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  1. Tell the truth or not?
    the Montero mechanism for emissions control at work
    Autor*in: Requate, Tilman; Camacho-Cuena, Eva; Ch'ng, Kean Siang; Waichman, Israel
    Erschienen: [2019]
    Verlag:  Kiel Centre for Globalization, [Kiel]

    We experimentally test the truth-telling mechanism proposed by Montero (2008) for eliciting firms' abatement costs. We compare this mechanism with two well-known alternative allocation mechanisms, free and costly allocation of permits at the... mehr

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 595
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    We experimentally test the truth-telling mechanism proposed by Montero (2008) for eliciting firms' abatement costs. We compare this mechanism with two well-known alternative allocation mechanisms, free and costly allocation of permits at the Pigouvian price. Controlling for the number of firms and the firms' maximal emissions, we find that, in line with the theoretical predictions, firms over-report their maximal emissions under free allocation of permits and under-report these under costly allocation of permits. Under Montero's mechanism, by contrast, firms almost always report their maximal emissions truthfully. However, in terms of efficiency, the difference between Montero's mechanism and costly allocation disappears with industries including more than one firm.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/205133
    Schriftenreihe: KCG working paper ; no. 18 (September 2019)
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 48 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Challenging conventional wisdom
    experimental evidence on heterogeneity and coordination in avoiding a collective catastrophic event
    Autor*in: Waichman, Israel; Requate, Tilman; Karde, Markus; Milinski, Manfred
    Erschienen: [2019]
    Verlag:  Kiel Centre for Globalization, [Kiel]

    Avoiding a catastrophic climate change event is a global public good characterized by several dimensions, notably heterogeneity between the parties involved. It is often argued that such heterogeneity between countries is a major obstacle to... mehr

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 595
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    Avoiding a catastrophic climate change event is a global public good characterized by several dimensions, notably heterogeneity between the parties involved. It is often argued that such heterogeneity between countries is a major obstacle to cooperative climate policy. We challenge this belief by experimentally simulating two important heterogeneities, in wealth and loss, when dangerous climate change occurs. We find that under loss heterogeneity the success rate in achieving sufficient mitigation to prevent catastrophic climate change is higher than with homogeneous parties. We also observe that neither endowment heterogeneity nor the combination of endowment and loss heterogeneities lead to significantly different success rates than with homogeneous parties. Our findings suggest that heterogeneities may facilitate rather than hinder successful international climate policy negotiations.

     
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/205134
    Schriftenreihe: KCG working paper ; no. 19 (September 2019)
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 43 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Self-nudging vs. social nudging in social dilemmas
    an experiment
    Autor*in: Diederich, Johannes; Goeschl, Timo; Waichman, Israel
    Erschienen: February 21, 2022
    Verlag:  Heidelberg University, Department of Economics, Heidelberg

    The exogenous manipulation of choice architectures to achieve social ends ('social nudges') can raise problems of effectiveness and ethicality because it favors group outcomes over individual outcomes. One answer is to give individuals control over... mehr

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    HeiBIB - Die Heidelberger Universitätsbibliographie
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    DS 532
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    The exogenous manipulation of choice architectures to achieve social ends ('social nudges') can raise problems of effectiveness and ethicality because it favors group outcomes over individual outcomes. One answer is to give individuals control over their nudge ('self-nudge'), but the trade-offs involved are poorly understood. We examine how subjects self-nudge in a paradigmatic social dilemma setting and whether outcomes differ between the self-nudge and two exogenous nudges in line with perfect free-riding or full cooperation. Subjects recruited from the general population play a ten-round VCM online in fixed groups of four with one daily contribution decision. The nudge takes the shape of a non-participation default contribution, comparing zero, full, and self-determined levels. We find that the average self-nudge is 44% of the endowment and only 7% of subjects choose one of the two exogenous defaults. Yet, there is a hard trade-off between ethicality and effectiveness: Self-nudging groups do not better than groups under the perfect free-riding nudge. The reason is that non-defaulting subjects contribute less. Groups under the full cooperation default exhibit no reactance against the nudge and outperform both alternative choice architectures.

