Direkt zur Hauptnavigation springen Direkt zum Inhalt springen
info(at)avldigital.remove-this.de
Deutsch English
Letzte Suchanfragen

Ergebnisse für *

Zeige Ergebnisse 1 bis 16 von 16.

  1. Shadow insurance?
    money market fund investors and bank sponsorship
    Autor*in: Jacewitz, Stefan; Unal, Haluk; Wu, Chengjun
    Erschienen: 2021
    Verlag:  Federal Research Bank of Kansas City, Kansas City, Mo.

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VS 359
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    Schriftenreihe: KcFED research working papers ; RWP 21, 07 (August 2021)
    Schlagworte: Geldmarktfonds; Institutioneller Investor; Bank; Informeller Finanzsektor; Fondskosten; USA; bank; bank holding company; bank run; financial crisis; liquidity risk; money market fund; systemic risk; too big to fail
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 55 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Bank Runs, Fragility, and Credit Easing
    Autor*in: Amador, Manuel; Bianchi, Javier
    Erschienen: 2021
    Verlag:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass

    We present a tractable dynamic macroeconomic model of self-fulfilling bank runs. A bank is vulnerable to a run when a loss of investors' confidence triggers deposit withdrawals and leads the bank to default on its obligations. We analytically... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    Sächsische Landesbibliothek - Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Universitätsbibliothek Freiburg
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Technische Informationsbibliothek (TIB) / Leibniz-Informationszentrum Technik und Naturwissenschaften und Universitätsbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We present a tractable dynamic macroeconomic model of self-fulfilling bank runs. A bank is vulnerable to a run when a loss of investors' confidence triggers deposit withdrawals and leads the bank to default on its obligations. We analytically characterize how the vulnerability of an individual bank depends on macroeconomic aggregates and how the number of banks facing a run affects macroeconomic aggregates in turn. In general equilibrium, runs can be partial or complete, depending on aggregate leverage and the dynamics of asset prices. Our normative analysis shows that the effectiveness of credit easing and its welfare implications depend on whether a financial crisis is driven by fundamentals or by self-fulfilling runs

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    Schriftenreihe: NBER working paper series ; no. w29397
    Schlagworte: Bankinsolvenz; Bankenliquidität; Bankenkrise; Finanzkrise; Ankündigungseffekt; Quantitative Lockerung; bank run
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource, illustrations (black and white)
    Bemerkung(en):

    Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
  3. A DeFi bank run
    Iron Finance, IRON stablecoin, and the fall of TITAN
    Autor*in: Kanis Saengchote
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  [Puey Ungphakorn Institute for Economic Research], [Bangkok]

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VS 785
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Auflage/Ausgabe: This version: 19 July 2021
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / Puey Ungphakorn Institute for Economic Research ; no. 155 (July 2021)
    Schlagworte: DeFi; stablecoin; bank run; self-fulfilling panic
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 18 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Who can tell which banks will fail?
    Autor*in: Blickle, Kristian; Brunnermeier, Markus Konrad; Luck, Stephan
    Erschienen: [2022]
    Verlag:  Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York, NY

    We use the German Crisis of 1931, a key event of the Great Depression, to study how depositors behave during a bank run in the absence of deposit insurance. We find that deposits decline by around 20 percent during the run and that there is an equal... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 207
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We use the German Crisis of 1931, a key event of the Great Depression, to study how depositors behave during a bank run in the absence of deposit insurance. We find that deposits decline by around 20 percent during the run and that there is an equal outflow of retail and nonfinancial wholesale deposits from both ex-post failing and surviving banks. This implies that regular depositors are unable to identify failing banks. In contrast, the interbank market precisely identifies which banks will fail: the interbank market collapses for failing banks entirely but continues to function for surviving banks, which can borrow from other banks in response to deposit outflows. Since regular depositors appear uninformed, it is unlikely that deposit insurance would exacerbate moral hazard. Instead, interbank depositors are best positioned for providing "discipline" via short-term funding.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/262055
    Schriftenreihe: Staff reports / Federal Reserve Bank of New York ; no. 1005 (February 2022)
    Schlagworte: bank run; deposit insurance; financial crises
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 74 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. A wake-up call theory of contagion
    Autor*in: Ahnert, Toni; Bertsch, Christoph
    Erschienen: 13 December 2021
    Verlag:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

