Direkt zur Hauptnavigation springen Direkt zum Inhalt springen
info(at)avldigital.remove-this.de
Deutsch English
Letzte Suchanfragen

Ergebnisse für *

Zeige Ergebnisse 1 bis 3 von 3.

  1. Non-partisan "Get-Out-the-Vote" efforts and policy outcomes
    Autor*in: Kovenock, Daniel J.; Roberson, Brian
    Erschienen: 2009
    Verlag:  WZB, Berlin

    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
  2. Non-partisan 'get-out-the-vote' efforts and policy outcomes
    Autor*in: Kovenock, Daniel J.; Roberson, Brian
    Erschienen: 2009

    Abstract: "This paper utilizes a simple model of redistributive politics with voter abstention to analyze the impact of nonpartisan 'get-out-the-vote' efforts on policy outcomes. Although such efforts are often promoted on the grounds that they... mehr

     

    Abstract: "This paper utilizes a simple model of redistributive politics with voter abstention to analyze the impact of nonpartisan 'get-out-the-vote' efforts on policy outcomes. Although such efforts are often promoted on the grounds that they provide the social benefit of increasing participation in the electoral process, we find that they have a meaningful impact on policy outcomes and are an important political influence activity for nonprofit advocacy organizations. In equilibrium, nonpartisan gotv efforts are more likely to arise in those segments of the electorate that are sufficiently small and disenfranchised (as measured by the ex ante voter abstention rate). Among those segments in which such efforts arise, the resulting gains are increasing in the level of disenfranchisement of the voters in the segment and decreasing in the segment's size." (author's abstract)

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    oai:gesis.izsoz.de:document/25809
    RVK Klassifikation: QB 910 ; QB 910
    DDC Klassifikation: Politikwissenschaft (320)
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Märkte und Politik, Abteilung Marktprozesse und Steuerung ; Bd. 2009-07
    Schlagworte: Wahlverhalten; Nichtstaatliche Organisation; Verteilungspolitik; Ökonomische Theorie der Politik; Public-Choice-Theorie; Spieltheorie; Theorie
    Weitere Schlagworte: (stw)Wahlverhalten; (stw)Nichtregierungsorganisation; (stw)Verteilungspolitik; (stw)Neue politische Ökonomie; (stw)Spieltheorie; (stw)Wahlverhalten; (stw)Theorie; (thesoz)politische Aktivität; (thesoz)politische Kultur; (thesoz)Wahlbeteiligung; (thesoz)Wahlkampf; (thesoz)Nichtwähler; (thesoz)Wahlverhalten; (thesoz)Wähler; (thesoz)Wahlergebnis; (thesoz)politisches Verhalten; (thesoz)Non-Profit-Organisation; (thesoz)politische Partizipation; (thesoz)politischer Einfluss; get out the vote; redistributive politics; nonprofit advocacy organizations; Colonel Blotto game; Tullock game; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur
    Umfang: Online-Ressource, 26 S.
    Bemerkung(en):

    Veröffentlichungsversion
  3. Public debt and the political economy of reforms
    Autor*in: Boyer, Pierre C.; Esslinger, Christoph; Roberson, Brian
    Erschienen: March 2021
    Verlag:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    We develop a two-period model of redistributive politics in which two politicians compete in an election in each period. In the first period, the politicians propose both whether to experiment with an efficient reform with uncertain benefits and... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 63
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We develop a two-period model of redistributive politics in which two politicians compete in an election in each period. In the first period, the politicians propose both whether to experiment with an efficient reform with uncertain benefits and choose the amount of public debt. Politicians also allocate pork-barrel spending to voters in each period. We show that allowing politicians to raise debt ensures that the reform is always implemented when the reform’s ratio of private good to public good gains exceeds a threshold, i.e. the reform generates enough private good benefits. This is not the case when the reform’s ratio of private good to public good gains is below this threshold. We also examine hard and a soft debt limits, and find that both limits reduce the political success of the reform. However, at moderate debt levels soft limits dominate hard limits with respect to equilibrium efficiency of reform provision.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/235332
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo working paper ; no. 8962 (2021)
    Schlagworte: political competition; public debt; reforms; redistributive politics; debt and spending limits
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 58 Seiten), Illustrationen