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  1. (In)efficient repo markets
    Autor*in: Dieler, Tobias; Mancini, Loriano; Schürhoff, Norman
    Erschienen: 2021
    Verlag:  Swiss Finance Institute, Geneva

    Repo markets trade off the efficient allocation of liquidity in the financial sector with resilience to funding shocks. The repo trading and clearing mechanisms are crucial determinants of the allocation-resilience tradeoff. The two common... mehr

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    Repo markets trade off the efficient allocation of liquidity in the financial sector with resilience to funding shocks. The repo trading and clearing mechanisms are crucial determinants of the allocation-resilience tradeoff. The two common mechanisms, anonymous central-counterparty (CCP) and non-anonymous over-the-counter (OTC) markets, are inefficient and their welfare rankings depend on funding tightness. CCP (OTC) markets inefficiently liquidate high (low) quality assets for large (small) funding shocks. Two innovations to repo market design contribute to maximize welfare: a liquidity-contingent trading mechanism and a two-tiered guarantee fund

     
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    Schriftenreihe: Research paper series / Swiss Finance Institute ; no 21, 10
    Schlagworte: repo market; funding run; nancial stability; asymmetric information; central clearing; novation; guarantee fund; collateral
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 68 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Equilibrium in incomplete markets with differential information
    a basic model of generic existence
    Autor*in: Boisdeffre, Lionel de
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne, Paris

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    Schriftenreihe: Documents de travail du Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne ; 2021, 08
    Schlagworte: sequential equilibrium; temporary equilibrium; perfect foresight; existence; rational expectations; financial markets; asymmetric information; arbitrage
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 36 Seiten)
  3. Dropping rational expectations
    Autor*in: Boisdeffre, Lionel de
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne, Paris

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    Schriftenreihe: Documents de travail du Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne ; 2021, 09
    Schlagworte: sequential equilibrium; temporary equilibrium; perfect foresight; existence; rational expectations; financial markets; asymmetric information; arbitrage
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 24 Seiten)
  4. Dropping the Cass trick and extending Cass' theorem to asymmetric information and restricted participation
    Autor*in: Boisdeffre, Lionel de
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne, Paris

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    Schriftenreihe: Documents de travail du Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne ; 2021, 10
    Schlagworte: sequential equilibrium; perfect foresight; existence of equilibrium; rational expectations; incomplete markets; asymmetric information; arbitrage
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 22 Seiten)
  5. Unconventional credit policy in an economy under Zero Lower Bound
    = Política creditica no convencional en una economía con límite inferior de cero en la tasa de política monetaria
    Autor*in: Pozo, Jorge; Rojas, Youel
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  [Banco Central de Reserva del Perú], [Lima, Peru]

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    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series / Banco Central de Reserva del Perú ; DT. no. 2021, 005 (agosto 2021)
    Schlagworte: Unconventional credit policy; asymmetric information; moral hazard; zero Lower bound
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 47 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. An economic theory of labor discrimination
    Autor*in: Vallejo, Hernan
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  CEDE, Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Económico, Bogotá, D.C., Colombia

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    Schriftenreihe: Documento CEDE ; 2021, 12 (marzo de 2021)
    Schlagworte: Monopsony; labor discrimination; asymmetric information; self-selection; adverseselection; market power
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 22 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. The heterogeneous impact of referrals on labor market outcomes
    Autor*in: Lester, Benjamin; Rivers, David A.; Topa, Giorgio
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York, NY

    We document a new set of facts regarding the impact of referrals on labor market outcomes. Our results highlight the importance of distinguishing between different types of referrals-those from family and friends and those from business contacts-and... mehr

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    We document a new set of facts regarding the impact of referrals on labor market outcomes. Our results highlight the importance of distinguishing between different types of referrals-those from family and friends and those from business contacts-and different occupations. Then we develop an on-the-job search model that incorporates referrals and calibrate the model to key moments in the data. The calibrated model yields new insights into the roles played by different types of referrals in the match formation process, and provides quantitative estimates of the effects of referrals on employment, earnings, output, and inequality.

     
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    hdl: 10419/247910
    Schriftenreihe: Staff reports / Federal Reserve Bank of New York ; no. 987 (October 2021)
    Schlagworte: labor markets; referrals; networks; search theory; asymmetric information
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 52 Seiten)
  8. Equilibrium CEO contract with belief heterogeneity
    Autor*in: Bianchi, Milo; Dana, Rose-Anne; Jouini, Elyès
    Erschienen: April 2021
    Verlag:  Toulouse School of Economics, [Toulouse]

