen: 2019
    Verlag:  School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economics, University of St.Gallen, St. Gallen

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    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / University of St.Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economics ; no. 2019, 11 (August 2019)
    Schlagworte: Foreign aid; favoritism; political capture; patronage; clientelism; aid allocation; Africa; World Bank; infant mortality; child health; georeferenced data; spatial analysis
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 48 Seiten), Illustrationen
  15. Management of the COVID-19 pandemic in Kerala through the lens of state capacity and clientelism
    Autor*in: Chathukulam, Jos; Joseph, Manasi
    Erschienen: June 2022
    Verlag:  United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research, Helsinki, Finland

    During the first wave of COVID-19 infections, Kerala, a state in southern India, successfully managed to contain the pandemic. As a result, the Kerala model of managing the COVID-19 pandemic was celebrated as a success across the globe. However, at... mehr

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    During the first wave of COVID-19 infections, Kerala, a state in southern India, successfully managed to contain the pandemic. As a result, the Kerala model of managing the COVID-19 pandemic was celebrated as a success across the globe. However, at the time of writing, it looks like the celebrations were a bit premature and the failure to contain the spurt in COVID19 infections in the state in a second wave also ascertains this fact. While the rest of India recovered from the second wave of COVID-19 infections, Kerala struggled to bring the pandemic under control. This paper examines the state capacity in terms of health infrastructure before and during the pandemic. The paper also investigates the reasons behind the unravelling of the Kerala model of pandemic management. We analyse the role and impact of clientelism and political hegemony of the Left Democratic Front (LDF) in Kerala over COVID-19 mitigation strategies. We also investigate how Kerala's effective pandemic response created a sort of performance legitimacy for the LDF government.

     
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    ISBN: 9789292671914
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    hdl: 10419/267817
    Schriftenreihe: WIDER working paper ; 2022, 60
    Schlagworte: COVID-19 pandemic; state capacity; political hegemony; clientelism; Kerala model
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 36 Seiten), Illustrationen
  16. Out of communal land
    clientelism through delegation of agricultural tenancy contracts
    Autor*in: Kurosaki, Takashi; Paul, Saumik; Witoelar, Firman
    Erschienen: August 2021
    Verlag:  Arndt-Corden Department of Economics, Crawford School of Public Policy, ANU College of Asia and the Pacific, [Canberra]

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    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Working papers in trade and development ; no. 2021, 20
    Schlagworte: tanah bengkok; political budget cycle; clientelism; agricultural tenancy; electoral competition; Indonesia
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 55 Seiten), Illustrationen
  17. El Baile Rojo: impacto de la violencia política sobre el comportamiento electoral, el caso de la Unión Patriótica (1984-2007)
    Autor*in: Cabra-Ruiz, Nicolás
    Erschienen: marzo de 2023
    Verlag:  Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE, Bogotá, D.C., Colombia

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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Spanisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 1992/65866
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; 2023, 6
    Schlagworte: political violence; electoral behavior; clientelism; democracy; local power
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 56 Seiten), Illustrationen
  18. Political incentives and corruption: evidence from ghost students
    Autor*in: Fergusson, Leopoldo; Harker, Arturo; Molina, Carlos; Yamín, Juan Camilo
    Erschienen: abril de 2023
    Verlag:  Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE, Bogotá, D.C., Colombia

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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 1992/66329
    Schriftenreihe: Documento CEDE ; 2023, 10
    Schlagworte: Education; political agency; corruption; clientelism
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 69 Seiten), Illustrationen
  19. Economic policies vs. identity politics
    the rise of a right-wing nationalist party in India
    Autor*in: Maitra, Pushkar; Mitra, Sandip; Mookherjee, Dilip; Visaria, Sujata
    Erschienen: [2023]
    Verlag:  HKUST Center for Economic Policy, Hong Kong

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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: HKUST CEP working paper ; no. 2023, 01 (May, 2023)
    Schlagworte: clientelism; identity politics; rightwing nationalism; West Bengal; federalism
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 50 Seiten), Illustrationen
  20. Economic policies vs. identity politics: the rise of a right-wing nationalist party in India
    Autor*in: Maitra, Pushkar; Mitra, Sandip; Mookherjee, Dilip; Visaria, Sujata
    Erschienen: [2023]
    Verlag:  Boston University - Department of Economics, [Boston, MA]

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    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: [IED working papers] ; 387
    Schlagworte: clientelism; identity politics; rightwing nationalism; West Bengal; federalism
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 47 Seiten), Illustrationen
  21. The political economy of MGNREGS spending in Andhra Pradesh
    Erschienen: 2014
    Verlag:  Internat. Food Policy Research Inst., Washington, DC

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    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: IFPRI discussion paper ; 1371
    Schlagworte: India; Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee; political economy; clientelism; project allocation
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (VI, 38 S.), graph. Darst.