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  1. Reasons without Rationalism
    Autor*in: Setiya, Kieran
    Erschienen: 2009
    Verlag:  Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J.

    Standort:
    Brandenburgische Technische Universität Cottbus - Senftenberg, Universitätsbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    uneingeschränkte Fernleihe, Kopie und Ausleihe
    Link zum Verbundkatalog:
    Kooperativer Bibliotheksverbund Berlin-Brandenburg (KOBV)
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9781400827725
    Weitere Identifier:
    Schlagworte: Handlung; Tugend; Motivation
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (144 S.)
    Bemerkung(en):

    Main description: Modern philosophy has been vexed by the question "Why should I be moral?" and by doubts about the rational authority of moral virtue. In Reasons without Rationalism, Kieran Setiya shows that these doubts rest on a mistake. The "should" of practical reason cannot be understood apart from the virtues of character, including such moral virtues as justice and benevolence, and the considerations to which the virtues make one sensitive thereby count as reasons to act. Proposing a new framework for debates about practical reason, Setiya argues that the only alternative to this "virtue theory" is a form of ethical rationalism in which reasons derive from the nature of intentional action. Despite its recent popularity, however, ethical rationalism is false. It wrongly assumes that we act "under the guise of the good," or it relies on dubious views about intention and motivation. It follows from the failure of rationalism that the virtue theory is true: we cannot be fully good without the perfection of practical reason, or have that perfection without being good. Addressing such topics as the psychology of virtue and the explanation of action, Reasons without Rationalism is essential reading for philosophers interested in ethics, rationality, or the philosophy of mind
  2. Reasons without Rationalism
    Autor*in: Setiya, Kieran
    Erschienen: 2009
    Verlag:  Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J.

    Standort:
    Ostbayerische Technische Hochschule Amberg-Weiden / Hochschulbibliothek Amberg
    Fernleihe:
    uneingeschränkte Fernleihe, Kopie und Ausleihe

    Standort:
    TH-AB - Technische Hochschule Aschaffenburg, Hochschulbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    uneingeschränkte Fernleihe, Kopie und Ausleihe

    Standort:
    Technische Hochschule Augsburg
    Fernleihe:
    uneingeschränkte Fernleihe, Kopie und Ausleihe

    Standort:
    Universitätsbibliothek Bamberg
    Fernleihe:
    uneingeschränkte Fernleihe, Kopie und Ausleihe

    Standort:
    Hochschule Coburg, Zentralbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    uneingeschränkte Fernleihe, Kopie und Ausleihe

    Standort:
    Hochschule Kempten, Hochschulbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    uneingeschränkte Fernleihe, Kopie und Ausleihe

    Standort:
    Hochschule Landshut, Hochschule für Angewandte Wissenschaften, Bibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    uneingeschränkte Fernleihe, Kopie und Ausleihe

    Standort:
    Universitätsbibliothek Passau
    Fernleihe:
    uneingeschränkte Fernleihe, Kopie und Ausleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9781400827725
    Weitere Identifier:
    Schlagworte: Handlung; Tugend; Motivation
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (144 S.)
    Bemerkung(en):

    Main description: Modern philosophy has been vexed by the question "Why should I be moral?" and by doubts about the rational authority of moral virtue. In Reasons without Rationalism, Kieran Setiya shows that these doubts rest on a mistake. The "should" of practical reason cannot be understood apart from the virtues of character, including such moral virtues as justice and benevolence, and the considerations to which the virtues make one sensitive thereby count as reasons to act. Proposing a new framework for debates about practical reason, Setiya argues that the only alternative to this "virtue theory" is a form of ethical rationalism in which reasons derive from the nature of intentional action. Despite its recent popularity, however, ethical rationalism is false. It wrongly assumes that we act "under the guise of the good," or it relies on dubious views about intention and motivation. It follows from the failure of rationalism that the virtue theory is true: we cannot be fully good without the perfection of practical reason, or have that perfection without being good. Addressing such topics as the psychology of virtue and the explanation of action, Reasons without Rationalism is essential reading for philosophers interested in ethics, rationality, or the philosophy of mind
  3. Reasons without rationalism
    Autor*in: Setiya, Kieran
    Erschienen: ©2007
    Verlag:  Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J.

    Standort:
    Ostbayerische Technische Hochschule Amberg-Weiden / Hochschulbibliothek Amberg
    Fernleihe:
    uneingeschränkte Fernleihe, Kopie und Ausleihe

    Standort:
    Ostbayerische Technische Hochschule Amberg-Weiden, Hochschulbibliothek, Standort Weiden
    Fernleihe:
    uneingeschränkte Fernleihe, Kopie und Ausleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 0691127492; 1282129724; 1400827728; 9780691127491; 9781282129726; 9781400827725
    Schlagworte: PHILOSOPHY / Social; PHILOSOPHY / Ethics & Moral Philosophy; Act (Philosophy); Ethics; Practical reason; Virtue; Ethics; Virtue; Act (Philosophy); Practical reason; Tugend; Motivation; Handlung
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (131 pages)
    Bemerkung(en):

    Includes bibliographical references (pages 121-127) and index

    "Squeezing the good into the right through the tubes of imperfection" -- The relevance of action theory -- A puzzle about intention -- The belief-desire model -- Acting for reasons -- Solving the puzzle -- A causal theory of action? -- Against the guise of the good -- Character and practical thought -- An argument for the virtue theory -- Practical reason and the guise of the good -- Motivation and desire -- Self-knowledge as the aim of action

    Modern philosophy has been vexed by the question "Why should I be moral?" and by doubts about the rational authority of moral virtue. In Reasons without Rationalism, Kieran Setiya shows that these doubts rest on a mistake. The "should" of practical reason cannot be understood apart from the virtues of character, including such moral virtues as justice and benevolence, and the considerations to which the virtues make one sensitive thereby count as reasons to act. Proposing a new framework for debates about practical reason, Setiya argues that the only alternative to this "virtue theory" is a fo