Direkt zur Hauptnavigation springen Direkt zum Inhalt springen
info(at)avldigital.remove-this.de
Deutsch English
Letzte Suchanfragen

Ergebnisse für *

Zeige Ergebnisse 1 bis 17 von 17.

  1. The political economy of euro area sovereign debt restructuring
    Autor*in: Heinemann, Friedrich
    Erschienen: 2021
    Verlag:  ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, Mannheim, Germany

    The establishment of a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM) is one of the important issues in the academic debate on a viable constitution for the European Monetary Union (EMU). Yet the topic seems to be taboo in official reform... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Bundesverfassungsgericht, Bibliothek
    Signatur:
    Online-Ressource
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 15
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    The establishment of a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM) is one of the important issues in the academic debate on a viable constitution for the European Monetary Union (EMU). Yet the topic seems to be taboo in official reform contributions to the debate. Against this backdrop, the article identifies the SDRM interests of key players, including the European Commission, the European Parliament, the European Central Bank and national governments. The empirical section takes advantage of the recently established EMU Positions Database. The findings confirm political economy expectations: Low-debt countries support an EMU constitution that includes an insolvency procedure whereas a coalition of high-debt countries and European institutions oppose it. The analysis points towards a possible political-economic equilibrium for coping with sovereign insolvencies: an institutional set-up without a SDRM and with hidden transfers. Recent European fiscal innovatios in response to the Covid-19 solvency shock confirm this prediction.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/229143
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / ZEW ; no. 21, 004 (01/2021)
    Schlagworte: sovereign debt restructuring mechanism; banking regulation; EMU reform; fiscal union
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (24 Seiten)
  2. The universe of supervisory mandates - total eclipse of the core?
    Autor*in: Kirakul, Sasin; Yong, Jeffery; Zamil, Raihan
    Erschienen: 2021
    Verlag:  Bank for International Settlements, Financial Stability Institute, [Basel]

    Most banking supervisory authorities are charged with multiple mandates in addition to their core responsibility of fostering the safety and soundness (S&S) of banks and the banking system. Some of these mandates may conflict with, or divert scarce... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    Keine Rechte
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Most banking supervisory authorities are charged with multiple mandates in addition to their core responsibility of fostering the safety and soundness (S&S) of banks and the banking system. Some of these mandates may conflict with, or divert scarce supervisory resources away from, the core S&S function. This paper takes stock of supervisory mandates in 27 jurisdictions and explores how banking supervisors interpret and navigate the S&S remit among other objectives. We find that most surveyed authorities have at least 10 or more objectives, accentuating potential tensions with their S&S remit – whose scope and complexity have increased over time. In this context, we outline a range of initiatives that some supervisory authorities take to deliver on their core S&S remit, while minimising potential tensions with other objectives. Nevertheless, the staggering range of objectives imposed on supervisory authorities highlights the extraordinary pressure placed on supervisors to juggle multiple responsibilities and risks diluting their ability to deliver on the core S&S mandate.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9789292594565
    Schriftenreihe: FSI insights on policy implementation ; no 30 (March 2021)
    Schlagworte: banking regulation; banking supervision; supervisory independence; supervisory mandates; supervisory objectives
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 33 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Corporate loans, banks' internal risk estimates and central bank collateral
    evidence from the euro area
    Autor*in: Calza, Alessandro; Hey, Julius-Benjamin; Parrini, Alessandro; Sauer, Stephan
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  European Central Bank, Frankfurt am Main, Germany

    We use a unique dataset of ratings for euro area corporate loans from commercial banks' internal rating-based (IRBs) systems and central banks' in-house credit assessment systems (ICASs) to investigate whether banks' IRB ratings underestimate the... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 534
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We use a unique dataset of ratings for euro area corporate loans from commercial banks' internal rating-based (IRBs) systems and central banks' in-house credit assessment systems (ICASs) to investigate whether banks' IRB ratings underestimate the credit risk of their corporate loan portfolios when the latter are used as collateral in the Eurosystem's monetary policy operations. We are able to identify systematic risk underestimation by comparing the IRB ratings with those produced for the same borrowers by the ICASs. Our results show that while they are on average more conservative than ICASs for the entire population of rated corporate loans, IRBs are significantly less conservative than ICASs for those loans that are actually used as Eurosystem collateral, particularly for large loans. The less conservative estimates of risk by IRBs relative to ICASs can be partly explained by banks' liquidity constraints, but not by their degree of capitalisation. Overall, our findings suggest the existence of a collateral-related channel through which the use of IRB ratings may influence the internal estimation of risk by banks.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9789289947657
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/237718
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series / European Central Bank ; no 2579 (July 2021)
    Schlagworte: Internal ratings; probability of default; banking regulation; central bank liquidity
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 40 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Allocating losses: bail-ins, bailouts and bank regulation
    Autor*in: Keister, Todd; Mitkov, Yuliyan
    Erschienen: [2020]
    Verlag:  ECONtribute, Bonn

