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  1. Urban Sprawl and Social Capital
    Evidence from Indonesian Cities
    Erschienen: May 2022
    Verlag:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass

    We use detailed data from Indonesian cities to study how variation in density within urban areas affects social capital. For identification, we instrument density with soil characteristics, and control for community averages of observed... mehr

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    We use detailed data from Indonesian cities to study how variation in density within urban areas affects social capital. For identification, we instrument density with soil characteristics, and control for community averages of observed characteristics. Under plausible assumptions, these controls address sorting on observables and unobservables. We find that lower density increases trust in neighbors and community participation. We also find that lower density is associated with lower interethnic tolerance, but this relationship is explained by sorting. Heterogeneity analysis suggests that crime in dense areas undermines community trust and participation, intensifying the negative impact of density

     

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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
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    Schriftenreihe: NBER working paper series ; no. w30068
    Schlagworte: Urbanisierung; Suburbanisierung; Sozialkapital; Indonesien; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations; Public Goods; Regional Economic Activity: Growth, Development, Environmental Issues, and Changes
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource, illustrations (black and white)
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  2. The Value of Pharmacy Benefit Management
    Erschienen: July 2022
    Verlag:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass

    In theory, equilibrium profits for drug patent holders would not involve significant restraints on production and patient utilization if the market had a mechanism for two-part pricing (Oi 1971) or quantity commitments (Murphy, Snyder, and Topel... mehr

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    In theory, equilibrium profits for drug patent holders would not involve significant restraints on production and patient utilization if the market had a mechanism for two-part pricing (Oi 1971) or quantity commitments (Murphy, Snyder, and Topel 2014). In fact, patent expiration has little effect on drug utilization especially when those drugs are delivered through insurance plans. This paper provides a quantitative model consistent with the theory and evidence in which pharmacy benefit management on behalf of insurance plans serves these and other purposes in both monopoly and oligopoly provider settings. Calibrating the model to the U.S. market, I conclude that pharmacy benefit management is worth at least $145 billion annually beyond its resource costs. PBM services add at least $192 billion annually in value to society compared to a manufacturer price-control regime. Requiring all PBM services to be self-provided by plan sponsors would forgo about 40 percent of the net value of PBM services largely by increasing management costs. Due to changes in the incidence of PBM services over the drug life cycle, the services encourage innovation even though they reduce the profits of incumbent manufacturers

     

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    Sprache: Englisch
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    Schriftenreihe: NBER working paper series ; no. w30231
    Schlagworte: Arzneimittel; Pharmahandel; Pharmaindustrie; Patent; Unvollkommener Markt; Monopol; Oligopol; USA; Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations; Analysis of Health Care Markets; Health Insurance, Public and Private; Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
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  3. Restrict the Middleman?
    Quantitative Models of PBM Regulations and Their Consequences
    Erschienen: March 2023
    Verlag:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass

    This paper provides the first quantitative economic models of pharmacy benefit management regulation. The price-theoretic models allow for various market frictions and imperfections including market power, coordination costs, tax distortions, and... mehr

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    This paper provides the first quantitative economic models of pharmacy benefit management regulation. The price-theoretic models allow for various market frictions and imperfections including market power, coordination costs, tax distortions, and incomplete innovation incentives. A rigorous economic interpretation is provided for what are sometimes called "rebate walls" or "rebate traps." Applicable types of regulation include rebate rules, such as the HHS rebate rule and the Insulin Act; disclosure requirements such as the PBM Transparency Act of 2023; and pharmacy contract restrictions such as the CMS Medicare rule to take effect in 2024. Utilization of brands and generics, plan spending, cost sharing, spillovers to nonpharmacy medical spending, government budgets, and the pace of drug innovation are among the outcomes tracked by the open-source model

     

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    Sprache: Englisch
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    Schriftenreihe: NBER working paper series ; no. w30998
    Schlagworte: Pharmahandel; Regulierung; Gesundheitsmarkt; Arzneimittelmarkt; Unvollkommener Markt; Wettbewerbspolitik; USA; Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations; Analysis of Health Care Markets; Health Insurance, Public and Private; Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks; Economics of Regulation
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  4. Beyond Pigou
    Externalities and Civil Society in the Supply-Demand Framework
    Erschienen: March 2023
    Verlag:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass

    The extent of voluntary cooperation in the presence of externalities is shown as an equilibrium outcome in the supply and demand framework. The analysis uses familiar ingredients to provide a new way of understanding the results of the extensive... mehr

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    The extent of voluntary cooperation in the presence of externalities is shown as an equilibrium outcome in the supply and demand framework. The analysis uses familiar ingredients to provide a new way of understanding the results of the extensive literature beginning with Buchanan, Coase, Ostrom, Shapley, Telser, Tullock, and Williamson showing that a Pigouvian tax is not the only alternative to independently acting individuals who are coordinated merely through distorted market prices. Voluntary cooperation can have a far different incidence than Pigouvian taxes and subsidies while changing the character of the costs resulting from externalities. The paper discusses applications including forest management, volume discounts, residential associations, energy policy, the scope of planning of household activities, and the role of workplaces in preventing infectious disease