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    Schriftenreihe: Working papers / Toulouse School of Economics ; no 1253
    Schlagworte: heterogeneous beliefs; asymmetric information; manager-shareholders equilibrium
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 39 Seiten), Illustrationen
  9. Insider trading regulation and shorting constraints
    evaluating the joint effects of two market interventions
    Autor*in: Merl, Robert; Stöckl, Thomas; Palan, Stefan
    Erschienen: July 20, 2021
    Verlag:  University of Graz, School of Business, Economics and Social Sciences, [Graz]

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    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / School of Business, Economics and Social Sciences, University of Graz ; 2021, 03
    Schlagworte: insider trading; short positions; regulation; asset market; asymmetric information; experiment
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 36 Seiten), Illustrationen
  10. Literature review of experimental asset markets with insiders
    Autor*in: Merl, Robert
    Erschienen: July 26, 2021
    Verlag:  University of Graz, School of Business, Economics and Social Sciences, [Graz]

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    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / School of Business, Economics and Social Sciences, University of Graz ; 2021, 04
    Schlagworte: experiment; asset market; insider trading; asymmetric information
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 39 Seiten)
  11. Estimating firms' bank-switching costs
    Autor*in: Liaudinskas, Karolis; Grigaitė, Kristina
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  Norges Bank, Oslo

    We explore Lithuanian credit register data and two bank closures to provide a novel estimate of firms' bank-switching costs and a novel identification of the hold-up problem. We show that when a distressed bank's closure forced firms to switch, these... mehr

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    We explore Lithuanian credit register data and two bank closures to provide a novel estimate of firms' bank-switching costs and a novel identification of the hold-up problem. We show that when a distressed bank's closure forced firms to switch, these firms started borrowing at lower interest rates immediately and permanently. This suggests that firms were held up and overcharged exante, and reveals the lower bound of their ex-ante switching costs. Opaquer firms were overcharged more, which suggests that information asymmetries significantly contribute to switching costs. In line with banks' reputational concerns, a healthy bank's closure revealed no overcharging. To policy-makers, our results suggest potential benefits of distressed banks' closures.

     
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    ISBN: 9788283791952
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    hdl: 11250/2758398
    hdl: 10419/246125
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / Norges Bank ; 2021, 4
    Schlagworte: switching costs; lending relationships; hold-up; asymmetric information; bank closures; financial distress
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 57 Seiten), Illustrationen
  12. Specialization in banking
    Autor*in: Blickle, Kristian; Parlatore, Cecilia; Saunders, Anthony
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York, NY

    Using highly detailed data on the loan portfolios of large U.S. banks, we document that these banks "specialize" by concentrating their lending disproportionately into one industry. This specialization improves a bank’s industry-specific knowledge... mehr

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    Using highly detailed data on the loan portfolios of large U.S. banks, we document that these banks "specialize" by concentrating their lending disproportionately into one industry. This specialization improves a bank’s industry-specific knowledge and allows it to offer generous loan terms to borrowers, especially to firms with access to alternate sources of funding and during periods of greater nonbank lending. Superior industry-specific knowledge is further reflected in better loan and, ultimately, bank performance. Banks concentrate more on their primary industry in times of instability and relatively lower Tier 1 capital. Finally, specialization counteracts a well-documented trend in reduced lending by large banks to opaque small and medium-sized enterprises.

     
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    Schriftenreihe: Staff reports / Federal Reserve Bank of New York ; no. 967 (May 2021)
    Schlagworte: bank specialization; bank concentration; asymmetric information; loan performance; bank performance
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 60 Seiten), Illustrationen
  13. Unconventional credit policy in an economy with supply and demand credit frictions
    Autor*in: Pozo, Jorge; Rojas, Youel
    Erschienen: [2020]
    Verlag:  [Banco Central de Reserva del Perú], [Lima, Peru]

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    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series / Banco Central de Reserva del Perú ; DT. no. 2020, 014 (diciembre 2020)
    Schlagworte: Credit policy; asymmetric information; moral hazard; seniority level
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 74 Seiten), Illustrationen
  14. Unconventional credit policy in an economy under zero lower bound
    Autor*in: Pozo, Jorge; Rojas, Youel
    Erschienen: July 2021
    Verlag:  Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, International Economics Department, Geneva, Switzerland

    In this paper we develop a simple two-period model that reconciles credit demand and supply frictions. In this stylized but realistic model credit and deposit markets are interlinked and credit demand and credit supply frictions amplify each other in... mehr

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    In this paper we develop a simple two-period model that reconciles credit demand and supply frictions. In this stylized but realistic model credit and deposit markets are interlinked and credit demand and credit supply frictions amplify each other in such a way that produces in equilibrium very low levels of credit and stronger reductions of the real and nominal interest, so an economy is much closer to the ZLB. However, an unconventional credit policy, that consists on central bank loans to firms that are guaranteed by the government, can undo partially the effects of the credit frictions and prevents the economy from reaching the ZLB. Since central bank loans are not subject to the moral hazard problem between bankers and depositors and are government-guaranteed, credit market interventions rise aggregate credit supply and positively affect the aggregate credit demand, respectively. However, once the economy is at the ZLB the effect of a credit policy is reduced due to a relatively stronger inflation reduction, which in turn reduces entrepreneurs' incentives to demand bank loans.