    We study the interaction between a government's bailout policy and banks' willingness to impose losses on (or \bail in") their investors. The government has limited commitment and may choose to bail out banks facing large losses. The anticipation of... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 711
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We study the interaction between a government's bailout policy and banks' willingness to impose losses on (or \bail in") their investors. The government has limited commitment and may choose to bail out banks facing large losses. The anticipation of this bailout undermines a bank's private incentive to impose a bail-in. In the resulting equilibrium, bail-ins are too small and bailouts are too large. Some banks may also face a run by informed investors, creating further distortions and leading to larger bailouts. We show how a regulator with limited information can raise welfare and improve financial stability by imposing a system-wide, mandatory bail-in at the onset of a crisis. In some situations, allowing banks to choose between meeting a minimum bail-in and opting out can raise welfare further.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/228852
    Schriftenreihe: ECONtribute discussion paper ; no. 049 (December 2020)
    Schlagworte: Bank bailouts; moral hazard; financial stability; banking regulation
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 68 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. Precision of public information disclosures, banks' stability and welfare
    Autor*in: Moreno, Diego; Takalo, Tuomas
    Erschienen: 3 March 2021
    Verlag:  Bank of Finland, Helsinki

    We study the optimal precision of public information disclosures about banksíassets quality. In our model the precision of information a§ects banksí cost of raising funding and asset proÖle riskiness. In an imperfectly competitive banking sector,... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 685
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We study the optimal precision of public information disclosures about banksíassets quality. In our model the precision of information a§ects banksí cost of raising funding and asset proÖle riskiness. In an imperfectly competitive banking sector, banksístability and social surplus are non-monotonic functions of precision: an intermediate precision (or low-to-intermediate precision if banks contract their repayment promises on public information) maximizes stability, and also yields the maximum surplus when the social cost of bank failure c is large. When c is small and the banksíasset risk taking is not too sensitive to changes in the precision, the maximum surplus (and maximum risk) are reached at maximal precision. In a perfectly competitive banking sector in which banksíasset risk taking is not too sensitive to the precision of information, the maximum surplus (and maximum risk) are reached at maximal precision, while maximum stability is reached at minimal precision.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9789523233683
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/240351
    Schriftenreihe: Bank of Finland research discussion papers ; 2021, 3
    Schlagworte: financial stability; stress tests; bank transparency; banking regulation
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 49 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. The implications of new financial regulations on small business financing in Trinidad and Tobago
    Autor*in: Garcia-Singh, Chantal
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  Central Bank of Trinidad & Tobago, [Port-of-Spain]

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    Keine Rechte
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series / Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago ; WP 2022, 01 (February 2022)
    Schlagworte: Small business financing; financial intermediation; banking regulation; GMM
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 23 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. Supervision without regulation
    discount limits at the Austro-Hungarian bank, 1909-1913
    Autor*in: Rieder, Kilian; Jobst, Clemens
    Erschienen: 22 March 2022
    Verlag:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

    Zugang:
    Verlag (lizenzpflichtig)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    LZ 161
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; DP16841
    Schlagworte: lender of last resort; banking regulation; central bank lending; Liquidity Crisis; creditlimits
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 46 Seiten), Illustrationen
  8. The Disciplining Effect of Supervisory Scrutiny in the EU-Wide Stress Test
    Autor*in: Pancaro, Cosimo; Kok Sørensen, Christoffer; Müller, Carola; Ongena, Steven
    Erschienen: [2022]
    Verlag:  SSRN, [S.l.]

    Relying on confidential supervisory data related to the 2016 EU-wide stress test, this paper presents novel empirical evidence that supervisory scrutiny associated to stress testing has a disciplining effect on bank risk. We find that banks that... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Relying on confidential supervisory data related to the 2016 EU-wide stress test, this paper presents novel empirical evidence that supervisory scrutiny associated to stress testing has a disciplining effect on bank risk. We find that banks that participated in the 2016 EU-wide stress test subsequently reduced their credit risk relative to banks that were not part of this exercise. Relying on new metrics for supervisory scrutiny that measure the quantity, potential impact, and duration of interactions between banks and supervisors during the stress test, we find that the disciplining effect is stronger for banks subject to more intrusive supervisory scrutiny during the exercise. We also find that a strong risk management culture is a prerequisite for the supervisory scrutiny to be effective. Finally, we show that a similar disciplining effect is not exerted neither by higher capital charges nor by more transparency and related market discipline induced by the stress test

