Direkt zur Hauptnavigation springen Direkt zum Inhalt springen
info(at)avldigital.remove-this.de
Deutsch English
Filtern nach
Aktive Filter
Letzte Suchanfragen

Ergebnisse für *

Zeige Ergebnisse 1 bis 25 von 40.

  1. Competitive procurement with ex post moral hazard
    Autor*in: Chakraborty, Indranil; Khalil, Fahad; Lawarrée, Jacques
    Erschienen: January 2021
    Verlag:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    Unlike standard auctions, we show that competitive procurement may optimally limit competition or use inefficient allocation rules that award the project to a less efficient firm with positive probability. Procurement projects often involve ex post... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 63
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Unlike standard auctions, we show that competitive procurement may optimally limit competition or use inefficient allocation rules that award the project to a less efficient firm with positive probability. Procurement projects often involve ex post moral hazard after the competitive process is over. A procurement mechanism must combine an incentive scheme with the auction to guard against firms bidding low to win the contract and then cutting back on effort. While competition helps reduce the rent of efficient firms, it exacerbates the problem due to moral hazard. If allocative efficiency is a requirement, limiting the number of participants may be optimal. Alternatively, the same incentives can be optimally provided using inefficient allocation rules.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/232460
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo working paper ; no. 8863 (2021)
    Schlagworte: competitive procurement; auctions; moral hazard
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 49 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Procuring survival
    Autor*in: Cappelletti, Matilde; Giuffrida, Leonardo M.
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, Mannheim, Germany

    Public spending (i.e., “G”) enables governments to fulfill their fiscal policies. This paper takes a micro perspective and quantifies the impact of procurement spending - a specific component of G - on firm survival. We find that firms that receive... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 15
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Public spending (i.e., “G”) enables governments to fulfill their fiscal policies. This paper takes a micro perspective and quantifies the impact of procurement spending - a specific component of G - on firm survival. We find that firms that receive public contracts survive longer, ceteris paribus, and that this effect accrues over time, reaching 20 percentage points after ten years. Our results are based on a novel dataset for Italy that combines balance sheet data on the universe of limited liability firms with administrative records on market entry and exit and quasi-universe of public contract data between 2008 and 2018. For construction auctions, we also rely on bid-level data to inform a regression discontinuity analysis. We find that the survival rate of winners relative to marginal losers is 70% higher after 36 months - or after two years and half of the median contract expiration. We explore several alternative channels that could rationalize our findings. We find that recipients do not become more productive, and their earnings become increasingly dependent on sales to public customers.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/247702
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / ZEW ; no. 21, 093 (11/2021)
    Schlagworte: firm survival; firm dynamics; government demand; public procurement; demandshocks; productivity; auctions; regression discontinuity design
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (40 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Curbing price fluctuations in cap-and-trade auctions
    Autor*in: Jeitschko, Thomas D.; Pal, Pallavi
    Erschienen: August 2021
    Verlag:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    In recent years, a significant problem with the carbon credit market has been the higher than initially predicted price volatility. It is essential to study the market in a repeated-period dynamic setting to identify the factors enabling high... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 63
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    In recent years, a significant problem with the carbon credit market has been the higher than initially predicted price volatility. It is essential to study the market in a repeated-period dynamic setting to identify the factors enabling high fluctuations in prices. In this paper, we examine the dynamic auction design and propose a method to curb price volatility through a flexible supply cap. The equilibrium analysis shows that modifying the cap on per period supply can decrease price fluctuations. Currently, the government or the auctioneer sets a per-period limit on the supply, which reduces at a fixed rate over time. However, this paper suggests that a flexible cap on the per-period supply would be a better alternative. Specifically, we show that correlating the supply rate with expected future demand results in a more stable price.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/245447
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo working paper ; no. 9266 (2021)
    Schlagworte: dynamic mechanism design; auctions; emissions permits; environmental regulation; climate change
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 33 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Intermediary liability and trade in follow-on innovation
    Autor*in: Cuntz, Alexander; Sahli, Matthias
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  Université de Neuchâtel, Institute de Recherches Économiques, [Neuchâtel]