    Zugang:
    Verlag (lizenzpflichtig)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    LZ 161
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; DP16809
    Schlagworte: wake-up call; Information Choice; financial crises; contagion; bank run; global games; fundamental re-assessment
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 71 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Who Can Tell Which Banks Will Fail?
    Autor*in: Blickle, Kristian; Brunnermeier, Markus Konrad; Luck, Stephan
    Erschienen: 2022
    Verlag:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass

    We use the German Crisis of 1931, a key event of the Great Depression, to study how depositors behave during a bank run in the absence of deposit insurance. We find that deposits decline by around 20% during the run and that there is an equal outflow... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    Sächsische Landesbibliothek - Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Universitätsbibliothek Freiburg
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Technische Informationsbibliothek (TIB) / Leibniz-Informationszentrum Technik und Naturwissenschaften und Universitätsbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We use the German Crisis of 1931, a key event of the Great Depression, to study how depositors behave during a bank run in the absence of deposit insurance. We find that deposits decline by around 20% during the run and that there is an equal outflow of retail and non-financial wholesale deposits from both ex-post failing and surviving banks. This implies that regular depositors are unable to identify failing banks. In contrast, the interbank market precisely identifies which banks will fail: the interbank market collapses for failing banks entirely but continues to function for surviving banks, which can borrow from other banks in response to deposit outflows. Since regular depositors appear uninformed, we argue that it is unlikely that deposit insurance would exacerbate moral hazard. Instead, interbank depositors are best positioned for providing "discipline" via short-term funding

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    Schriftenreihe: NBER working paper series ; no. w29753
    Schlagworte: Wirtschaftskrise; Bankinsolvenz; Bankenkrise; Anlageverhalten; Deutschland (bis 1945); bank run; Bankansturm
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource, illustrations (black and white)
    Bemerkung(en):

    Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
  7. Money under the mattress
    inflation and lending of last resort
    Autor*in: Barlevy, Gadi; Bird, Daniel; Fershtman, Daniel; Weiss, David
    Erschienen: [2022]
    Verlag:  Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, [Chicago, Illinois]

    Central banks create money to lend during credit crunches, which might lead to inflation. We examine whether the two key functions of central banks - price stability and last-resort lending - conflict. We develop a nominal model of bank runs à la... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 244
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Central banks create money to lend during credit crunches, which might lead to inflation. We examine whether the two key functions of central banks - price stability and last-resort lending - conflict. We develop a nominal model of bank runs à la Diamond and Dybvig (1983) in which individuals can store the money they withdraw "under the mattress" or use it to buy assets. This feature allows for lending of last resort without creating inflation. Our analysis also provides a new rationale for the "Bagehot rule": High interest rates prevent inflation, rather than mitigate the risk of lending during credit crunches.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/264328
    Schriftenreihe: [Working paper] / Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago ; WP 2022, 14 (May 3, 2022)
    Schlagworte: Bagehot rule; price-level stability; financial stability; bank run
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 37 Seiten)
  8. Who withdraws first?
    line formation during bank runs
    Autor*in: Kiss, Hubert János; Rodríguez-Lara, Ismael; Rosa-Garcia, Alfonso
    Erschienen: 4-2022
    Verlag:  Chapman University, Economic Science Institute, [Orange, CA]

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: ESI working papers ; 22, 04
    Schlagworte: bank run; beliefs; experimental economics; line formation; loss aversion; observability
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 108 Seiten), Illustrationen
  9. Bank runs, bank competition and opacity
    Autor*in: Ahnert, Toni; Martinez-Miera, David
    Erschienen: December 2020
    Verlag:  Verein für Socialpolitik, [Köln]

    We model asset opacity and deposit rate choices of banks who imperfectly compete for uninsured deposits, are subject to runs, and face a threat of entry. Higher competition increases deposit rates and bank fragility, resulting in an intermediate... mehr