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    Schriftenreihe: Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper ; No. 22-59, 2022
    Schlagworte: Stress Testing; Credit risk; Internal Models; Banking Supervision; banking regulation
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (67 p)
    Bemerkung(en):

    Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments July 28, 2022 erstellt
  9. Window dressing of regulatory metrics
    evidence from repo markets
    Autor*in: Bassi, Claudio; Behn, Markus; Grill, Michael; Waibel, Martin
    Erschienen: [2023]
    Verlag:  European Central Bank, Frankfurt am Main, Germany

    This paper investigates both the magnitude and the drivers of bank window dressing behaviour in euro-denominated repo markets. Using a confidential transaction-level data set, our analysis illustrates that banks engineer an economically sizeable... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 534
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    This paper investigates both the magnitude and the drivers of bank window dressing behaviour in euro-denominated repo markets. Using a confidential transaction-level data set, our analysis illustrates that banks engineer an economically sizeable contraction in their repo transactions around regulatory reporting dates. We establish a causal link between these reductions and banks' incentives to window dress and document the role of the leverage ratio and the G-SIB framework as the most relevant drivers of window dressing behaviour. Our findings suggest that regulatory action is warranted to limit banks' ability to window dress.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9789289955133
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/278342
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series / European Central Bank ; no 2771 (February 2023)
    Schlagworte: banking regulation; window dressing; repo markets; leverage ratio; G-SIBs
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 61 Seiten), Illustrationen
  10. Can it be prevented this time?
    the role of profits in banking regulation
    Autor*in: Esposito, Lorenzo; Mastromatteo, Giuseppe
    Erschienen: June 2023
    Verlag:  Levy Economics Institute, Annandale-on-Hudson, NY

    Since the nineties, crises have punctuated financial markets, shattering the conventional wisdom about how these markets work and how to regulate them, and forcing a deep rethinking of the supervisory framework that, however, did not change much of... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 88
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Since the nineties, crises have punctuated financial markets, shattering the conventional wisdom about how these markets work and how to regulate them, and forcing a deep rethinking of the supervisory framework that, however, did not change much of the banks’ behavior and incentives. In particular, banking regulation did not face the nexus profitability-riskiness. Based on Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis, we discuss the literature on banks’ profitability and its relation to the originate-to-distribute model. We also propose a different strategy for banking regulation, based on a profitability cap that prevents financial innovation from overwhelming supervision. Finally, we discuss the data for the US case, confirming the importance of profitability as a signal of incoming troubles and the possibility of using the profitability cap to greatly simplify banking regulation.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/283212
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / Levy Economics Institute of Bard College ; no. 1021
    Schlagworte: banking regulation; financial stability; Minsky; Basel 3; profitability
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 32 Seiten), Illustrationen
  11. Bank regulation and sovereign risk
    a paradox
    Autor*in: Afonso, António; Teixeira, André
    Erschienen: May 2023
    Verlag:  CESifo, Munich, Germany

    This paper investigates the impact of banking prudential regulation on sovereign risk. We show that prudential regulation reduces sovereign risk and induces governments to spend more. As a result, countries with tight prudential regulation have lower... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 63
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    This paper investigates the impact of banking prudential regulation on sovereign risk. We show that prudential regulation reduces sovereign risk and induces governments to spend more. As a result, countries with tight prudential regulation have lower primary budget balances and accumulate more government debt over time. We find that prudential regulation reduces private debt, while paradoxically increasing government debt. We explore several explanations for this paradox. Our results suggest that prudential regulation enables governments to accumulate debt because they improve the nation's credit rating and its borrowing conditions in sovereign bond markets.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/279183
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo working papers ; 10434 (2023)
    Schlagworte: banking regulation; fiscal policy; macroprudential policy; sovereign debt; sovereign risk
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 43 Seiten), Illustrationen
  12. Enough liquidity with enough capital - and vice versa?
    Autor*in: Gersbach, Hans; Haller, Hans; Zelzner, Sebastian
    Erschienen: [2023]
    Verlag:  Center for Financial Studies, Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, Germany

    We study the interplay of capital and liquidity regulation in a general equilibrium setting by focusing on future funding risks. The model consists of a banking sector with long-term illiquid investment opportunities that need to be financed by... mehr

