Letzte Suchanfragen

Ergebnisse für *

Zeige Ergebnisse 1 bis 5 von 5.

  1. Are tax havens good? Implications of the crackdown on secrecy
    Erschienen: 2015
    Verlag:  Univ.-Bibliothek Frankfurt am Main, Frankfurt am Main

  2. Foundations of the Soviet command economy, 1917 to 1941
    Autor*in: Harrison, Mark
    Erschienen: March 2016
    Verlag:  University of Warwick, Department of Economics, Coventry

    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series ; no. 283
    Schlagworte: command economy; communism; corruption; economic growth; incentives; personnel; policy reform; power; secrecy; security; Soviet Union; violence; war economy
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 32 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Secrecy and state capacity
    a look behind the Iron Curtain
    Autor*in: Harrison, Mark
    Erschienen: Jan 2017
    Verlag:  University of Warwick, Centre for Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy, Department of Economics, [Coventry]

    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series ; no. 312
    Schlagworte: abuse of authority; adverse selection; censorship; military outlays; secrecy; state capacity; transaction costs; trust
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 33 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Emplotting total devotion: secrecy, fame, and imitation in late antique Lives of Christian ascetics
    Autor*in: Staat, Klazina
    Erschienen: 2023

    This article concentrates on ideals of total devotion in Latin late antique Lives of secret saints. It argues that total devotion is narrativised according to a standardised plot structure or ‘masterplot’. The plot starts with the saints’ performance... mehr

    Index theologicus der Universitätsbibliothek Tübingen
    keine Fernleihe

     

    This article concentrates on ideals of total devotion in Latin late antique Lives of secret saints. It argues that total devotion is narrativised according to a standardised plot structure or ‘masterplot’. The plot starts with the saints’ performance of total devotion in religious competition, which increases their fame and emotional attraction among the followers. Imitating the example of earlier ascetics, the saints withdraw in isolation to avoid the followers’ attention, but to no avail: the more they hide, the more they become known through the spreading of rumours. The saints’ subsequent disclosure intensifies their emotional attraction, and results in the people’s demonstration of total devotion. In a final step, the audience of the hagiographical tales is invited to follow the saints’ example. Laying bare the recurring plot elements, the article highlights the nexus of ascetic withdrawal, secrecy, fame, emotions, storytelling, and imitation in the constitution of total devotion.

     

    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Aufsatz aus einer Zeitschrift
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    Übergeordneter Titel: Enthalten in: Religion; London [u.a.] : Routledge, 1971; 53(2023), 1, Seite 135-160; Online-Ressource

    Schlagworte: religious competition; rumours; secrecy; ascetic withdrawal; imitation; narrative plot; Latin hagiography; Total devotion
  5. Pay transparency under subjective performance evaluation
    Erschienen: January 2021
    Verlag:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    This paper studies how pay transparency affects organizations that reward employees based on their efforts (i.e., using "subjective performance evaluation"). First, we show that transparency triggers social comparisons that require the organization... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    DS 63
    keine Fernleihe

     

    This paper studies how pay transparency affects organizations that reward employees based on their efforts (i.e., using "subjective performance evaluation"). First, we show that transparency triggers social comparisons that require the organization to pay its employees an "envy premium". This premium reduces the value of the employment relationship to the organization, and thus its incentive to pay subjective bonuses to the hard-working employees. To restore credibility of its incentive system, a transparent organization must therefore reduce the weight of bonuses, and increase the weight of fixed salaries, in the employees' compensation, relative to organizations that operate in a more conventional "pay secrecy" regime. Second, we show that transparency enables the employees to collectively sanction the organization for reneging on subjective incentives. Collective enforcement allows the transparent organization to use strong employment relationships to "cross-subsidize" weak ones, achieving a more balanced allocation of effort than under pay secrecy. We discuss testable implications of our model for compensation design, the choice between transparency and secrecy regimes, and organizational responses to pay transparency laws.

     

    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/232446
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo working paper ; no. 8849 (2021)
    Schlagworte: social comparisons; secrecy; transparency; relational contracts; incentives
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 75 Seiten), Illustrationen