     
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    hdl: 10419/238105
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series / Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, International Economics Department ; no. HEIDWP2021, 14
    Schlagworte: Unconventional credit policy; asymmetric information; moral hazard; zero Lower bound
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 43 Seiten), Illustrationen
  15. Price discovery and gains from trade in asset markets with insider trading
    Autor*in: Brünner, Tobias; Levínský, René
    Erschienen: 2020
    Verlag:  Verein für Socialpolitik, [Köln]

    The present study contributes to the ongoing debate on possible costs and benefits of insider trading. We present a novel call auction model with insider information. Our model predicts that more insider information improves informational efficiency... mehr

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    The present study contributes to the ongoing debate on possible costs and benefits of insider trading. We present a novel call auction model with insider information. Our model predicts that more insider information improves informational efficiency of prices, but this comes at the expense of reduced gains from trade. The model further implies that in the presence of insider information the call auction performs worse than continuous double auction. Testing these hypotheses in the lab we find that insider information increases informational efficiency of call auction prices but does not decrease the realized gains from trade. Contrary to the theoretical prediction, the call auction does not perform worse than the continuous double auction. In fact, when the probability of insider information is high, the call auction has the most informative prices and highest realized gains from trade. Our experiment provides new evidence, from markets with very asymmetrically dispersed information, that lends support to the decision by many stock exchanges to use call auctions when information asymmetries are severe and the need for accurate prices is large, e.g., at the open or close of the trading day.

     
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    hdl: 10419/224618
    Schriftenreihe: Jahrestagung 2020 / Verein für Socialpolitik ; 113
    Schlagworte: call market; call auction; double auction; asymmetric information; experiment; informational efficiency
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 26 Seiten), Illustrationen
  16. Cheap talk is not cheap: free versus costly communication
    Autor*in: Aghadadashli, Hamid; Kirchsteiger, Georg; Legros, Patrick
    Erschienen: February 2021
    Verlag:  ECARES, Brussels, Belgium

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    hdl: 2013/ULB-DIPOT:oai:dipot.ulb.ac.be:2013/319773
    Auflage/Ausgabe: This version: February 23, 2021
    Schriftenreihe: ECARES working paper ; 2021, 07
    Schlagworte: credible communication; asymmetric information; coordination
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 55 Seiten), Illustrationen
  17. Inefficiency and regulation in credence goods markets with altruistic experts
    Autor*in: Farukh, Razi; Kerkhof, Anna; Loebbing, Jonas
    Erschienen: February 2020
    Verlag:  Verein für Socialpolitik, [Köln]

    We study a credence goods problem - that is, a moral hazard problem with non-contractible outcome - where altruistic experts (the agents) care both about their income and the utility of consumers (the principals). Experts' preferences over income and... mehr

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    We study a credence goods problem - that is, a moral hazard problem with non-contractible outcome - where altruistic experts (the agents) care both about their income and the utility of consumers (the principals). Experts' preferences over income and their consumers' utility are convex, such that experts care less for consumers when their financial situation is bad. In a market setting with multiple consumers per expert, a cross-consumer externality arises: one consumer's payment raises the expert's income, which makes the non-selfish part of preferences more important and thereby induces the expert to provide higher quality services to all consumers. The externality renders the market outcome inefficient. Price regulation partially overcomes this inefficiency and Pareto-improves upon the market outcome. If market entry of experts is endogenous, price regulation should be accompanied by licensing arrangements that cap the number of experts in the market. Our theory provides a novel rationale for the wide-spread use of price regulation and licensing in real-world markets for expert services.

     
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    hdl: 10419/224590
    Schriftenreihe: Jahrestagung 2020 / Verein für Socialpolitik ; 82
    Schlagworte: altruism; asymmetric information; common agency; credence goods,expert services; externality; inefficiency; moral hazard; regulation
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 40 Seiten), Illustrationen
  18. Shareholder heterogeneity, asymmetric information, and the equilibrium manager
    Autor*in: Bianchi, Milo; Dana, Rose-Anne; Jouini, Elyès
    Erschienen: January 2021
    Verlag:  Toulouse School of Economics, [Toulouse]

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    Schriftenreihe: Working papers / Toulouse School of Economics ; no 1181
    Schlagworte: heterogeneous shareholders; asymmetric information; manager-shareholders equilibrium
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 49 Seiten)
  19. Estimation procedure for "price formation in call actions with insider information"
    Autor*in: Brünner, Tobias
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  Lincoln International Business School, University of Lincoln, Lincoln

    This note provides the details of the estimation procedure in Br¨unner (2019). In Section 2 we derive the posterior distribution. Section 3 describes the MCMC algorithm used to obtain draws from the posterior distribution and in Section 4 we present... mehr

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    This note provides the details of the estimation procedure in Br¨unner (2019). In Section 2 we derive the posterior distribution. Section 3 describes the MCMC algorithm used to obtain draws from the posterior distribution and in Section 4 we present the method for our model check. We conclude with a presentation of the estimation results.