    Zugang:
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 108
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We study the interplay of capital and liquidity regulation in a general equilibrium setting by focusing on future funding risks. The model consists of a banking sector with long-term illiquid investment opportunities that need to be financed by short-term debt and by issuing equity. Reliance on refinancing long-term investment in the middle of the life-time is risky, since the next generation of potential short-term debt holders may not be willing to provide funding when the return prospects on the long-term investment turn out to be bad. For moderate return risk, equilibria with and without bank default coexist, and bank default is a self-fulfilling prophecy. Capital and liquidity regulation can prevent bank default and may implement the first-best. Yet the former is more powerful in ruling out undesirable equilibria and thus dominates liquidity regulation. Adding liquidity regulation to optimal capital regulation is redundant.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/278736
    Schriftenreihe: CFS working paper series ; no. 714
    Schlagworte: financial intermediation; funding risk; bank default; banking regulation; liquidity requirements; capital requirements
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 62 Seiten), Illustrationen
  13. Do market-based networks reflect true exposures between banks?
    Autor*in: Craig, Ben R.; Karamysheva, Madina; Salakhova, Dilyara
    Erschienen: [2023]
    Verlag:  European Central Bank, Frankfurt am Main, Germany

    We compare networks constructed using five commonly used methods and publicly available daily market data to networks based on reported exposures along several dimensions of the balance sheet, i.e., loans, bonds, equity. Our findings suggest that... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 534
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We compare networks constructed using five commonly used methods and publicly available daily market data to networks based on reported exposures along several dimensions of the balance sheet, i.e., loans, bonds, equity. Our findings suggest that while the global network structure remains stable, individual exposures are more dynamic. The main message from the regression analysis is that the market-based networks do their job relatively well, however, various market-based networks capture different types of exposures. All the measures reflect common portfolios of bonds and loans. Equity-based measures match better direct and indirect equity, while credit-risk measures capture direct bonds. None of the measures robustly identify direct interbank lending.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9789289962445
    Weitere Identifier:
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series / European Central Bank ; no 2867
    Schlagworte: banking regulation; financial networks; interconnections; market-based networks; true-exposure networks
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 75 Seiten), Illustrationen
  14. Stress test precision and bank competition
    Autor*in: Moreno, Diego; Takalo, Tuomas
    Erschienen: 2 February 2024
    Verlag:  Bank of Finland, Helsinki

    We study a competitive banking sector in which banks choose the level of risk of their asset portfolios and, upon the public disclosure of stress test results, raise funding by promising investors a repayment. We show that competition forces banks to... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 685
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We study a competitive banking sector in which banks choose the level of risk of their asset portfolios and, upon the public disclosure of stress test results, raise funding by promising investors a repayment. We show that competition forces banks to choose risky assets so as to promise investors high repayments, and to gamble on favorable stress test results. Increasing stress test precision increases banks' asset riskiness but also improves allocative efficiency. When risk taking is not too sensitive to the precision of information, maximal transparency maximizes both stability and surplus. In contrast, when banks exercise market power assets are less risky, while opacity maximizes banks' stability and, when the social cost of bank failure is sufficiently large, the surplus as well. Our results in overall highlight the need to take into account the structure of banking industry when designing stress tests.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/281999
    Schriftenreihe: Bank of Finland research discussion papers ; 2024, 3
    Schlagworte: financial stability; stress tests; bank transparency; banking regulation; bank competition
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 19 Seiten)
  15. Bail-in and legacy assets
    harmonized rules for targeted partial compensation to strengthen the bail-in regime
    Autor*in: Poyntner, Philipp; Reininger, Thomas
    Erschienen: 2018
    Verlag:  OeNB, Oesterreichische Nationalbank, Vienna, Austria

    Zugang:
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/264816
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / OeNB, Oesterreichische Nationalbank ; 224
    Schlagworte: banking regulation; bail-in; retail holders; consumer protection; income distribution; HFCS
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 36 Seiten), Illustrationen
  16. Regulation and rational banking bubbles in infinite horizon
    Autor*in: Chevallier, Claire Océane; El Joueidi, Sarah
    Erschienen: October, 2016
    Verlag:  Center for Research in Economics and Management, University of Luxembourg, Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance, Luxembourg

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; 2016, 15
    Schlagworte: Banking bubbles; banking regulation; DSGE; infinitely lived agents; multiple equilibria; Value-at-Risk
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 41 Seiten), Illustrationen
  17. Profitability, valuation and resilience of global banks
    a tight link
    Autor*in: Caparusso, John; Lewrick, Ulf; Tarashev, Nikola A.
    Erschienen: November 2023
    Verlag:  Bank for International Settlements, Monetary and Economic Department, [Basel]

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VS 546
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: BIS working papers ; no 1144
    Schlagworte: Financial stability; price-to-book ratio; banking regulation
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 28 Seiten), Illustrationen