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  1. Foreclosure and tunneling with partial vertical ownership
    Autor*in: Hunold, Matthias; Petrishcheva, Vasilisa
    Erschienen: September 2022
    Verlag:  Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Düsseldorf, Germany

    We study the incentives of firms that hold partial vertical ownership to foreclose rivals. Compared to a full vertical merger, with partial ownership, a firm may obtain only part of the target's profit but may nevertheless be able to influence the... mehr

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    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 256
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We study the incentives of firms that hold partial vertical ownership to foreclose rivals. Compared to a full vertical merger, with partial ownership, a firm may obtain only part of the target's profit but may nevertheless be able to influence the target's strategy significantly. The target may be either a supplier or a customer, which opens the scope for either input foreclosure or customer foreclosure. We show that the incentives to foreclose can be higher, equal, or even lower with partial ownership than with a vertical merger, depending on how the protection of minority shareholders and transfer price regulations are specified.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9783863043902
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/265095
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) ; no 391
    Schlagworte: Backward ownership; Entry deterrence; Foreclosure; Minority shareholdings; Partial ownership; Uniform pricing; Vertical integration
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 55 Seiten)
  2. Foreclosure and tunneling with partial vertical ownership
    Autor*in: Hunold, Matthias; Petrishcheva, Vasilisa
    Erschienen: September 2022
    Verlag:  Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Düsseldorf, Germany

    We study the incentives of firms that hold partial vertical ownership to foreclose rivals. Compared to a full vertical merger, with partial ownership, a firm may obtain only part of the target's profit but may nevertheless be able to influence the... mehr

    Standort:
    Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Düsseldorf
    Fernleihe:
    uneingeschränkte Fernleihe, Kopie und Ausleihe

     

    We study the incentives of firms that hold partial vertical ownership to foreclose rivals. Compared to a full vertical merger, with partial ownership, a firm may obtain only part of the target's profit but may nevertheless be able to influence the target's strategy significantly. The target may be either a supplier or a customer, which opens the scope for either input foreclosure or customer foreclosure. We show that the incentives to foreclose can be higher, equal, or even lower with partial ownership than with a vertical merger, depending on how the protection of minority shareholders and transfer price regulations are specified

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Druck
    ISBN: 9783863043902
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) ; no 391
    Schlagworte: Backward ownership; Entry deterrence; Foreclosure; Minority shareholdings; Partial ownership; Uniform pricing; Vertical integration
    Umfang: 47 Seiten