    Zugang:
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DSM 13
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We model asset opacity and deposit rate choices of banks who imperfectly compete for uninsured deposits, are subject to runs, and face a threat of entry. Higher competition increases deposit rates and bank fragility, resulting in an intermediate socially optimal level of bank competition. We provide a novel theory of bank opacity. The cost of opacity is more partial runs by creditors, which induces costly liquidation of investment and lowers current profits. The benefit of opacity is to deter entry of competitors, which increases bank charter value. Banks can be excessively opaque, motivating transparency regulation.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/242348
    Schriftenreihe: Jahrestagung 2021 / Verein für Socialpolitik ; 31
    Schlagworte: Competition; entry; opacity; fragility; bank run; global games; competition policy; transparency regulation
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 46 Seiten), Illustrationen
  10. Money under the mattress
    inflation and lending of last resort
    Autor*in: Barlevy, Gadi; Bird, Daniel; Fershtman, Daniel; Weiss, David
    Erschienen: [2022]
    Verlag:  The Pinhas Sapir Center for Development, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / The Pinhas Sapir Center for Development ; no. 2022, 3
    Schlagworte: Bagehot rule; price-level stability; financial stability; bank run
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 37 Seiten)
  11. Deflation, silent runs, and bank holidays, in the great contraction
    Autor*in: Rockoff, Hugh
    Erschienen: 2003
    Verlag:  NBER, Cambridge, Mass.

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    W 1 (9522)
    Fernleihe:
    uneingeschränkte Fernleihe, Kopie und Ausleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Druck
    RVK Klassifikation: QB 910
    Schriftenreihe: NBER working paper series ; 9522
    Schlagworte: Bankenkrise; Außenwirtschaftliches Gleichgewicht; Bankenliquidität; Bankenregulierung; Bankgeschichte; USA; bank run
    Umfang: 52 S, graph. Darst
    Bemerkung(en):

    Internetausg.: papers.nber.org/papers/w9522.pdf - lizenzpflichtig

    Literaturverz. S. 41 - 44
  12. Deflation, silent runs, and bank holidays, in the great contraction
    preliminary
    Erschienen: 05 Dec. 2002
    Verlag:  Dep. of Economics, Rutgers, the State Univ. of New Jersey, New Brunswick, NJ

    This paper argues that the banking crises in the United States in the early 1930s were similar to the "twin crisesʺ -- banking and balance of payments crises -- which have occurred in developing countries in recent years. The downturn that began in... mehr

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    W 1036 (2003.02)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    This paper argues that the banking crises in the United States in the early 1930s were similar to the "twin crisesʺ -- banking and balance of payments crises -- which have occurred in developing countries in recent years. The downturn that began in 1929 undermined banks that had made risky loans in the twenties. The deflation that followed further weakened the banks, especially in rural areas where deflation in prices and incomes was the greatest. Depositors in those areas began transferring their deposits to banks they regarded as safer, or purchasing bonds. These "silent runs,ʺ essentially a capital flight, have been neglected in many accounts of the banking crises. But evidence from the Gold Settlement Fund (which recorded interregional gold movements) and from regional deposit movements suggests that silent runs were important, especially in the crucial year 1930. When the crisis worsened, state and local authorities began declaring "bank holidays,ʺ which limited the right of depositors to make withdrawals, a movement that culminated in the declaration of a national bank holiday by President Roosevelt. In retrospect the policy advocated periodically by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the purchase of government bonds on the open market, was right for the country as a whole. But a majority of the Governors of the other Federal Reserve Banks were opposed. Some opponents of open market purchases thought they would benefit the stock market without contributing significantly to the revival of business in the interior. The result was a minimalist policy that led to an unprecedented financial and economic collapse.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Auflage/Ausgabe: [Elektronische Ressource]
    Schriftenreihe: Working papers / Department of Economics, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey ; 2003,02
    Schlagworte: Bankenkrise; Außenwirtschaftliches Gleichgewicht; Bankenliquidität; Bankenregulierung; Bankgeschichte; USA; bank run
    Umfang: Online-Ressource, 58 p., text, ill
    Bemerkung(en):

    Gesamttitel von der Homepage
  13. Explaining the life cycle of bank-sponsored money market funds
    an application of the regulatory dialectic
    Autor*in: Jacewitz, Stefan; Pogach, Jonathan; Unal, Haluk; Wu, Chengjun
    Erschienen: [2024]
    Verlag:  Federal Research Bank of Kansas City, Kansas City, Mo.

