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  1. A few things You wanted to know about the economics of CBDCs, but were afraid to model: a survey of what we can learn from who has done
    Autor*in: Aragão, Marcelo A. T.
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  Banco Central do Brasil, Brasília, DF, Brazil

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series / Banco Central do Brasil ; 554 (August 2021)
    Schlagworte: Central Banks and their Policies; Central Bank Digital Currencies; Monetary Policy; Fiscal Policy; Financial Stability; PolicyCoordination; Economic Modelling; DSGE; New Monetarist Models; Search-Theoretic Models of Money; Banking Models; Bank Runs; LDA Analysis
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 34 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Unexpected effects of bank bailouts
    depositors need not apply and need not run
    Autor*in: Berger, Allen N.; Lamers, Martien; Roman, Raluca A.; Schoors, Koen
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Philadelphia, PA

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
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    Schriftenreihe: Working papers / Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia ; 21, 10 (February 2021)
    Schlagworte: ailouts; Banking; Depositor Behavior; Market Discipline; Bank Runs
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 58 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Banking crises under a Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC)
    Autor*in: Bitter, Lea
    Erschienen: September 10, 2020
    Verlag:  Verein für Socialpolitik, [Köln]

    One of the main concerns when considering Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) is the disintermediating effect on the banking sector in normal times, and even more the risk of a bank run in times of crisis. This paper extends the bank run model of... mehr

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    One of the main concerns when considering Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) is the disintermediating effect on the banking sector in normal times, and even more the risk of a bank run in times of crisis. This paper extends the bank run model of Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015) by analyzing the impact of a CBDC. A CBDC is an additional type of liability to the central bank which, by accounting identity, must be accompanied by respective accommodations on the asset side. The model compares the effects of two different asset side policies with each other and to the economy without a CBDC. I find that a CBDC reduces net worth in the banking sector in normal times but mitigates the risk of a bank run in times of crisis. The prevailing concerns about the risk of a bank run turn out to be partial equilibrium considerations disregarding the asset side effects of a CBDC.

     
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/224600
    Schriftenreihe: Jahrestagung 2020 / Verein für Socialpolitik ; 90
    Schlagworte: Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC); Digital Currency; CentralBanking; Financial Intermediation; Bank Runs; Lender of Last Resort
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 47 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Misdiagnosing bank capital problems
    Autor*in: Bulow, Jeremy; Klemperer, Paul
    Erschienen: October 2021
    Verlag:  Nuffield College, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom

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    Schriftenreihe: Economics discussion papers / Nuffield College, University of Oxford ; Paper No: 2021-W04
    Schlagworte: Bank Capital; Regulatory Capital; Capital Requirements; Regulatory Forbearance; Bank Runs; Solvency Runs; Liquidity Runs; Stress Tests; Financial Crisis
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 57 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. Born to run
    adaptive and strategic behavior in experimental bank-run games
    Autor*in: Belotti, Federico; Campioni, Eloisa; Larocca, Vittorio; Marazzi, Francesca; Panaccione, Luca; Mortari, Andrea Piano
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  CEIS Tor Vergata, [Rom]

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
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    Schriftenreihe: CEIS Tor Vergata research paper series ; vol. 19, issue 9 = no. 529 (December 2021)
    Schlagworte: Coordination Games; Experimental Studies; Bank Runs
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 34 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Funding deposit insurance
    Autor*in: Oosthuizen, Dick; Zalla, Ryan
    Erschienen: [2022]
    Verlag:  European Central Bank, Frankfurt am Main, Germany

    We present a quantitative model of deposit insurance. We characterize the policymaker's optimal choices of coverage for depositors and premiums raised from banks. Premiums contribute to a deposit insurance fund that lowers taxpayers' resolution cost... mehr

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    We present a quantitative model of deposit insurance. We characterize the policymaker's optimal choices of coverage for depositors and premiums raised from banks. Premiums contribute to a deposit insurance fund that lowers taxpayers' resolution cost of bank failures. We find that riskadjusted premiums reduce moral hazard, enabling the policymaker to increase deposit insurance coverage by 3 percentage points and decrease the share of expected annual bank failures from 0.66% to 0.16%. The model predicts a fund-to-covered-deposits ratio that matches the data and declines in taxpayers' income due to taxpayers' risk aversion.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9789289952897
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/269111
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; no 2704 (August 2022)
    Schlagworte: Deposit Insurance; Bank Runs; Bank Regulation
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 62 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. Essays in empirical finance
    Autor*in: Jankauskas, Tomas
    Erschienen: [2023]
    Verlag:  Tilburg University, Tilburg

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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Dissertation
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9789056687120
    Weitere Identifier:
    Schriftenreihe: [Dissertation series] / [Center for Economic Research, Tilburg University] ; [nr. 710 (2023)]
    Schlagworte: Empirical Finance; Term Structure; Corporate Bonds; Risk Premia; Equity; Maturity; Central Bank Intervention; Bank Runs; Equity Risk; Unconventional Monetary Policy; Fragility; European Central Bank; Bank Lending; Asset Pricing Models; Risk Premium; Severity; Financial Sector; Banking Sector; Methodology
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 173 Seiten), Illustrationen
    Bemerkung(en):

    Dissertation, Tilburg University, 2023
  8. Banking crises under a Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC)
    Autor*in: Bitter, Lea
    Erschienen: [2023]
    Verlag:  Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190, [München]

    One of the main concerns associated with central bank digital currencies (CBDC) is the disintermediating effect on the banking sector in general, and the risk of bank runs in times of crisis in particular. This paper examines the implications of an... mehr

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    One of the main concerns associated with central bank digital currencies (CBDC) is the disintermediating effect on the banking sector in general, and the risk of bank runs in times of crisis in particular. This paper examines the implications of an interest-bearing CBDC on banking crises in a dynamic bank run model with a financial accelerator. The analysis distinguishes between bank failures due to illiquidity and due to insolvency. In a numerical exercise, CBDC leads to a reduction in the net worth of banks in normal times but mitigates the risk of a bank run in times of crisis. The financial stability implications also depend on how CBDC is accounted for on the asset side of the central bank balance sheet: if CBDC issuance is offset by asset purchases, it delays the onset of both types of bank failures to larger shocks. In contrast, if CBDC issuance is offset by loans to banks, it substantially impedes failures due to illiquidity, but only marginally affects bank failures due to insolvency.

     
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/282118
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / Rationality & Competition, CRC TRR 190 ; no. 426 (September 12, 2023)
    Schlagworte: Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC); Financial Intermediation; FinancialStability; Bank Runs
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 51 Seiten), Illustrationen