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  1. Cournot meets Bayes-Nash
    a discontinuity in behavior infinitely repeated duopoly games
    Autor*in: Argenton, Cédric; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Müller, Wieland
    Erschienen: 15 February 2022
    Verlag:  CentER, Tilburg University, [Tilburg]

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    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VS 37
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / CentER ; no. 2022, 003
    Schlagworte: Cournot; Bayesian game; Bayes-Nash equilibrium; repeated games; collusion; cooperation; experimental economics
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 25 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Cournot meets Bayes-Nash
    a discontinuity in behavior in finitely repeated duopoly games
    Autor*in: Argenton, Cédric; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Müller, Wieland
    Erschienen: [2023]
    Verlag:  Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190, [München]

    We conduct a series of Cournot duopoly market experiments with a high number of repetitions and fixed matching. Our treatments include markets with (a) complete cost symmetry and complete information, (b) slight cost asymmetry and complete... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 553
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We conduct a series of Cournot duopoly market experiments with a high number of repetitions and fixed matching. Our treatments include markets with (a) complete cost symmetry and complete information, (b) slight cost asymmetry and complete information, and (c) varying cost asymmetries and incomplete information. For the case of complete cost symmetry and complete information, our data confirm the well-known result that duopoly players achieve, on average, partial collusion. However, as soon as any level of cost asymmetry or incomplete information is introduced, observed average individual quantities are remarkably close to the static Bayes-Nash equilibrium predictions.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/282151
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / Rationality & Competition, CRC TRR 190 ; no. 460 (November 21, 2023)
    Schlagworte: Cournot; Bayesian game; Bayes-Nash equilibrium; repeated games; collusion; cooperation; experimental economics
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 39 Seiten), Illustrationen