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VS 359
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    Schriftenreihe: KcFED research working papers ; RWP 24, 01 (February 2024)
    Schlagworte: bank; bank holding company; bank run; financial crisis; liquidity risk; money marketfund; systemic risk; too big to fail
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 41 Seiten), Illustrationen
  14. Investor attention to bank risk during the spring 2023 bank run
    Autor*in: Fischl-Lanzoni, Natalia; Hiti, Martin; Kaplan, Nathan; Sarkar, Asani
    Erschienen: [2024]
    Verlag:  Federal Reserve Bank of New York, [New York, NY]

    We examine how investors' perception of bank balance sheet risk evolved before and during the March-April 2023 bank run. To do so, we estimate the covariance ("beta") of bank excess stock returns with returns on factors constructed from long-short... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 207
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We examine how investors' perception of bank balance sheet risk evolved before and during the March-April 2023 bank run. To do so, we estimate the covariance ("beta") of bank excess stock returns with returns on factors constructed from long-short portfolios sorted on shares of uninsured deposits and unrealized losses on securities. We find that the market's perception of bank risk shifted in both the time series and the cross-section. From January 2022 to February 2023, both factor betas were mostly insignificant, but after the bank run started, they became positive and significant for all banks on average. However, in the cross-section, only the factor betas of banks put on downgrade watch on March 13 were significant, consistent with our finding that this announcement was informative. When additional banks were downgraded in April, their factor betas also became significant, even though we find the April announcements to be noninformative for these banks. We suggest that investors with limited attention focused on the banks included in the April announcements to update their priors on balance sheet risk

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    Schriftenreihe: Staff reports / Federal Reserve Bank of New York ; no. 1095 (April 2024)
    Schlagworte: bank run; information sensitivity; limited attention; balance sheet beta; uninsured deposits; unrealized losses
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 66 Seiten), Illustrationen
  15. Preventing (panic) bank runs
    Autor*in: Kiss, Hubert J.; Rodríguez-Lara, Ismael; Rosa-Garcia, Alfonso
    Erschienen: 2022
    Verlag:  Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Budapest

    Andolfatto et al. (2017) proposes a mechanism to eliminate bank runs that occur as a coordination problem among depositors (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). Building on their work, we conduct a laboratory experiment where we offer depositors the... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 151
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Andolfatto et al. (2017) proposes a mechanism to eliminate bank runs that occur as a coordination problem among depositors (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). Building on their work, we conduct a laboratory experiment where we offer depositors the possibility to relocate their funds to a priority account. We find evidence that the mechanism reduces not only bank runs that occur because of a coordination problem among depositors but also panic bank runs (Kiss et al., 2018) that occur when depositors can observe the action of others.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/282206
    Schriftenreihe: KRTK KTI working papers ; KRTK KTI WP - 2022, 13 (June 2022)
    Schlagworte: bank run; coordination problem; panic behavior; experimental economics; policy tools; financial stability
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 49 Seiten), Illustrationen
  16. How does macroprudential regulation change bank credit supply?
    Autor*in: Kashyap, Anil K.; Tsomocos, Dimitrios P.; Vardoulakis, Alexandros P.
    Erschienen: 2014

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    W 1 (20165)
    Fernleihe:
    uneingeschränkte Fernleihe, Kopie und Ausleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Druck
    Schriftenreihe: NBER working paper series ; 20165
    Schlagworte: Finanzmarktaufsicht; Bankenregulierung; Kreditgeschäft; Bankrisiko; Bankenkrise; Pareto-Optimum; Theorie; bank run
    Umfang: 50 S., graph. Darst.
    Bemerkung(en):

    Parallel als Online-Ausg. erschienen