     
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    hdl: 10419/233813
    Schriftenreihe: LEAF working paper series ; no. 21, 01
    Schlagworte: transaction cost; call market; asymmetric information; Bayesian econometrics; Monte Carlo Markov Chain algorithm
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  20. Double marginalization and vertical integration
    Autor*in: Choné, Philippe; Linnemer, Laurent; Vergé, Thibaud
    Erschienen: March 2021
    Verlag:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    Asymmetric information in procurement entails double marginalization. The phenomenon is most severe when the buyer has all the bargaining power at the production stage, while it vanishes when the buyer and suppliers' weights are balanced. Vertical... mehr

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    Asymmetric information in procurement entails double marginalization. The phenomenon is most severe when the buyer has all the bargaining power at the production stage, while it vanishes when the buyer and suppliers' weights are balanced. Vertical integration eliminates double marginalization and reduces the likelihood that the buyer purchases from independent suppliers. Conditional on market foreclosure, the probability that final consumers are harmed is positive only if the buyer has more bargaining power when selecting suppliers than when negotiating over quantities and intermediate prices. The buyer’s and consumers' interests are otherwise aligned.

     
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    hdl: 10419/235341
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo working paper ; no. 8971 (2021)
    Schlagworte: antitrust policy; vertical merger; asymmetric information; bargaining; double marginalization; procurement mechanism
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 44 Seiten), Illustrationen
  21. The informational value of environmental taxes
    Autor*in: Ambec, Stefan; Coria, Jessica
    Erschienen: September 2019
    Verlag:  Department of Economics, Göteborg University, Göteborg

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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 2077/61743
    Schriftenreihe: Working papers in economics ; no. 774
    Schlagworte: pollution; externalities; asymmetric information; environmental regulation; tax; standards; multiple policies; ratchet effect; nitrogen oxides
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 37 Seiten), Illustrationen
  22. Nonlinear pricing in oligopoly: how brand preferences shape market outcomes
    Autor*in: Gomes, Renato; Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie; Maestri, Lucas Jóver
    Erschienen: March 2022
    Verlag:  [Toulouse School of Economics], [Toulouse]

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    Auflage/Ausgabe: This version: 21/01/2022
    Schriftenreihe: Working papers / Toulouse School of Economics ; no 1326
    Schlagworte: competition; price discrimination; asymmetric information; preference correlation; price dispersion
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 55 Seiten), Illustrationen
  23. Opportunity and inequality across generations
    Autor*in: Koeniger, Winfried; Zanella, Carlo
    Erschienen: February 2022
    Verlag:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    We evaluate a temporary public sector employment program targeted at individuals with weak labor market attachment, applying dynamic inverse probability weighting to account for dynamic selection. We show that the program is successful in increasing... mehr

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    We evaluate a temporary public sector employment program targeted at individuals with weak labor market attachment, applying dynamic inverse probability weighting to account for dynamic selection. We show that the program is successful in increasing employment and reducing social assistance. However, being at a regular workplace seems crucial: we find negative employment effects for participants employed at a workplace created especially for the purpose. The decrease in social assistance is to some extent countered by an increase in the share receiving unemployment insurance benefits, indicating that municipalities are able to shift costs from the local to the central budget.

     
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/252197
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 15073
    Schlagworte: asymmetric information; intergenerational mobility; inequality; human capital; schooling; bequests
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 82 Seiten), Illustrationen
  24. Bank opacity - patterns and implications
    Autor*in: Avdjiev, Stefan; Jager, Maximilian
    Erschienen: 2022
    Verlag:  Bank for International Settlements, Monetary and Economic Department, [Basel]

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    Schriftenreihe: BIS working papers ; no 992 (January 2022)
    Schlagworte: bank opacity; asymmetric information; event study; credit risk; asset markets
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 48 Seiten), Illustrationen
  25. Moldy lemons and market shutdowns
    Autor*in: Chang, Jin Wook; Darst, R. Matthew
    Erschienen: March 11, 2022
    Verlag:  Divisions of Research & Statistics and Monetary Affairs, Federal Reserve Board, Washington, D.C.

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    Schriftenreihe: Finance and economics discussion series ; 2022, 013
    Schlagworte: asymmetric information; market unraveling; non-exclusive contracting
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 40 Seiten), Illustrationen