Verlag:
Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest
The traditional voting games are special transferable utility cooperative games, so-called simple games, where the players are the parties and the value of a coalition may be 1 or 0 depending on the ability of the coalition to pass a motion or not....
mehr
ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
Signatur:
DS 151 (2010,25)
Fernleihe:
keine Fernleihe
The traditional voting games are special transferable utility cooperative games, so-called simple games, where the players are the parties and the value of a coalition may be 1 or 0 depending on the ability of the coalition to pass a motion or not. In this paper we introduce general weighted voting games, where the value of a coalition is a random variable. We illustrate the use of this model on examples from Hungary. -- weighted voting ; Hungarian National Assembly ; absent voters ; Shapley-Shubik index
