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  1. Foreclosure and tunneling with partial vertical ownership
    Autor*in: Hunold, Matthias; Petrishcheva, Vasilisa
    Erschienen: September 2022
    Verlag:  Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Düsseldorf, Germany

    We study the incentives of firms that hold partial vertical ownership to foreclose rivals. Compared to a full vertical merger, with partial ownership, a firm may obtain only part of the target's profit but may nevertheless be able to influence the... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 256
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We study the incentives of firms that hold partial vertical ownership to foreclose rivals. Compared to a full vertical merger, with partial ownership, a firm may obtain only part of the target's profit but may nevertheless be able to influence the target's strategy significantly. The target may be either a supplier or a customer, which opens the scope for either input foreclosure or customer foreclosure. We show that the incentives to foreclose can be higher, equal, or even lower with partial ownership than with a vertical merger, depending on how the protection of minority shareholders and transfer price regulations are specified.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9783863043902
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/265095
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) ; no 391
    Schlagworte: Backward ownership; Entry deterrence; Foreclosure; Minority shareholdings; Partial ownership; Uniform pricing; Vertical integration
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 55 Seiten)
  2. Foreclosure and tunneling with partial vertical ownership
    Autor*in: Hunold, Matthias; Petrishcheva, Vasilisa
    Erschienen: [2022]
    Verlag:  Universität Potsdam, Potsdam

    Zugang:
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VS 811
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Universität Potsdam, Universitätsbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    Schriftenreihe: CEPA discussion papers ; no. 57 (November 2022)
    Schlagworte: Backward ownership; Entry deterrence; Foreclosure; Minority shareholdings; Partial ownership; Uniform pricing; Vertical integration
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (47 Seiten; 689 KB), Illustratioen
    Bemerkung(en):

    We demonstrate how the incentives of firms that partially own their suppliers or customers to foreclose rivals depend on how the partial owner can extract profits from the target (tunneling). Compared to a fully vertically integrated firm, a partial owner may obtain only a share of the target’s profit but influence the target’s strategy significantly. We show that the incentives for customer and input foreclosure can be higher, equal, or even lower with partial ownership than with a vertical merger, depending on how the protection of minority shareholders and transfer price regulations affect the scope for profit extraction
  3. Foreclosure and tunneling with partial vertical ownership
    Autor*in: Hunold, Matthias; Petrishcheva, Vasilisa
    Erschienen: [2022]
    Verlag:  Universität Potsdam, Potsdam

    Zugang:
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    Universität Potsdam, Universitätsbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    uneingeschränkte Fernleihe, Kopie und Ausleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    Schriftenreihe: CEPA discussion papers ; no. 57 (November 2022)
    Schlagworte: Backward ownership; Entry deterrence; Foreclosure; Minority shareholdings; Partial ownership; Uniform pricing; Vertical integration
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (47 Seiten; 689 KB), Illustratioen
    Bemerkung(en):

    We demonstrate how the incentives of firms that partially own their suppliers or customers to foreclose rivals depend on how the partial owner can extract profits from the target (tunneling). Compared to a fully vertically integrated firm, a partial owner may obtain only a share of the target’s profit but influence the target’s strategy significantly. We show that the incentives for customer and input foreclosure can be higher, equal, or even lower with partial ownership than with a vertical merger, depending on how the protection of minority shareholders and transfer price regulations affect the scope for profit extraction
  4. Foreclosure and tunneling with partial vertical ownership
    Autor*in: Hunold, Matthias; Petrishcheva, Vasilisa
    Erschienen: September 2022
    Verlag:  Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Düsseldorf, Germany

    We study the incentives of firms that hold partial vertical ownership to foreclose rivals. Compared to a full vertical merger, with partial ownership, a firm may obtain only part of the target's profit but may nevertheless be able to influence the... mehr

    Standort:
    Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Düsseldorf
    Fernleihe:
    uneingeschränkte Fernleihe, Kopie und Ausleihe

     

    We study the incentives of firms that hold partial vertical ownership to foreclose rivals. Compared to a full vertical merger, with partial ownership, a firm may obtain only part of the target's profit but may nevertheless be able to influence the target's strategy significantly. The target may be either a supplier or a customer, which opens the scope for either input foreclosure or customer foreclosure. We show that the incentives to foreclose can be higher, equal, or even lower with partial ownership than with a vertical merger, depending on how the protection of minority shareholders and transfer price regulations are specified

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Druck
    ISBN: 9783863043902
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) ; no 391
    Schlagworte: Backward ownership; Entry deterrence; Foreclosure; Minority shareholdings; Partial ownership; Uniform pricing; Vertical integration
    Umfang: 47 Seiten