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  1. Do civil servants respond to behavioral interventions?
    a field experiment
    Erschienen: November 2021
    Verlag:  Inter-American Development Bank, Department of Research and Chief Economist, [Washington, DC]

    Introducing financial incentives to increase productivity in the public sector tends to be politically and bureaucratically cumbersome, particularly in developing countries. Behavioral interventions could be a low-cost alternative, both politically... mehr

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    Introducing financial incentives to increase productivity in the public sector tends to be politically and bureaucratically cumbersome, particularly in developing countries. Behavioral interventions could be a low-cost alternative, both politically and financially, although evidence of their effectiveness remains scarce. We evaluate the effect of redesigning the notice requiring civil servants in Buenos Aires to comply with citizens requests under Argentina's freedom of information act. The new notice, sent to the treatment group, attempts to exploit salience, deterrence, clarity, and social norms to increase adherence to deadlines. The results show an increase in the share of requests fulfilled by the second deadline, possibly because of a strong anchoring effect. These findings indicate that behavioral interventions can affect civil servants' actions. The fact that the intervention occurred at the same time as a civil service training program with sessions attended by members of both the control and treatment groups allows us to evaluate spillover effects. The evidence suggests that the time it takes a members of the treatment group to respond to a request increases with her interactions with members of the control group at the workshops. These findings have implications for policy design. First, they indicate that behavioral interventions could affect task compliance and productivity in the public sector. Second, they provide evidence that workshops may not always have the intended consequences, particularly when they increase interactions among employees with high and low incentives for task compliance.

     

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    Sprache: Englisch
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/252344
    Schriftenreihe: IDB working paper series ; no IDB-WP-1218
    Schlagworte: Behavioral economics; Nudge; Civil servants; Freedom of information act; Public administration; State capacity; Incentives; Transparency; Anchoring
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 48 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Developing content for the Management and Organizational Practices Survey-Hospitals (MOPS-HP)
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  U.S. Census Bureau, Center for Economic Studies, Washington, DC

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    Schriftenreihe: Working papers / Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau ; 21, 25 (September 2021)
    Schlagworte: Hospitals; Management Practices; Chief Nursing Officers; Staffing and Teams; Incentives; Protocols
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 50 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Determinations of other-regarding behavior and the private provision of public goods
    Erschienen: 2021

    Diese Arbeit leistet einen Beitrag zur Forschung, die die im ökonomischen Standardmodell verwendete Annahme des eng gefassten Eigeninteresses in Frage stellt. Der erste Teil der Arbeit umfasst drei experimentelle Studien über soziale Präferenzen. Der... mehr

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    Diese Arbeit leistet einen Beitrag zur Forschung, die die im ökonomischen Standardmodell verwendete Annahme des eng gefassten Eigeninteresses in Frage stellt. Der erste Teil der Arbeit umfasst drei experimentelle Studien über soziale Präferenzen. Der zweite Teil der Arbeit umfasst drei Studien, die sich in die Literatur zur privaten Bereitstellung öffentlicher Güter einfügen. Jahrzehntelange experimentelle Forschung mit öffentlichen Gütern, Ultimatum-, Vertrauens- und Diktatorspielen hat gezeigt, dass Individuen selbst bei anonymen One-Shot-Entscheidungen auf monetäre Auszahlungen zum Nutze... This thesis contributes to research that challenges the narrow self-interest assumption used in the standard economic model. The first part of the thesis includes three experimental studies on social preferences. The second part of the thesis includes three studies that fit into the literature on private provision of public goods. Decades of experimental research with public goods, ultimatum, trust, and dictator games have shown that individuals forgo monetary payoffs for the benefit of others even in anonymous one-shot decisions. One explanation for this behavior is that individuals have a...

     

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    Beteiligt: Bizer, Kilian (AkademischeR BetreuerIn); Spiwoks, Markus (AkademischeR BetreuerIn); Rau, Holger A. (AkademischeR BetreuerIn)
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Dissertation
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 21.11130/00-1735-0000-0008-5937-7
    Schlagworte: Behavioral Economics; Social preferences; Fairness; Dishonesty; Private provision of public goods; Incentives
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 137 Seiten), Illustrationen, Diagramme
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    Kumulative Arbeit

    Dissertation, Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, 2021

  4. Human capital and education policy
    evidence from survey data
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  ifo Institut, München

