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  1. Strategically biased learning in market interactions
    Erschienen: [2022]
    Verlag:  LEM, Laboratory of Economics and Management, Institute of Economics, Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa, Italy

    We consider a market economy where two rational agents are able to learn the distribution of future events. In this context, we study whether moving away from the standard Bayesian belief updating, in the sense of under-reaction to some degree to new... mehr

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    We consider a market economy where two rational agents are able to learn the distribution of future events. In this context, we study whether moving away from the standard Bayesian belief updating, in the sense of under-reaction to some degree to new information, may be strategically convenient for traders. We show that, in equilibrium, strong under-reaction occurs, thus rational agents may strategically want to bias their learning process. Our analysis points out that the underlying mechanism driving ex-ante strategical decisions is diversity seeking. Finally, we show that, even if robust with respect to strategy selection, strong under-reaction can generate low realized welfare levels because of a long transient phase in which the agent makes poor predictions.

     

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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/259545
    Schriftenreihe: LEM working paper series ; 2022, 02 (January 2022)
    Schlagworte: Learning; Strategic interaction; Behavioral Bias; Financial Markets
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 16 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Third-degree price discrimination in the age of big data
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics, Cambridge

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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
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    Schriftenreihe: Cambridge working paper in economics ; 2159
    Janeway Institute working paper series ; 2021, 04
    Schlagworte: Strategic interaction; network games; interventions; industrial organisation; platforms; hypergraphs
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 36 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Strategic interaction and institutional quality determinants of environmental regulations across select OECD countries
    Erschienen: 2014
    Verlag:  Washington State Univ., School of Economic Sciences, Pullman, Wash.

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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series / Washington State University, School of Economic Sciences ; 2014,7
    Schlagworte: Environmental regulations; Institutions spillovers; Spatial model; Strategic interaction
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (33 S.)