    Liability rules affect the incentives of intermediaries to disseminate and curate creative works, in particular when works build on the work of predecessors and they are potentially infringing copyright. In an application to the visual arts, we show... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 615
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Liability rules affect the incentives of intermediaries to disseminate and curate creative works, in particular when works build on the work of predecessors and they are potentially infringing copyright. In an application to the visual arts, we show that appropriation artists borrow images from different sources and incorporate them into new, derivative works of art. By doing so, they risk infringing copyright but also put commercial trade and availability of the work at litigation risk as liability can extend to intermediaries in markets (auction houses) or in public exhibitions (museums). Using a differences-in-differences model and unique data on the level of the individual art work, we empirically investigate the impact of the prominent 2013 Cariou v. Prince U.S. court decision on trade and availability in Appropriation Art.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/265178
    Schriftenreihe: IRENE working paper ; 21, 11
    Schlagworte: copyright; intermediary liability; reuse; appropriation art; auctions
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 51 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design
    Autor*in: Pycia, Marek; Troyan, Peter
    Erschienen: June 2021
    Verlag:  University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich

    We introduce a general class of simplicity standards that vary the foresight abilities required of agents in extensive-form games. Rather than planning for the entire future of a game, agents are presumed to be able to plan only for those histories... mehr

    Zugang:
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 191
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We introduce a general class of simplicity standards that vary the foresight abilities required of agents in extensive-form games. Rather than planning for the entire future of a game, agents are presumed to be able to plan only for those histories they view as simple from their current perspective. Agents may update their so-called strategic plan as the game progresses, and, at any point, for the called-for action to be simply dominant, it must lead to unambiguously better outcomes, no matter what occurs at non-simple histories. We use our gradated approach to simplicity to provide characterizations of simple mechanisms. While more demanding simplicity standards may reduce the flexibility of the designer in some cases, this is not always true, and many well-known mechanisms are simple, including ascending auctions, posted prices, and serial dictatorship-style mechanisms. In particular, we explain the widespread popularity of the well-known Random Priority mechanism by characterizing it as the unique mechanism that is efficient, fair, and simple to play.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/235606
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series / University of Zurich, Department of Economics ; no. 393
    Schlagworte: Extensives Spiel; Mechanismus-Design-Theorie; Spieltheorie; Auktionstheorie; Simplicity; simple dominance; limited foresight; obvious dominance; strongly obvious dominance; market design; mechanism design; extensive-form games; auctions; allocation
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 83 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Auction performance, strategic supply management, and bidder behavior in treasury bill auctions
    evidence from the Philippines
    Autor*in: Mariño, Eduardo Anthony G.; Marszalec, Daniel
    Erschienen: [2020]
    Verlag:  CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo, [Tokyo]

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VS 358
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Auflage/Ausgabe: Revised in September 2020
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; CIRJE-F-1138
    Schlagworte: auctions; discriminatory auction; uniform-price auction; Treasury bills; active supply management; quantity restriction
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 41 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. Teams and individuals in standard auction formats
    decisions and emotions
    Autor*in: Karmeliuk, Maria; Kocher, Martin
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190, Munich, Germany

    Our study compares individual and team bidding in standard auction formats: first-price, second-price and ascending-price (English) auctions with independent private values. In a laboratory experiment, we find that individuals overbid more than teams... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 553
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Our study compares individual and team bidding in standard auction formats: first-price, second-price and ascending-price (English) auctions with independent private values. In a laboratory experiment, we find that individuals overbid more than teams in first-price auctions and deviate more from bidding their own value in second-price auctions. However we observe no difference in bidding behavior in English auctions. Based on control variables, we claim that the observed difference can be explained by better reasoning abilities of teams. Emotions play a role in determining bids, but the effect of emotions on bidding does not differ between individuals and teams.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/233502
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / Rationality & Competition, CRC TRR 190 ; no. 279 (February 26, 2021)
    Schlagworte: auctions; team decision-making; experiment; overbidding
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 43 Seiten), Illustrationen
  8. Team behavior in auctions, reciprocity on markets, and gender bias in student evaluations of teachers
    essays in experimental economics
    Autor*in: Karmeliuk, Maria
    Erschienen: 2021
    Verlag:  Universitätsbibliothek der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, München

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (Array)

    Standort:
    Universitätsbibliothek Braunschweig
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Universitätsbibliothek Clausthal
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Fachhochschule Erfurt, Hochschulbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Technische Universität Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Bibliothek der Hochschule Hannover
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Standort:
    Bibliothek im Kurt-Schwitters-Forum
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Technische Informationsbibliothek (TIB) / Leibniz-Informationszentrum Technik und Naturwissenschaften und Universitätsbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Zentrale Hochschulbibliothek Lübeck
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Leuphana Universität Lüneburg, Medien- und Informationszentrum, Universitätsbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Hochschule Magdeburg-Stendal, Hochschulbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Hochschule Osnabrück, Bibliothek Campus Westerberg
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Hochschule Magdeburg-Stendal, Standort Stendal, Bibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    UB Weimar
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Beteiligt: Kocher, Martin (AkademischeR BetreuerIn)
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Dissertation
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    Schlagworte: auctions; price discrimination; teaching evaluations; experiment
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 159 Seiten), Illustrationen
    Bemerkung(en):