     

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    Sprache: Englisch
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    Schriftenreihe: NBER working paper series ; no. w31095
    Schlagworte: Externer Effekt; Pigou-Steuer; Internalisierung externer Effekte; Externalities; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations; Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies; Firm Performance: Size, Diversification, and Scope
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource, illustrations (black and white)
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  5. Ideas Mobilize People
    The Diffusion of Communist Ideology in China
    Erschienen: February 2023
    Verlag:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass

    Can ideas mobilize people into collective action? We provide a positive answer to this question by studying how exposure to the Communist ideology shaped an individual's choice to join the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) during the party's formative... mehr

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    Can ideas mobilize people into collective action? We provide a positive answer to this question by studying how exposure to the Communist ideology shaped an individual's choice to join the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) during the party's formative stage. The individuals we focus on are cadets at the Whampoa Military Academy, who subsequently fought in 20th-century China's most important wars. Our identification strategy exploits the locality-time-content variation in the circulation of the New Youth magazine--the major platform to promote Communism after the Treaty of Versailles in 1919--as well as the variation in an individual's location over time. By comparing the Whampoa cadets living in a locality with post-1919 New Youth available against those who had lived in the same locality but missed this channel, we demonstrate that the former were significantly more likely to join the CCP. In future political struggles, those whose party choice was more influenced by this ideology channel were less likely to quit the CCP and more likely to sacrifice their lives. Additionally, we document that family background cannot predict the party choice of these political pioneers but social networks can complement ideology exposure

     

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    Sprache: Englisch
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    Schriftenreihe: NBER working paper series ; no. w30947
    Schlagworte: Kommunismus; Ideologie; Informationsverbreitung; Kommunistische Partei; Mitgliedschaft; China; General; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness; Asia including Middle East; Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development; General
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  6. Organizing for Collective Action
    Olson Revisited
    Erschienen: February 2023
    Verlag:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass

    We study a standard collective action problem in which successful achievement of a group interest requires costly participation by some fraction of its members. How should we model the internal organization of these groups when there is asymmetric... mehr

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    We study a standard collective action problem in which successful achievement of a group interest requires costly participation by some fraction of its members. How should we model the internal organization of these groups when there is asymmetric information about the preferences of their members? How effective should we expect it to be as we increase the group's size n? We model it as an optimal honest and obedient communication mechanism and we show that for large n it can be implemented with a very simple mechanism that we call the Voluntary Based Organization. Two new results emerge from this analysis. Independently of the assumptions on the underlying technology, the limit probability of success in the best honest and obedient mechanism is the same as in an unorganized group, a result that is not generally true if obedience is omitted. An optimal organization, however, provides a key advantage: when the probability of success converges to zero, it does so at a much slower rate than in an unorganized group. Because of this, significant probabilities of success are achievable with simple honest and obedient organizations even in very large groups

     

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    Schriftenreihe: NBER working paper series ; no. w30991
    Schlagworte: Kollektives Handeln; Organisation; Asymmetrische Information; Präferenztheorie; Spieltheorie; Noncooperative Games; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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  7. Ending Pay for PBM Performance
    Consequences for Prescription Drug Prices, Utilization, and Government Spending
    Erschienen: September 2023
    Verlag:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass

    Proposed "delinking" legislation would prohibit Pharmacy Benefit Managers (PBMs) from being remunerated based on the rebates and discounts they negotiate for drug insurance plans serving Medicare beneficiaries. This policy would significantly change... mehr

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    Proposed "delinking" legislation would prohibit Pharmacy Benefit Managers (PBMs) from being remunerated based on the rebates and discounts they negotiate for drug insurance plans serving Medicare beneficiaries. This policy would significantly change drug pricing and utilization and shift billions of dollars annually from patients and taxpayers to drug manufacturers and retail pharmacy companies. Annual federal spending on Medicare Part D premiums would increase $3 billion to $10 billion plus any concomitant increase in Medicare subsidies for out-of-pocket expenses. All of these consequences stem from the fact that PBMs are hired to obtain rebates and discounts but would no longer be compensated based on their results. The quantitative estimates utilize a large body of economic research showing how much "pay for performance" matters for economic outcomes. The price-theoretic models also account for various market frictions and imperfections including market power, coordination costs, tax distortions, and incomplete innovation incentives

     

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    Schriftenreihe: NBER working paper series ; no. w31667
    Schlagworte: Arzneimittel; Pharmahandel; Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung; Pharmaindustrie; Arzneimittelrecht; USA; Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations; Health Insurance, Public and Private; Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity; Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks; Economics of Regulation
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