    Elisabeth Grewenig prepared this study while she was working at the Center for Economics of Education at the ifo Institute. The study was completed in March 2021 and accepted as doctoral thesis by the Department of Economics at the LMU Munich. It... mehr

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    Elisabeth Grewenig prepared this study while she was working at the Center for Economics of Education at the ifo Institute. The study was completed in March 2021 and accepted as doctoral thesis by the Department of Economics at the LMU Munich. It consists of five distinct empirical essays that address various aspects of human capital formation and education policy. Chapters 2 and 3 are concerned with the determinants of human capital formation. In particular, chapter 2 investigates the impact of gender norms on labor-supply expectations of adolescents. Chapter 3 analyzes the effects of the Corona-induced school closures on students' time spent with different educational activities. Chapters 4 and 5 are concerned with the implementation and feasibility of educational reforms. Thereby, chapter 4 evaluates the impact of recent reforms on binding teacher recommendations by studying educational outcomes of students in primary and secondary schools. Chapter 5 examines whether support for educational policies is amenable to information provision about party-positions. Finally, chapter 6 contributes to the methodological debate around survey measurement by investigating belief elicitation in large-scale online surveys.

     

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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Dissertation
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    ISBN: 9783959420990
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/243180
    Schriftenreihe: ifo Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung ; 96 (2021)
    Schlagworte: Stranded assets; climate policy; expectations; utilities; event study; green innovation; patents; panel analysis; green finance; climate risk; intangible assets; institutional investors; renewable energy; crowding-out; regional economics; input-output ana; Gender Norms; Female Labor Supply; Survey Experiments; EducationalInequality; COVID-19; Low-Achieving Students; Home Schooling; DistanceTeaching; School Tracking; Admission Policies; Student Performance; Political Parties; Partisanship; Information; Endogenous Preferences; Voters,Family Policy; Beliefs; Incentives; Online Search
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 294 Seiten), Illustrationen
    Bemerkung(en):

    Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe

    Dissertation, Universität München, 2021

  5. Incentive contracts when agents distort probabilities
    Erschienen: May 2021
    Verlag:  Universität Wien, Department of Economics, [Wien]

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    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / Universität Wien, Department of Economics ; no. 21, 01
    Schlagworte: Contracts; Risk Attitude; Incentives; Probability Weighting; Experiments
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 71 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. On the law of the household: the principles used by parents in disciplining their children
    Autor*in: Shavell, Steven
    Erschienen: 2021
    Verlag:  Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA

    In this article I first describe the basic principles that parents employ in disciplining their children. The description is based on a survey of parents, the major results of which are that parental sanctions are premised on wrongdoing—not on the... mehr

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    In this article I first describe the basic principles that parents employ in disciplining their children. The description is based on a survey of parents, the major results of which are that parental sanctions are premised on wrongdoing—not on the mere causation of harm; that parental sanctions tend to be greater when wrongdoing results in harm than when it does not; that parental sanctions for intentionally harmful conduct exceed those for negligence; and that parental sanctions are not raised when the probability that wrongdoing would be discovered is low.I then develop a theory to explain the principles of discipline as functional for parents. The kernel of the theory is that the rules of discipline maximize the expected utility of parents—assuming that the utility of parents is reduced by the occurrence of harm and also reflects the well–being of their children.After elaborating the theory, I comment on several related issues, including the possible influence of childhood experience on our preferences as adults over legal rules; and I remark on the similarity between the principles of criminal law and those applied by parents in disciplining their children

     

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    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / Harvard John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business ; no. 1070 (08/2021)
    Schlagworte: Eltern; Kinder; Kinderschutz; Rechtsökonomik; Rules; Incentives; Parents; Children; Law and Economics
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 58 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. The interdisciplinarity dilemma: public versus private interests
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  LEM, Laboratory of Economics and Management, Institute of Economics, Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa, Italy

    In this paper, we investigate how the choice to conduct interdisciplinary work affects a researcher's career. Using data on 23,926 articles published by 6,105 researchers affiliated with the University of Florida in the period 2008-2013, we show that... mehr

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    In this paper, we investigate how the choice to conduct interdisciplinary work affects a researcher's career. Using data on 23,926 articles published by 6,105 researchers affiliated with the University of Florida in the period 2008-2013, we show that synthesizing knowledge from diverse fields pays off in terms of reputation. However, if combining too-distant research fields, the impact of a work is penalized. Moreover, research conducted balancing the contribution of different scientific fields has a negative impact on the reputation of scientists in terms of the number of citations but a positive impact on the diffusion of knowledge across other disciplines. Our findings are robust to a number of controls, including individual, time, and field of study fixed effects, and they apply to all investigators regardless of their gender, collaboration behavior, performance, and affiliation. All in all, despite its public benefits, interdisciplinary research comes with a cost for a researcher's academic career. This trade-off poses challenging questions to policymakers.

