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  1. Making subsidies work
    rules vs. discretion
    Erschienen: 04 February 2022
    Verlag:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Verlag (lizenzpflichtig)
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    LZ 161
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    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; DP17004
    Schlagworte: Public subsidies; investment; employment; political discretion; Regression Discontinuity
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 63 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. When and why do buyers rate in online markets?
    Erschienen: 04 February 2022
    Verlag:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

    Zugang:
    Verlag (lizenzpflichtig)
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    LZ 161
    keine Fernleihe
    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; DP17006
    Schlagworte: Public subsidies; investment; employment; political discretion; Regression Discontinuity
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 63 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Public subsidies and cooperation in research and development
    evidence from the lab
    Erschienen: [2022]
    Verlag:  EERI, Economics and Econometrics Research Institute, Brussels, Belgium

    We implement an experimental design based on a duopoly game in which subjects choose whether to cooperate in Research and Development (R&D) activities. We first conduct six experimental markets that differ in both the levels of knowledge spillovers... mehr

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    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    DS 545
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    We implement an experimental design based on a duopoly game in which subjects choose whether to cooperate in Research and Development (R&D) activities. We first conduct six experimental markets that differ in both the levels of knowledge spillovers and the intensity of competition. Consistently with the theory, we find that the probability of cooperation increases in the level of spillovers and decreases in that of market competition. We then replicate the experimental markets by providing subsidies to subjects who cooperate. Subsidies relevantly increase the probability of cooperation in focus markets, causing, however, a sensible reduction of R&D investments. Overall, our evidence suggests that, depending on the characteristics of the market, the use of public subsidies might be redundant, for firms would anyway joined their R&D efforts; or counterproductive, inducing firms to significantly reduce R&D investments compared to the non-cooperative scenario.

     

    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/273048
    Schriftenreihe: EERI research paper series ; no 2022, 04
    Schlagworte: Cooperation in R&D; Public subsidies; knowledge spillovers; market competition
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 34 Seiten), Illustrationen