    Dissertation, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, 2021
  9. Universal high-speed broadband provision
    an alternative policy approach
    Autor*in: Wolfstetter, Elmar
    Erschienen: April 2021
    Verlag:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    Millions of citizens and firms lack access to high speed internet, even though governments pledged to spend huge sums of money to subsidize internet networks. In this paper we review some systematic flaws of present subsidy policies and outline a... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 63
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Millions of citizens and firms lack access to high speed internet, even though governments pledged to spend huge sums of money to subsidize internet networks. In this paper we review some systematic flaws of present subsidy policies and outline a promising alternative. We propose that governments should treat the broadband infrastructure as a public responsibility and set up intelligently designed public-private partnerships that fund and temporarily operate the broadband in exchange for collecting service fees and, if necessary, subsidies. Simple “least-present value of revenue” auctions should be used to award all concessions, not only those that require subsidies, and concessions should flexibly revert to public ownership depending on realized revenues. This procurement method is easy to use, immune to strategic manipulations and renegotiations, and has already proven successful in procuring toll-roads and bridges.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/235384
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo working paper ; no. 9014 (2021)
    Schlagworte: public-private partnerships; auctions; universal service auctions; high-speed broadband provision; public finance
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 20 Seiten)
  10. Strategic leaks in first-price auctions and tacit collusion
    the case of spying and counter-spying
    Autor*in: Fan, Cuihong; Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar
    Erschienen: April 2021
    Verlag:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    We analyze strategic leaks due to spying out a rival’s bid in a first-price auction. Such leaks induce sequential bidding, complicated by the fact that the spy may be a counterspy who serves the interests of the spied at bidder and reports... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 63
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We analyze strategic leaks due to spying out a rival’s bid in a first-price auction. Such leaks induce sequential bidding, complicated by the fact that the spy may be a counterspy who serves the interests of the spied at bidder and reports strategically distorted information. This ambiguity about the type of spy gives rise to a non-standard signaling problem where both sender and receiver of messages have private information and the sender has a chance to make an unobserved move. Whereas spying without counterspy exclusively benefits the spying bidder, the potential presence of a counterspy yields a collusive outcome, even if the likelihood that the spy is a counterspy is arbitrarily small. That collusive impact shows up in all equilibria and is strongest in the unique pooling equilibrium which is also the payoff dominant equilibrium.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/235391
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo working paper ; no. 9021 (2021)
    Schlagworte: auctions; tacit collusion; espionage; second-mover advantage; signaling; incomplete information
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 16 Seiten), Illustrationen
  11. On the existence of equilibrium in Bayesian games without complementarities
    Autor*in: Meneghel, Idione; Tourky, Rabee
    Erschienen: August 28, 2019
    Verlag:  Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VS 29
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Cowles Foundation discussion paper ; no. 2190 (August 2019)
    Schlagworte: bayesian games; monotone strategies; pure-strategy equilibrium; auctions
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 28 Seiten), Illustrationen
  12. Morning-fresh: declining prices and the right-to-choose in the Faroe fish market
    Autor*in: Laksá, Sanna; Marszalec, Daniel
    Erschienen: [2020]
    Verlag:  [CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo], [Tokyo]

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VS 358
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Auflage/Ausgabe: Revised in September 2020
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; CIRJE-F-1141
    Schlagworte: auctions; sequential auctions; afternoon effect; declining price anomaly; fish market; right-to-choose auctions
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 14 Seiten), Illustrationen
  13. Optimal information disclosure in auctions
    Autor*in: Bergemann, Dirk; Heumann, Tibor; Morris, Stephen; Sorokin, Constantine; Winter, Eyal
    Erschienen: 04 January 2022
    Verlag:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

    Zugang:
    Verlag (lizenzpflichtig)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    LZ 161
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; DP16858
    Schlagworte: Zweitpreisauktion; Informationsversorgung; Online-Marketing; Theorie; auctions; Second-price auctions; information design; information disclosure; DigitalAdvertising; Conflation
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 25 Seiten), Illustrationen
  14. Reserve prices as signals
    Autor*in: Koska, Onur A.; Stähler, Frank
    Erschienen: February 2022
    Verlag:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    This paper discusses the role of secret versus public reserve prices when bidders’ valuations depend positively on the seller’s private signal. A public reserve price is announced before the auction starts, and a secret reserve price is disclosed... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 63
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    This paper discusses the role of secret versus public reserve prices when bidders’ valuations depend positively on the seller’s private signal. A public reserve price is announced before the auction starts, and a secret reserve price is disclosed after the highest bid has been reached. The public reserve price regime may warrant a distortion as a good seller type may have to increase the reserve price beyond payo˙-maximization in order to be able to credibly signal her type. We introduce and determine a rational signaling equilibrium which adds two domination-based conditions to the belief structure of a weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium. We show that a secret (public) reserve price design qualifies as an equilibrium if the distortion is large (small).