     

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    hdl: 10419/247303
    Schriftenreihe: LEM working paper series ; 2021, 34 (October 2021)
    Schlagworte: Interdisciplinarity; Research Policy; Academic Career; Generality; Incentives; Citations
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 42 Seiten), Illustrationen
  8. Contracting, pricing, and data collection under the AI flywheel effect
    Erschienen: August 17, 2021
    Verlag:  ESMT Berlin, Berlin, Germany

    This paper explores how firms that lack expertise in machine learning (ML) can leverage the so-called AI Flywheel effect. This effect designates a virtuous cycle by which, as an ML product is adopted and new user data are fed back to the algorithm,... mehr

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    This paper explores how firms that lack expertise in machine learning (ML) can leverage the so-called AI Flywheel effect. This effect designates a virtuous cycle by which, as an ML product is adopted and new user data are fed back to the algorithm, the product improves, enabling further adoptions. However, managing this feedback loop is difficult, especially when the algorithm is contracted out. Indeed, the additional data that the AI Flywheel effect generates may change the provider's incentives to improve the algorithm overtime. We formalize this problem in a simple two-period moral hazard framework that captures the main dynamics among ML, data acquisition, pricing, and contracting. We find that the firm's decisions crucially depend on how the amount of data on which the machine is trained interacts with the provider's effort. If this effort has a more (less) significant impact on accuracy for larger volumes of data, the firm underprices (overprices) the product. Interestingly, these distortions sometimes improve social welfare, which accounts for the customer surplus and profits of both the firm and provider. Further, the interaction between incentive issues and the positive externalities of the AI Flywheel effect has important implications for the firm's data collection strategy. In particular, the firm can boost its profit by increasing the product's capacity to acquire usage data only up to a certain level. If the product collects too much data per user, the firm's profit may actually decrease, i.e., more data is not necessarily better.

     

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    hdl: 10419/238266
    Auflage/Ausgabe: Revised version
    Schriftenreihe: ESMT working paper ; 20, 01 (R3)
    Schlagworte: Data; Machine Learning; Data Product; Pricing; Incentives; Contracting
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 52 Seiten), Illustrationen
  9. Essays on competition, regulation, and innovation in the banking industry
    Erschienen: [2020]
    Verlag:  Tilburg University, Tilburg

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    Medientyp: Dissertation
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    Schriftenreihe: [Dissertation series] / [Center for Economic Research, Tilburg University] ; [nr. 634 (2020)]
    Schlagworte: Interest Rates; Banking Industry; Financial Insitutions; Innovation; Fintech; Geographic Loans; Colombia; Technological Innovation; Consumer Demand; Incumbents; Financial Inclusion; Welfare Implications; Consumer Value; Policy Tools; Access to Credit; Interaction; Policy Intervention; Microfinance; Incentives; Developing Economies; Financial Serves; Charge; Scenarios; United States of America; Industry
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 173 Seiten), Illustrationen
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    Enthält mehrere Beiträge

    Dissertation, Tilburg University, 2020

  10. Essays on repugnance in economic transactions
    Autor*in: Ackfeld, Viola
    Erschienen: 2020
    Verlag:  Universitäts- und Stadtbibliothek Köln, Köln

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    Beteiligt: Ockenfels, Axel (AkademischeR BetreuerIn); Heinz, Matthias (AkademischeR BetreuerIn)
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Dissertation
    Format: Online
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    Schlagworte: Repugnance; Incentives; Privacy; Behavioral Economics
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 231 Seiten), Illustrationen
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    Dissertation, Universität zu Köln, 2020

  11. Pay transparency under subjective performance evaluation
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University of Linz, Linz-Auhof, Austria

    This paper studies how pay transparency affects organizations that reward employees based on their efforts (i.e., using "subjective performance evaluation"). First, we show that transparency triggers social comparisons that require the organization... mehr