     
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/261075
    Schriftenreihe: AWI discussion paper series ; no. 710 (February 2022)
    Schlagworte: Nudging; choice architecture; defaults; public goods; behavioral economics; experiment
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (33, [15] Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. The creation of social norms under weak institutions
    Autor*in: Diekert, Florian; Eymess, Tillmann; Luomba, Joseph; Waichman, Israel
    Erschienen: 14 May 2020
    Verlag:  University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics, Heidelberg

    Preventing overfishing at Lake Victoria is a typical situation where policies have to rely on norm-based interventions to improve outcomes. Our lab-in-the-field experiment studies how information about high or low levels of previous cooperation affects... mehr

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 532
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    Preventing overfishing at Lake Victoria is a typical situation where policies have to rely on norm-based interventions to improve outcomes. Our lab-in-the-field experiment studies how information about high or low levels of previous cooperation affects the creation of social norms in a three-player prisoner's dilemma game with/without a feedback mechanism. The provision of social information succeeds in creating norms of cooperation only if a feedback mechanism is available. Without feedback, social information cannot prevent the decline of cooperation rates. Exploring the role of the reference network, we find that the effect increases with social proximity among participants.

     
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/235007
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper series / University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics ; no. 684
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (57 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. Tell the truth or not?
    the Montero mechanism for emissions control at work
    Autor*in: Requate, Tilman; Camacho-Cuena, Eva; Ch'ng, Kean Siang; Waichman, Israel
    Erschienen: 2018
    Verlag:  Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel, Department of Economics, [Kiel]

    We experimentally test the truth-telling mechanism proposed by Montero (2008) for eliciting firms' abatement costs. We compare this mechanism with two well-known alternative allocation mechanisms, grandfathering and pure auctioning. We conducted 27... mehr

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 1 (2018,2)
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    We experimentally test the truth-telling mechanism proposed by Montero (2008) for eliciting firms' abatement costs. We compare this mechanism with two well-known alternative allocation mechanisms, grandfathering and pure auctioning. We conducted 27 treatments with a total of 623 participants, controlling for the allocation mechanism, the number of firms, and the true maximal emission levels. We find that, in line with the theoretical predictions, firms over-report their maximal emissions under grandfathering and under-report them under pure auctioning, while under Montero's mechanism firms almost always report their maximal emissions truthfully. However, in terms of efficiency, the difference between Montero's mechanism and pure auctioning disappears when there is more than one firm in the market.

     
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    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/174362
    Schriftenreihe: Economics working paper / Christian-Albrechts-Universität Kiel, Department of Economics ; no 2018, 02
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 44 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Challenging conventional wisdom
    experimental evidence on heterogeneity and coordination in avoiding a collective catastrophic event
    Autor*in: Waichman, Israel; Requate, Tilman; Karde, Markus; Milinski, Manfred
    Erschienen: 2018
    Verlag:  Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel, Department of Economics, [Kiel]

    Avoiding a catastrophic climate change event is a global public good characterized by several dimensions, notably heterogeneity between the parties involved. It is often argued that such heterogeneity between countries is a major obstacle to... mehr

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 1 (2018,5)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Avoiding a catastrophic climate change event is a global public good characterized by several dimensions, notably heterogeneity between the parties involved. It is often argued that such heterogeneity between countries is a major obstacle to cooperative climate policy. We challenge this belief by experimentally simulating two important heterogeneities, in wealth and loss, when dangerous climate change occurs. We find that under loss heterogeneity the success rate in achieving sufficient mitigation to prevent catastrophic climate change is higher than with homogeneous parties. We also observe that neither endowment heterogeneity nor the combination of endowment and loss heterogeneities lead to significantly different success rates than with homogeneous parties. Our findings suggest that heterogeneities may facilitate rather than hinder successful international climate policy negotiations.

     
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    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/177618
    Auflage/Ausgabe: This version: April 10, 2018
    Schriftenreihe: Economics working paper / Christian-Albrechts-Universität Kiel, Department of Economics ; no 2018, 05
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 42 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. Ratchet up or down?
    an experimental investigation of global public good provision in the United Nations Youth Associations Network
    Autor*in: Gallier, Carlo; Kesternich, Martin; Löschel, Andreas; Waichman, Israel
    Erschienen: [2018]
    Verlag:  [CAWM], [Münster]

    From a current perspective the Paris Agreement is not sufficient to limit the global mean temperature below 2°C above pre-industrial level as intended. The Agreement stipulates that parties review, compare and ratchet up efforts to combat climate... mehr

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 306 (101)
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    From a current perspective the Paris Agreement is not sufficient to limit the global mean temperature below 2°C above pre-industrial level as intended. The Agreement stipulates that parties review, compare and ratchet up efforts to combat climate change over time. Within this process, commitments heavily depend on what has been already achieved and this status-quo reflects an important reference point serving either as commitment advice or potential threat. We present an experimental study that is specifically designed to incorporate the effect of a status-quo via pre-existing contribution levels under endowment heterogeneity in a game in which participants make voluntary contributions to a public good. Our participants are sampled from the United Nations Youth Associations Network, representing participants from 51 countries. Members from developed and developing countries take decisions against the background of different initial levels of endowments and pre-existing contributions. Our analysis indicates that starting with ambitious pre-existing contribution levels can foster aggregate mitigation levels. Falling behind this status-quo contribution levels by reducing the public good appears to be a strong behavioral barrier. These observations might provide support for the basic structure of the Paris Agreement with Nationally Determined Contributions and the possibility to adjust them, even if a downward revision of national targets may not be precluded.