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/252098
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo working paper ; no. 9581 (2022)
    Schlagworte: auctions; interdependent values; optimal reserve prices; rational signaling
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 29 Seiten), Illustrationen
  15. Technology neutral vs. technology specific procurement
    Autor*in: Fabra, Natalia; Montero, Juan-Pablo
    Erschienen: [2022]
    Verlag:  MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research, Cambridge, MA, USA

    An imperfectly-informed regulator needs to procure multiple units of some good (e.g., green energy, market liquidity, pollution reduction, land conservation) that can be produced with heterogeneous technologies at various costs. How should she... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    ZSS 39
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    An imperfectly-informed regulator needs to procure multiple units of some good (e.g., green energy, market liquidity, pollution reduction, land conservation) that can be produced with heterogeneous technologies at various costs. How should she optimally procure these units? Should she run technology specific or technology neutral auctions? Should she allow for partial separation across technologies? Should she instead post separate prices for each technology? What are the trade-offs involved? We find that one size does not fit all: the preferred instrument depends on the costs of the available technologies, their degree of substitutability, the extent of information asymmetry, and the costs of public funds. We illustrate the use of our theory for policy analysis with an ex-ante evaluation of Spain's recent renewable auction.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series / MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research ; 2022, 005 (March 2022)
    Schlagworte: public procurement; auctions; quantity regulation; price regulation; third-degree price discrimination; market power
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 48 Seiten), Illustrationen
  16. The cost of uncoupling GB interconnectors
    Autor*in: Guo, Bowei; Newbery, David M. G.
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics, Cambridge

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VSP 1362
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    Schriftenreihe: Cambridge working paper in economics ; 2118
    EPRG working paper ; 2102
    Schlagworte: Electricity trading; Market coupling; auctions; price forecasting
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 36 Seiten), Illustrationen
  17. Designing an incentive-compatible efficient renewable electricity support scheme
    Autor*in: Newbery, David M. G.
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics, Cambridge

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VSP 1362
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    Schriftenreihe: Cambridge working paper in economics ; 2128
    EPRG working paper ; 2107
    Schlagworte: renewables support schemes; distortions; auctions; yardstick contracts
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 30 Seiten), Illustrationen
  18. Designing efficient renewable electricity support schemes
    Autor*in: Newbery, David M. G.
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics, Cambridge

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VSP 1362
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    Schriftenreihe: Cambridge working paper in economics ; 2128
    EPRG working paper ; 2107
    Schlagworte: renewables support schemes; distortions; auctions; yardstick contracts
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 23 Seiten), Illustrationen
  19. Discriminatory auction design for renewable energy
    Autor*in: Kröger, Mats; Neuhoff, Karsten; Richstein, Jörn C.
    Erschienen: 2022
    Verlag:  DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, Berlin

    Designing auctions that favor low resource quality installations allows countries to geographically diversify their renewable energy production, while lowering payments to low-cost producers. In this paper, we develop a stylized model showing that a... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 14
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Designing auctions that favor low resource quality installations allows countries to geographically diversify their renewable energy production, while lowering payments to low-cost producers. In this paper, we develop a stylized model showing that a discriminatory auction design favoring low-wind-yield locations leads to a tradeoff between production costs and producer rent and that the scheme can lower consumer costs even without considering the positive externalities of distributed generation. We explore the influence of the heterogeneity of production costs, the strength of the adjustment, and the regulator’s knowledge about cost structures. Through a numerical analysis of the German reference yield model, we estimate that at current auction levels intra-technology discrimination through the reference yield model leads to a reduction of consumer costs of around 24.8 billion Euro or 13% between 2023 and 2030.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/263156
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion papers / Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung ; 2013
    Schlagworte: climate policy; auctions; renewable energy; onshore wind power; reference yield model
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 43 Seiten), Illustrationen
  20. Market effects of sponsored search auctions
    Autor*in: Motta, Massimo; Penta, Antonio
    Erschienen: [2022]
    Verlag:  BSE, Barcelona School of Economics, [Barcelona]