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    This paper studies how pay transparency affects organizations that reward employees based on their efforts (i.e., using "subjective performance evaluation"). First, we show that transparency triggers social comparisons that require the organization to pay its employees an "envy premium". This premium reduces the value of the employment relationship to the organization, and thus its incentive to pay subjective bonuses to the hard-working employees. To restore credibility of its incentive system, a transparent organization must therefore reduce the weight of bonuses, and increase the weight of fixed salaries, in the employees' compensation, relative to organizations that operate in a more conventional "pay secrecy" regime. Second, we show that transparency enables the employees to collectively sanction the organization for reneging on subjective incentives. Collective enforcement allows the transparent organization to use strong employment relationships to "cross-subsidize" weak ones, achieving a more balanced allocation of effort than under pay secrecy. We discuss testable implications of our model for compensation design, the choice between transparency and secrecy regimes, and organizational responses to pay transparency laws.

     

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    hdl: 10419/246319
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University of Linz ; no. 2102 (January 2021)
    Schlagworte: Social Comparisons; Secrecy; Transparency; Relational Contracts; Incentives
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 74 Seiten), Illustrationen
  12. Understanding the response to high-stakes incentives in primary education
    Erschienen: [2020]
    Verlag:  Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190, Munich, Germany

    This paper studies responses to high-stakes incentives arising from early ability tracking. We use three complementary research designs exploiting differences in school track admission rules at the end of primary school in Germany’s early ability... mehr

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    This paper studies responses to high-stakes incentives arising from early ability tracking. We use three complementary research designs exploiting differences in school track admission rules at the end of primary school in Germany’s early ability tracking system. Our results show that the need to perform well to qualify for a better track raises students’ math, reading, listening, and orthography skills in grade 4, the final grade before students are sorted into tracks. Evidence from self-reported behavior suggests that these effects are driven by greater study effort but not parental responses. However, we also observe that stronger incentives decrease student well-being and intrinsic motivation to study.

     

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    hdl: 10419/233485
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / Rationality & Competition, CRC TRR 190 ; no. 261 (November 5, 2020)
    Schlagworte: Student Effort; Tracking; Incentives
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 87 Seiten), Illustrationen
  13. Risk-sharing and entrepreneurship
    Erschienen: February 16, 2022
    Verlag:  Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Stockholm, Sweden

    In this paper, we study the role of risk-sharing in entrepreneurship-driven innovation. Studying entrepreneurship and innovation entails modeling an occupational choice and an effort choice. Risk-sharing may increase the number of individuals who... mehr

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    In this paper, we study the role of risk-sharing in entrepreneurship-driven innovation. Studying entrepreneurship and innovation entails modeling an occupational choice and an effort choice. Risk-sharing may increase the number of individuals who become entrepreneurs by limiting the downside risk. The effort of entrepreneurs may, however, be hampered by high risk-sharing if this limits the returns faced by successful entrepreneurs relative to unsuccessful entrepreneurs. We construct a simple theoretical model where risk-sharing may be either private or provided through the welfare state by means of taxation. We show that, in addition to the occupational and effort choice dimensions, the level of public risk-sharing also matters for the characteristics of entrepreneurs.

     

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    hdl: 10419/262038
    Schriftenreihe: IFN working paper ; no. 1424 (2022)
    Schlagworte: Innovation; Institutions; Growth risk-sharing; Inequality; Incentives
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 32 Seiten), Illustrationen
  14. Fees, incentives, and efficiency in large double auctions
    Erschienen: 16 February 2022
    Verlag:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Schriftenreihe: Array ; 17039
    Schlagworte: Double Auction; Fees; Transaction Costs; Incentives; Strategyproofness; Efficiency; Robustness
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 63 Seiten), Illustrationen
  15. A general framework to quantify the event importance in multi-event contests
    Erschienen: [2022]
    Verlag:  School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economics, University of St.Gallen, St. Gallen

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    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / University of St.Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economics ; no. 2022, 04 (July 2022)
    Schlagworte: Event importance; Football; Front-loading; Incentives; Multi-event contest
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 58 Seiten), Illustrationen
  16. Pillar 2's Impact on Tax Competition
    Erschienen: 26 August 2022
    Verlag:  [University of Oxford, Sai͏̈d Business School, Centre for Business Taxation], [Oxford]

