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  1. Moral constraints, social norm enforcement and strategic default in weak and strong economic conditions
    Autor*in: Brown, Martin; Schmitz, Jan; Zehnder, Christian
    Erschienen: [2023]
    Verlag:  [Study Center Gerzensee], [Gerzensee]

    We report data from a laboratory experiment studying the behavioral mechanisms which contribute to the increase in strategic defaults during an economic crisis. In our experiment, subjects can default on an outstanding loan, but moral constraints and... mehr

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    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 529
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We report data from a laboratory experiment studying the behavioral mechanisms which contribute to the increase in strategic defaults during an economic crisis. In our experiment, subjects can default on an outstanding loan, but moral constraints and social norm enforcement may provide incentives to repay. We exogenously vary the state of the economy: In the weak economy more borrowers are forced to default than in the strong. Our data reveal two main effects of an economic contraction: First, weak economic conditions seem to soften moral constraints as solvent debtors strategically default more often. Second, weak economic conditions undermine social norm enforcement. The decrease in norm enforcement, however, is not caused by a break-down of the repayment norm itself, but rather is a consequence of the additional informational uncertainty in weak economic conditions. In a weak economy peers are reluctant to sanction, because the risk of harming innocent debtors is higher.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/278618
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / Study Center Gerzensee ; 23, 03
    Schlagworte: Strategic Default; Moral Constraints; Social Norms
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 94 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Communication and hidden action
    evidence from a person-to-person lending experiment
    Autor*in: Brown, Martin; Schmitz, Jan; Zehnder, Christian
    Erschienen: November 2018
    Verlag:  School of Finance, University of St. Gallen, St. Gallen

    We report the results of a laboratory experiment which examines the impact of precontractualcommunication in person-to-person lending. We show that potential hiddenaction undermines the positive effect of communication on repayment behavior and... mehr

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    Standort:
    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VS 314 (2018,19)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We report the results of a laboratory experiment which examines the impact of precontractualcommunication in person-to-person lending. We show that potential hiddenaction undermines the positive effect of communication on repayment behavior and creditprovision. When strategic defaults by borrowers are revealed to lenders, pre-contractualcommunication reduces strategic default and increases credit provision. When strategicdefaults are hidden behind a veil of uncertainty, we find a substantially weaker impact ofcommunication. Borrowers are more likely to renege on repayment promises when theycan hide opportunistic behavior from lenders. These findings have important implicationsfor the design of lending relationships and procedures: Pre-contractual communicationand post-contractual monitoring go hand in hand

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    Auflage/Ausgabe: This version: November 2018
    Schriftenreihe: Working papers on finance ; no. 2018, 19
    University of St.Gallen, School of Finance Research Paper ; No. 2018/19
    Schlagworte: Strategic Default; Communication; Trust Game
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 49 Seiten), Illustrationen