Direkt zur Hauptnavigation springen Direkt zum Inhalt springen
info(at)avldigital.remove-this.de
Deutsch English
Letzte Suchanfragen

Ergebnisse für *

Zeige Ergebnisse 1 bis 13 von 13.

  1. Competition among public good providers for donor rewards
    Autor*in: Struwe, Natalie; Blanco, Esther; Walker, James
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  Research platform Empirical and Experimental Economics, University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck, Austria

    We present experimental evidence for decision settings where public good providers compete for endogenous donations offered by outside donors. Donors receive benefits from public good provision but cannot provide the good themselves. The performance... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 395
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We present experimental evidence for decision settings where public good providers compete for endogenous donations offered by outside donors. Donors receive benefits from public good provision but cannot provide the good themselves. The performance of three competition mechanisms is examined in relation to the level of public good provision and transfers offered by donors. In addition to a contest with rewards proportional to effort to all public good providers, we study two contests with exclusion from transfers, namely a winner-takes-all and a losergets-nothing. We compare behavior in these three decision settings to the default setting of no-transfers. Results for this novel decision environment with endogenous prizes show that contributions to the public good are not significantly different in the winner-takes-all and loser-gets-nothing settings, but donor's transfers are significantly lower in winner-takes-all. Initially, the winner-takes-all and loser-gets-nothing settings lead to a significant increase in public good contributions compared to the setting where transfers are proportional to contributions for everyone; but this difference diminishes over decision rounds. All three contest with endogenous prizes generate consistent and significantly higher public good provision compared to the setting with no-transfers.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/250151
    Schriftenreihe: Working papers in economics and statistics ; 2021, 29
    Schlagworte: Public Good; Institution; Externality; Contests; Laboratory Experiment
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 46 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Competition in persuasion
    an experiment?
    Autor*in: Wu, Wenhao; Ye, Bohan
    Erschienen: September 2021
    Verlag:  School of Entrepreneurship and Management, ShanghaiTech University, [Shanghai]

    We experimentally investigate a classic question, whether competition stimulates information revelation, by comparing two Bayesian persuasion models. One model has one sender (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011) and the other has two competing senders who... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    Nicht speichern
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We experimentally investigate a classic question, whether competition stimulates information revelation, by comparing two Bayesian persuasion models. One model has one sender (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011) and the other has two competing senders who reveal information sequentially and publicly (Wu, 2020). The first treatment provides strong support for Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), where the sender uses a noisy signaling device and the receiver complies with his suggestions. In the second treatment, we find that: (1) senders reveal more information in total than the sender in the first treatment; (2) the first sender reduces the use of the noisy signaling device as compared to the sender in the first treatment; (3) the second sender exhibits a “matching” behavior pattern; (4) the receiver can make use of information from both sides and she receives higher payoffs than in the first treatment. However, our experiment also documents deviations from the theory. Competition does not improve information revelation to the extent of full information. Torationalize the behavior, we use the Quantal Response Equilibrium model to explain the features of the empirical results in our experiment

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    Schriftenreihe: ShanghaiTech SEM working paper series ; no. 2021, 010
    Schlagworte: Bayesian Persuasion; Multiple Senders; Laboratory Experiment; Quantal Response Equilibrium
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 41 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Experiments on the hold-up problem and delegation
    Autor*in: Yang, Yadi
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  Tilburg University, Tilburg

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VS 181
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Dissertation
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9789056686505
    Weitere Identifier:
    Schriftenreihe: [Dissertation series] / [Center for Economic Research, Tilburg University] ; [nr. 649 (2021)]
    Schlagworte: Experiment; Laboratory Experiment; Reward; Incentive; Interaction; Literature
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 173 Seiten), Illustrationen
    Bemerkung(en):

    Dissertation, Tilburg University, 2021
  4. Essays on behavioral responses to dishonest and anti-social decisionmaking
    Autor*in: Brouwer, Thijs
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  Tilburg University, Tilburg

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VS 181
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Dissertation
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9789056686499
    Weitere Identifier:
    Schriftenreihe: [Dissertation series] / [Center for Economic Research, Tilburg University] ; [nr. 648 (2021)]
    Schlagworte: Decision Making; Worker; Employer; Laboratory Experiment; Norm Violation; Social Norms; Decision Maker; Productivity; Leadership; Experiment; Costs; Teaching
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 218 Seiten), Illustrationen
    Bemerkung(en):

    Dissertation, Tilburg University, 2021
  5. Does overconfidence lead to bargaining failures?
    Autor*in: Colzani, Paola; Santos-Pinto, Luís
    Erschienen: 2021
    Verlag:  Université de Lausanne, Faculté des hautes études commerciales (HEC), Département d'économie, Lausanne