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    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / University of Oxford, Sai͏̈d Business School, Centre for Business Taxation ; 2022, 11
    Schlagworte: Pillar 2; Inclusive Framework; Minimum Tax; International Tax; Tax Competition; OECD; Tax Reform; Incentives; GloBE; Corporation Tax
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 58 Seiten), Illustrationen
  17. Better off by risk adjustment?
    socioeconomic disparities in care utilization in Sweden following a payment reform
    Erschienen: August 2022
    Verlag:  Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Lund

    Reducing socioeconomic health inequalities is a key goal of most health systems. When care providers are paid prospectively, e.g., by a fixed sum per patient, existing inequalities may be sustained by the incentives to undertreat relatively unhealthy... mehr

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    Reducing socioeconomic health inequalities is a key goal of most health systems. When care providers are paid prospectively, e.g., by a fixed sum per patient, existing inequalities may be sustained by the incentives to undertreat relatively unhealthy patients. To counter this, prospective payments are often risk-adjusted based on observable patient characteristics. Despite that risk adjustment (RA) is widely used, empirical evidence is lacking on how it affects the behavior of care providers. This paper provides such evidence using detailed administrative data from a Swedish region. We examine how a novel RA model applied to the prospective payment for primary care providers - capitation - affected socioeconomic differences in care utilization among individuals with a chronic condition. The new RA model implied substantial increases of the average capitation for patients with low socioeconomic status (SES). Yet, we do not find any robust evidence of greater access to primary care for individuals with low SES relative to individuals with high SES after the model was introduced. We find a small increase in hospital emergency department visits (a substitute to primary care), but no effects on hospitalizations. These results do not suggest that the new RA model reduced socioeconomic health inequalities. Our findings highlight that a risk-adjusted prospective payment may not by itself guide treatment decisions. We discuss other governance and management policies that may address undesired health inequalities.

     

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    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / Department of Economics, Lund University ; 2022, 15
    Schlagworte: Socioeconomic health inequalities; Risk adjustment; Primary care; Health care utilization; Prospective payment; Incentives
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 54 Seiten), Illustrationen
  18. The targeted assignment of incentive schemes
    Erschienen: August 2022
    Verlag:  ECONtribute, Bonn

    A central question in designing optimal policies concerns the assignment of individuals with different observable characteristics to different treatments. We study this question in the context of increasing workers' performance by using targeted... mehr

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    A central question in designing optimal policies concerns the assignment of individuals with different observable characteristics to different treatments. We study this question in the context of increasing workers' performance by using targeted incentives based on measurable worker characteristics. To do so, we ran two large-scale experiments. The key results are that (i) performance can be predicted by accurately measured personality traits, (ii) a machine learning algorithm can detect such heterogeneity in worker responses to different schemes, and (iii) a targeted assignment of schemes to individual workers increases performance in a second experiment significantly above the level achieved by the single best scheme.

     

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    Auflage/Ausgabe: This version: April 8, 2022
    Schriftenreihe: ECONtribute discussion paper ; no. 187
    Schlagworte: Randomized Controlled Trial; Incentives; Heterogeneity; Treatment Effects; Selection; Algorithm
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  19. Markets and transaction costs
    Erschienen: [2022]
    Verlag:  University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich

    Transaction costs are omnipresent in markets yet are often omitted in economic models. We show that their presence can fundamentally alter incentives and welfare in markets in which the price equates supply and demand. We categorize transaction costs... mehr

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    Transaction costs are omnipresent in markets yet are often omitted in economic models. We show that their presence can fundamentally alter incentives and welfare in markets in which the price equates supply and demand. We categorize transaction costs into two types. Asymptotically uninfluenceable transaction costs-such as fixed and price fees-preserve the key asymptotic properties of markets without transaction costs, namely strategyproofness, efficiency, and robustness to misspecified beliefs and to aggregate uncertainty. In contrast, influenceable transaction costs - such as spread fees - lead to complex strategic behavior (which we call price guessing) and may result in severe market failure. In our analysis of optimal design we focus on transaction costs that are fees collected by a platform as revenue. We show how optimal design depends on the traders' beliefs. In particular, with common prior beliefs, any asymptotically uninfluenceable fee schedule can be scaled to be optimal, while purely influenceable fee schedules lead to zero revenue. Our insights extend beyond markets equalizing demand and supply.

