Verlag:
BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Università Bocconi, Milano, Italy
This article discusses a form of fiscal monetization that produces losses in the central bank's balance sheet, without a permanent increase in the money base. If an independent central bank acts as a long-sighted policymaker, an optimal helicopter...
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ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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This article discusses a form of fiscal monetization that produces losses in the central bank's balance sheet, without a permanent increase in the money base. If an independent central bank acts as a long-sighted policymaker, an optimal helicopter monetary policy can be identified. At the same time, if the government in charge is made up of career-concerned politicians and citizens are heterogenous, then the policy mix will produce distributional effects, and conflicts between politicians and central bankers will be likely. Political pressures will arise and the helicopter money option will be less likely. The framework is applied in a discussion of the economics and politics of issuing COVID-19 perpetual bonds with the European Central Bank as the buyer
