This monograph surveys the current literature on game theoretic models of strategic information transmission in politics. Such work generalizes earlier models by allowing relevant information to be asymmetrically held by agents, and subsequently...
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This monograph surveys the current literature on game theoretic models of strategic information transmission in politics. Such work generalizes earlier models by allowing relevant information to be asymmetrically held by agents, and subsequently studying the willingness and ability of these agents to transmit information through their actions. Substantively the monograph includes models of agenda control in legislatures and elections, veto threats and debate, electoral competition, reputation building, bargaining in the shadow of war and sophisticated voting. Within each topic the principal fo
Cover; Signaling Games in Political Science; Copyright; Contents; Introduction to the Series; 1. Introduction; 2. The Basic Model; 3. Agenda Control; 4. Rhetoric and Debate; 5. Electoral Competition; 6. Reputation and Leadership; 7. Crisis Bargaining; 8. Voting with Incomplete Information; 9. Discussion; References; Index;
