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  1. Incentive contracts when agents distort probabilities
    Autor*in: Gonzáles-Jiménez, Víctor
    Erschienen: May 2021
    Verlag:  Universität Wien, Department of Economics, [Wien]

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    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VS 543
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / Universität Wien, Department of Economics ; no. 21, 01
    Schlagworte: Contracts; Risk Attitude; Incentives; Probability Weighting; Experiments
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 71 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. On the stochasticity of ultimatum games
    Autor*in: Qi, Tianxiao; Xu, Bin; Wu, Jinshan; Vriend, Nicolaas J.
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  School of Economics and Finance, Queen Mary University of London, London

    Brenner and Vriend (2006) argued (experimentally and theoretically) that one should not expect proposers in ultimatum games to learn to converge to the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium offer, as finding the optimal offer is a hard learning problem... mehr

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    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 217
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Brenner and Vriend (2006) argued (experimentally and theoretically) that one should not expect proposers in ultimatum games to learn to converge to the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium offer, as finding the optimal offer is a hard learning problem for (boundedly-rational) proposers. In this paper we show that providing the proposers with given (fixed) acceptance probabilities (essentially eliminating the learning task) leads to somewhat lower offers, but still substantially above the monetary payoff-maximizing offer. By using a Risk Attitude test and a Probability Matching test, we show experimentally that the proposers' attitude with respect to risk, as well as their ability to interpret and deal with probabilities may matter when it comes to making UG offers. Thus, we argue that the lack of convergence to the minimum offers in ultimatum games may be related to the inherent stochasticity of typical UG experiments, highlighting a possible cause of such deviations that seems a complementary explanation to existing ones.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/247195
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / School of Economics and Finance, Queen Mary University of London ; no. 926 (April 2021)
    Schlagworte: Ultimatum game; Stochasticity; Risk Attitude; ProbabilityMatching
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 48 Seiten), Illustrationen