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VS 541
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: BSE working paper ; 1356 (June 2022)
    Schlagworte: digital advertising; auctions; oligopoly; Search Engines; brands; Horizontal agreements
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 40 Seiten), Illustrationen
  21. Screening adaptive cartels
    Autor*in: Ortner, Juan; Chassang, Sylvain; Kawai, Kei; Nakabayashi, Jun
    Erschienen: [2022]
    Verlag:  Benjamin H. Griswold III, Class of 1933, Center for Economic Policy Studies, Department of Economics, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / Griswold Center for Economic Policy Studies ; no. 300 (June 2022)
    Schlagworte: collusion; auctions; bidding rings; cartels; procurement; antitrust
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 41 Seiten), Illustrationen
  22. Market effects of sponsored search auctions
    Autor*in: Motta, Massimo; Penta, Antonio
    Erschienen: June 2022
    Verlag:  Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Department of Economics and Business, Barcelona

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VS 574
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Economics working paper series ; no. 1844
    Schlagworte: digital advertising; auctions; oligopoly; Search Engines; brands; Horizontal agreements
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 40 Seiten), Illustrationen
  23. Curbing price fluctuations in cap-and-trade auctions
    Autor*in: Jeitschko, Thomas D.; Pal, Pallavi
    Erschienen: September 2022
    Verlag:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    In recent years, a significant problem with the carbon credit market has been higher than initially predicted price volatility. It is essential to study the market in a repeated-period dynamic setting to identify the factors enabling high... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 63
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    In recent years, a significant problem with the carbon credit market has been higher than initially predicted price volatility. It is essential to study the market in a repeated-period dynamic setting to identify the factors enabling high fluctuations in prices. In this paper, we examine the dynamic auction design and propose a method to curb price volatility through a flexible supply cap. The equilibrium analysis shows that modifying the cap on per period supply can decrease price fluctuations. Currently, the government or the auctioneer sets a per-period limit on the supply, which reduces at a fixed rate over time. However, this paper suggests that a flexible cap on the per-period supply would be a better alternative. Specifically, we show that correlating the supply rate with expected future demand results in a more stable price.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/266013
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo working paper ; no. 9978 (2022)
    Schlagworte: dynamic mechanism design; auctions; emissions permits; environmental regulation; climate change
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 36 Seiten), Illustrationen
  24. Market effects of sponsored search auctions
    Autor*in: Motta, Massimo; Penta, Antonio
    Erschienen: September 2022
    Verlag:  [Toulouse School of Economics], [Toulouse]

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VS 330
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Working papers / Toulouse School of Economics ; no 1370
    Schlagworte: Digital advertising; auctions; oligopoly; search engines; brands; horizontal agreements
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 40 Seiten), Illustrationen
  25. Institutional and macroeconomic stability mediate the effect of auctions on renewable energy capacity
    Autor*in: Mac Clay, Pablo; Börner, Jan; Sellare, Jorge Luis
    Erschienen: December 2022
    Verlag:  Zentrum für Entwicklungsforschung (ZEF), Center for Development Research, Bonn

    Decarbonizing the global energy matrix through investments in renewable energy (RE) is considered a pathway to mitigate the effects of global climate change. Auctions have become an increasingly popular policy instrument for this purpose. In the last... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 48
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Decarbonizing the global energy matrix through investments in renewable energy (RE) is considered a pathway to mitigate the effects of global climate change. Auctions have become an increasingly popular policy instrument for this purpose. In the last few years, auctions have been rapidly adopted by low- and middle-income countries due to their flexibility and several theoretical advantages to mitigate risks deriving from poor business environments. Previous research has used data from higher-income countries and two-way fixed effects models to estimate the effects of auctions on RE capacity, mostly with favorable results. However, none of these studies accounted for heterogeneous treatment effects across units to explore whether auctions are effective in countries with unstable business environments. Here we analyze if auctions can foster RE in countries facing macroeconomic instability or poor institutional quality. For this purpose, we have drawn from multiple publicly available databases to build a panel dataset covering 98 countries for the period 2000-2020. Our definition of RE includes solar, wind, and biomass sources. We show results for each RE source separately and all of them combined. We first cluster countries in terms of the quality of their business environment and then perform a differences-in-differences analysis considering staggered treatment adoption. Our results show that auctions positively affect RE capacity, but average treatment effects are higher for countries with better business environments. Thus, caution is needed in adopting this instrument, especially in countries exposed to macroeconomic or institutional instability. At the same time, dynamic treatment effects suggest that the policy needs time to show results.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/268099
    Schriftenreihe: ZEF-discussion papers on development policy ; no. 323
    Schlagworte: renewable energy; auctions; policy evaluation; difference-in-differences; causal inference
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 49 Seiten), Illustrationen