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  1. Coase and cap-and-trade
    evidence on the independence property from the European carbon market
    Erschienen: 2021
    Verlag:  DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, Berlin

    This paper tests the independence property under the Coase Theorem in a large multinational cap-and-trade scheme for greenhouse gas emissions, the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). I analyze whether emissions of power producers regulated under... mehr

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    This paper tests the independence property under the Coase Theorem in a large multinational cap-and-trade scheme for greenhouse gas emissions, the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). I analyze whether emissions of power producers regulated under the EU ETS are independent from allowance allocations, leveraging a change in allocation policy for a difference-in-differences strategy. The evidence suggests that the independence property holds overall and for larger emitters. It fails for small emitters, indicating that transaction costs distort their emission decisions. However, due to their small share of aggregate emissions the independence property remains intact at the sector level.

     

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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/229898
    Auflage/Ausgabe: Updated version of DP 1850
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion papers / Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung ; 1925
    Schlagworte: Coase theorem; independence property; cap-and-trade; EU ETS; greenhouse gas emissions
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 44 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. In search of Santa Claus
    Samuelson, Stigler, and Coase theorem worlds
    Erschienen: September 2021
    Verlag:  Center for the History of Political Economy at Duke University, [Durham, NC]

    One of the more striking features of the debate over the Coase theorem is the wide variety of models and theoretical frameworks used to discuss, evaluate, or otherwise analyze Coase’s result - an artifact of an ambiguity in Coase’s reasoning. Some... mehr

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    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    One of the more striking features of the debate over the Coase theorem is the wide variety of models and theoretical frameworks used to discuss, evaluate, or otherwise analyze Coase’s result - an artifact of an ambiguity in Coase’s reasoning. Some framed Coase’s result in a bargaining context and others in a competitive markets (both partial and general equilibrium) context. And players on both sides lined up with their demonstrations that the Coase theorem did or did not hold water. The parties involved in these debates, though, were often talking past each other, debating very different environments and models, and on different terms. Stabilization was elusive. Those who, like eight-year-old Virginia O'Hanlon in her famous letter asking if there is a Santa Claus, very much wanted to believe could certainly find reason to do so. For others, however, the theorem smacked more of the shopping mall Santa who reeks of alcohol and cigarettes.

     

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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/244230
    Auflage/Ausgabe: Version 1.4
    Schriftenreihe: CHOPE working paper ; no. 2021, 19 (September 2021)
    Schlagworte: Coase theorem; Samuelson; Stigler; externalities; bargaining
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 28 Seiten)
  3. What happened on Blackstone Avenue?
    exorcising coase theorem mythology
    Erschienen: July 2021
    Verlag:  Center for the History of Political Economy at Duke University, [Durham, NC]

    The present paper revisits the path by which Coase came to set down the result now generally known as the Coase theorem in his 1960 article. I draw on both the published record and archival resources in an effort to clear away some of the mist and,... mehr

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    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    The present paper revisits the path by which Coase came to set down the result now generally known as the Coase theorem in his 1960 article. I draw on both the published record and archival resources in an effort to clear away some of the mist and, as it will emerge, dispel some of the mythology. As good as the traditional story is - thanks in no small part to Stigler’s hyperbole - the reality is far more interesting, both for what it tells us about Coase’s result and for our understanding of the messy process behind how it came to be. For as we shall see, Coase set out at least three versions of his result, two of them assuredly incorrect, in 1959-60 and had at best a faint sense for the implications of transaction costs for his conclusion - something which he was only put on to by others to whom he showed the original draft of his 1959 article. And as for that fateful evening during which he "converted" the Chicagoans to his point of view, we shall see both that the extent of the conversion necessary was far less than the traditional story suggests and that it is not at all clear what it was that the Chicagoans believed at the end of the evening, Coase’s 1960 argument notwithstanding.

     

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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
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    hdl: 10419/235886
    Auflage/Ausgabe: Version 1.6
    Schriftenreihe: CHOPE working paper ; no. 2021, 14 (July 2021)
    Schlagworte: Ronald Coase; transaction costs; Coase theorem; externalities
    Weitere Schlagworte: Array
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 41 Seiten)
  4. Governing climate geoengineering
    side-payments are not enough
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  Departimento di economia, metodi quantitativi e strategia di impresa, Università degli studi Milano-Bicocca, [Mailand]

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    Sprache: Englisch
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    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: CefES paper series ; no. 461 (February 2021)
    Schlagworte: climate governance; public good-or-bad; free-driving; transfers; promises; experiment; Coase theorem
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 61 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. What happened on Blackstone Avenue?
    recovering the origins of the coase theorem
    Erschienen: [2023]
    Verlag:  Center for the History of Political Economy at Duke University, [Durham, NC]

    This paper revisits the path by which Coase developed the result now known as the Coase theorem, including the famous meeting at the home of Aaron Director during which Coase ‘converted’ a group of Chicago economists to his way of thinking. Drawing... mehr

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    This paper revisits the path by which Coase developed the result now known as the Coase theorem, including the famous meeting at the home of Aaron Director during which Coase ‘converted’ a group of Chicago economists to his way of thinking. Drawing on published and archival sources, we discuss the challenges that Coase encountered in formulating his argument, particularly as regards the impact of transaction costs on his negotiation result, and illuminate the roles of Duncan Black and David Cavers in nudging Coase toward a theoretically valid result. Finally, we show that the Chicago economists’ ‘conversion’ was both less extensive than commonly believed and likely involved a their acceptance of a result that is both demonstrably incorrect and fundamentally different from that which Coase published in 1960.

     

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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
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    hdl: 10419/273543
    Schriftenreihe: CHOPE working paper ; no. 2023, 03 (May 2023)
    Schlagworte: Coase theorem; Ronald Coase; externalities; market failure; transaction costs
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 44 Seiten)
  6. Bargaining in the absence of property rights
    an experiment
    Erschienen: 12/2015
    Verlag:  Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA

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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / Harvard John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business ; no. 842
    Schlagworte: Coase theorem; absolute vs. relative right; bargaining,efficiency; distribution; fairness
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 44 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. How to protect entitlements
    an experiment
    Erschienen: 04/2017
    Verlag:  Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA

    In a full-information, zero transactions costs world, the degree of protection afforded to an entitlement does not affect the likelihood of efficient trade. In reality, imperfect information is often inevitable. Specifically, a party will usually... mehr

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    In a full-information, zero transactions costs world, the degree of protection afforded to an entitlement does not affect the likelihood of efficient trade. In reality, imperfect information is often inevitable. Specifically, a party will usually have incomplete information about fairness norms held by the other party – fairness norms that affect the other party's willingness to pay (WTP) or willingness to accept (WTA). Importantly, these fairness norms may depend on how strongly the entitlement is protected. We experimentally test the effect of the degree of protection on the parties' WTP and WTA and on the likelihood of efficient trade by varying the legal remedy for infringing upon the owner's entitlement. We show that our participants can be divided into three groups corresponding to three different fairness norms: negative types whose WTP and WTA are decreasing in the strength of the legal remedy; positive types whose WTP and WTA are increasing in the strength of the legal remedy; and flat types whose WTP and WTA do not depend on the strength of the legal remedy. We find that type is role-dependent, such that a higher WTP and a lower WTA – the combination most conducive to efficient trade – is obtained with a weaker legal remedy

     

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    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / Harvard John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business ; no. 901
    MPI Collective Goods Preprint ; No. 2017/05
    Schlagworte: property rule; liability rule; damages; compensation; Coase theorem; bargaining,fairness; equality; desert; entitlement; taking
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 26 Seiten), Illustrationen