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VS 554
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Cahier de recherches économiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie ; 21, 07
    Schlagworte: Overconfidence; Bargaining; Joint Production; Laboratory Experiment
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 56 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Essays on social media and democracy
    Autor*in: Gils, Freek van
    Erschienen: [2022]
    Verlag:  Tilburg University, Tilburg

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VS 181
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Dissertation
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9789056686802
    Weitere Identifier:
    Schriftenreihe: [Dissertation series] / [Center for Economic Research, Tilburg University] ; [nr. 678 (2022)]
    Schlagworte: Social Democracy; Social Media; Disinformation; Multi-Party System; Empirical Method; Laboratory Experiment; Voting Behavior; Political Interest; Earning a Doctorate; Polarization; Ban; Interest Group; Manipulation; News; Election; Communication
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 221 Seiten), Illustrationen
    Bemerkung(en):

    Dissertation, Tilburg University, 2022
  7. The corporate legality game
    a lab experiment on the impact of policies, frames and information
    Autor*in: Becchetti, Leonardo; Pelligra, Vittorio; Rossetti, Fiammetta
    Erschienen: [2023]
    Verlag:  KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business, Dept. of Management, Strategy and Innovation (MSI), Leuven, Belgium

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VS 597
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: MSI discussion paper ; no. 23, 05
    Schlagworte: Corruption; Laboratory Experiment; Redistribution; Conformity
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 54 Seiten), Illustrationen
  8. Litigation with negative expected value suits
    an experimental analysis
    Autor*in: Deck, Cary A.; Pecorino, Paul; Solomon, Michael
    Erschienen: 10-2022
    Verlag:  Chapman University, Economic Science Institute, [Orange, CA]

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: ESI working papers ; 22, 17
    Schlagworte: Dispute Resolution; Negative Expected Value Lawsuits; Laboratory Experiment
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 39 Seiten), Illustrationen
  9. Why do oaths work?
    image concerns and credibility in promise keeping
    Autor*in: Kingsuwankul, Sorravich; Tergiman, Chloe; Villeval, Marie-Claire
    Erschienen: [2023]
    Verlag:  Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    We use a laboratory experiment to understand the channels through which honesty oaths can affect behavior and credibility. Using a game with asymmetric information in a financial market setting that captures some important features of... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 432
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We use a laboratory experiment to understand the channels through which honesty oaths can affect behavior and credibility. Using a game with asymmetric information in a financial market setting that captures some important features of advisor-investor interactions, we manipulate the common knowledge of the promise and investigate three non-pecuniary costs of breaking an oath: co-player image costs, audience-image costs, and self-image costs. For investors oaths are neither sufficient nor necessary to generate trust: ultimately investors rely on their experience. We link laboratory results to a survey we conducted in the Netherlands where oaths are required in the banking sector.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/282871
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; TI 2023, 058
    Schlagworte: Promise-keeping; Honesty Oaths; Common Knowledge; Deniability; Financial Markets; Laboratory Experiment
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 69 Seiten), Illustrationen
  10. Institutions, competitiveness and cognitive ability
    Autor*in: Choi, Syngjoo; Kim, Byung-Yeon; Lee, Jungmin; Lee, Sokbae
    Erschienen: June 2020
    Verlag:  [Institute of Economic Research], [Seoul]

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VS 775
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: [SIER working paper series ; 134]
    Schlagworte: Piece Rate; Tournament; North Korea; Institution; Laboratory Experiment
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 47 Seiten)
  11. Individual versus group play in the repeated coordinated resistance game
    Autor*in: Cason, Timothy N.; Mui, Vai-Lam
    Erschienen: 2015
    Verlag:  Monash Univ., Dep. of Economics, Canberra

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / Monash University,Department of Economics ; 15,13
    Schlagworte: Laboratory Experiment; Cooperation; Repeated Games; Strategy
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (71 S.)
  12. Rich communication, social motivations, and coordinated resistance against divide-and-conquer
    a laboratory investigation
    Autor*in: Cason, Timothy N.; Mui, Vai-Lam
    Erschienen: 2015
    Verlag:  Monash Univ., Dep. of Economics, Canberra

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / Monash University,Department of Economics ; 15,14
    Schlagworte: Rich Communication; Coordinated Resistance; Laboratory Experiment; Content Analysis; Divide-and Conquer
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (47 S.)
  13. Bringing a natural experiment into the laboratory
    the measurement of individual risk attitudes
    Autor*in: Brokesova, Zuzana; Deck, Cary A.; Peliova, Jana
    Erschienen: 2016
    Verlag:  [Chapman University, Economic Science Institute], [Orange, CA]

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: [Working papers / Chapman University, Economic Science Institute ; 16-06]
    Schlagworte: Natural Experiment; Laboratory Experiment; Experimental Methodology; RiskAttitudes
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 17 Seiten), Illustrationen