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  1. Reasons without rationalism
    Autor*in: Setiya, Kieran
    Erschienen: ©2007
    Verlag:  Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J.

    Ostbayerische Technische Hochschule Amberg-Weiden / Hochschulbibliothek Amberg
    uneingeschränkte Fernleihe, Kopie und Ausleihe
    Ostbayerische Technische Hochschule Amberg-Weiden, Hochschulbibliothek, Standort Weiden
    uneingeschränkte Fernleihe, Kopie und Ausleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 0691127492; 1282129724; 1400827728; 9780691127491; 9781282129726; 9781400827725
    Schlagworte: PHILOSOPHY / Social; PHILOSOPHY / Ethics & Moral Philosophy; Act (Philosophy); Ethics; Practical reason; Virtue; Ethics; Virtue; Act (Philosophy); Practical reason; Tugend; Motivation; Handlung
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (131 pages)
    Bemerkung(en):

    Includes bibliographical references (pages 121-127) and index

    "Squeezing the good into the right through the tubes of imperfection" -- The relevance of action theory -- A puzzle about intention -- The belief-desire model -- Acting for reasons -- Solving the puzzle -- A causal theory of action? -- Against the guise of the good -- Character and practical thought -- An argument for the virtue theory -- Practical reason and the guise of the good -- Motivation and desire -- Self-knowledge as the aim of action

    Modern philosophy has been vexed by the question "Why should I be moral?" and by doubts about the rational authority of moral virtue. In Reasons without Rationalism, Kieran Setiya shows that these doubts rest on a mistake. The "should" of practical reason cannot be understood apart from the virtues of character, including such moral virtues as justice and benevolence, and the considerations to which the virtues make one sensitive thereby count as reasons to act. Proposing a new framework for debates about practical reason, Setiya argues that the only alternative to this "virtue theory" is a fo