     

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    hdl: 10419/266246
    Auflage/Ausgabe: Revised version, September 2022
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series / University of Zurich, Department of Economics ; no. 405
    Schlagworte: Transaction Costs; Markets; Demand and Supply; Incentives; Efficiency; Robustness
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource
  20. The backfiring effects of monetary and gift incentives on Covid-19 vaccination willingness
    Erschienen: September 2022
    Verlag:  CEDEX, Centre for Decision Research & Experimental Economics, Nottingham

    Policies offering material incentives for Covid-19 vaccination have been widely used around the world as countries pursue the pressing objective of boosting immunity. This paper reports an experiment in China aimed at testing the effects of such... mehr

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    Policies offering material incentives for Covid-19 vaccination have been widely used around the world as countries pursue the pressing objective of boosting immunity. This paper reports an experiment in China aimed at testing the effects of such interventions on vaccination willingness. We provide the first Covid-19 vaccine study to separately consider and directly compare the effects of both monetary and gift-based incentives, both of which have been commonly employed in practice. Results from a sample of 1,365 individuals suggest that incentives in the range of 8-125 USD backfire, inducing lower vaccination willingness than simply offering vaccines for free. The effects of money and gifts of equivalent value do not significantly differ. We compare our results against the burgeoning literature on Covid-19 vaccine incentives, and demonstrate that the negative effects we identify are stronger than those observed to date in other populations.

     

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    hdl: 10419/284272
    Schriftenreihe: CeDEx discussion paper series ; no. 2022, 14
    Schlagworte: Covid-19; Vaccine willingness; Incentives
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  21. Financial incentives and performance
    a meta-analysis of economics evidence
    Erschienen: 18 November 2022
    Verlag:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Schriftenreihe: Array ; DP17680
    Schlagworte: Incentives; experiments; meta-analysis; model uncertainty; publi-cation bias
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  22. On the role of monetary incentives in risk preference elicitation experiments
    Erschienen: [2022]
    Verlag:  Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE, Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe, [Frankfurt am Main]

    Incentivized experiments in which individuals receive monetary rewards according to the outcomes of their decisions are regarded as the gold standard for preference elicitation in experimental economics. These task-related real payments are... mehr

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    Incentivized experiments in which individuals receive monetary rewards according to the outcomes of their decisions are regarded as the gold standard for preference elicitation in experimental economics. These task-related real payments are considered necessary to reveal subjects' \true preferences". Using a systematic, large-sample approach with three subject pools of private investors, professional investors, and students, we test the effect of task-related monetary incentives on risk preferences in four standard experimental tasks. We find no systematic differences in behavior between and within subjects in the incentivized and non-incentivized regimes. We discuss implications for academic research and for applications in the field.

     

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    hdl: 10419/268749
    Schriftenreihe: SAFE working paper ; no. 286
    Schlagworte: Risk Preferences; Incentives; Experimental Economics; Risk Aversion
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  23. Rank vs money
    evidence from managers
    Erschienen: [2022]
    Verlag:  University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics, [Cambridge]

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    Schriftenreihe: Cambridge working paper in economics ; 2256
    Schlagworte: Status; Incentives; Relative performance; Intrinsic motivation
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 59 Seiten)
  24. A quantitative framework for analyzing the distributional effects of incentive schemes
    Erschienen: May 11, 2021
    Verlag:  [University of Toronto, Department of Economics], [Toronto]

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    Schriftenreihe: [Working paper] / [Department of Economics, University of Toronto ; 696
    Schlagworte: Incentives; Effort; Accountability Scheme; Education Production; Test Score Distribution; Inequality; Conditional Average Treatment Effect; Semi-Parametric; Counterfactual; Education Reform
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 72 Seiten), Illustrationen
  25. Optimal incentives without expected utility
    Erschienen: [2022]
    Verlag:  Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    This paper investigates the optimal design of incentives when agents distort probabilities. We show that the type of probability distortion displayed by the agent and its degree determine whether an incentivecompatible contract can be implemented,... mehr

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    This paper investigates the optimal design of incentives when agents distort probabilities. We show that the type of probability distortion displayed by the agent and its degree determine whether an incentivecompatible contract can be implemented, the strength of the incentives included in the optimal contract, and the location of incentives on the output space. Our framework demonstrates that incorporating descriptively-valid theories of risk in a principal-agent setting leads to incentive contracts that are typically observed in practice such as salaries, lump-sum bonuses, and high-performance commissions.

     

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    hdl: 10419/273803
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; TI 2022, 090
    Schlagworte: Contracts; Probability Weighting; Incentives; Mechanism Design; Rank-Dependent Utility
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 91 Seiten), Illustrationen