     
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    hdl: 10419/173353
    Schriftenreihe: [CAWM discussion paper] ; [no. 101]
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 23 Seiten), Illustrationen
  8. Ratchet up or down?
    an experimental investigation of global public good provision in the United Nations Youth Associations Network
    Autor*in: Gallier, Carlo; Kesternich, Martin; Löschel, Andreas; Waichman, Israel
    Erschienen: 2017
    Verlag:  ZEW, Centre for European Economic Research, Mannheim

    From a current perspective the Paris Agreement is not sufficient to limit the global mean temperature below 2°C above pre-industrial level as intended. The Agreement stipulates that parties review, compare and ratchet up efforts to combat climate... mehr

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 15 (2017,71)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    From a current perspective the Paris Agreement is not sufficient to limit the global mean temperature below 2°C above pre-industrial level as intended. The Agreement stipulates that parties review, compare and ratchet up efforts to combat climate change over time. Within this process, commitments heavily depend on what has been already achieved and this status-quo reflects an important reference point serving either as commitment advice or potential threat. We present an experimental study that is specifically designed to incorporate the effect of a status-quo via pre-existing contribution levels under endowment heterogeneity in a game in which participants make voluntary contributions to a public good. Our participants are sampled from the United Nations Youth Associations Network, representing participants from 51 countries. Members from developed and developing countries take decisions against the background of different initial levels of endowments and pre-existing contributions. Our analysis indicates that starting with ambitious pre-existing contribution levels can foster aggregate mitigation levels. Falling behind this status-quo contribution levels by reducing the public good appears to be a strong behavioral barrier. These observations might provide support for the basic structure of the Paris Agreement with Nationally Determined Contributions and the possibility to adjust them, even if a downward revision of national targets may not be precluded.

     
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/172523
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / ZEW, Centre for European Economic Research ; no. 17, 071
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 25 Seiten), Illustrationen
  9. Equal split in the informal market for group train travel
    Autor*in: Waichman, Israel; Korzhenevych, Artem; Requate, Tilman
    Erschienen: 2010
    Verlag:  Kiel Inst. for the World Economy, Kiel

    In this paper we make use of a unique dataset collected in the central train station of Kiel, Germany. A group ticket is used by individual proposers who search for co-travelers to share the ride with shortly before the train departure. The... mehr

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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
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    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
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    Standort:
    Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle, Bibliothek
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    Universitätsbibliothek Kiel, Zentralbibliothek
    Signatur:
    EWP 1
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 3 (1638)
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    In this paper we make use of a unique dataset collected in the central train station of Kiel, Germany. A group ticket is used by individual proposers who search for co-travelers to share the ride with shortly before the train departure. The bargaining behavior resembles the Ultimatum game to the extent that proposers request a fixed price for a shared ride and potential co-travelers usually accept or reject the deal. We observe that the prevailing price corresponds to the equal split of the ticket cost between the maximum possible number of co-travelers. This result is remarkable because the positions of the bargaining parties are hardly symmetric and the formation of the full group is not guaranteed. Using a simple agent-based model we are able to identify some sufficient conditions leading to the observed distribution of prices. Finally, we observed that the probability to accept an unusually high offer is decreasing with the price and increasing when the offer is made right before the train departure. -- Natural field experiment ; bargaining ; focal point ; equal split ; agent-based model

     
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    hdl: 10419/37098
    Schriftenreihe: Kiel working paper ; 1638
    Schlagworte: Eisenbahntarif; Soziale Gruppe; Schienenpersonenverkehr; Verhandlungstheorie; Ultimatumspiel; Feldforschung; Agentenbasierte Modellierung; Theorie; Deutschland
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 28 S.), graph. Darst.
  10. Pre-play communication in Cournot competition
    an experiment with students and managers
    Autor*in: Waichman, Israel; Requate, Tilman; Siang, Ch’ng Kean
    Erschienen: 2010
    Verlag:  Univ., Dep. of Economics, Kiel

    This study investigates the impact of pre-play communication on the outcomes in Cournot duopoly and triopoly experiments, using both students and managers as subjects. Communication is implemented by two different devices, a... mehr

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    Universitätsbibliothek Kiel, Zentralbibliothek
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    EZ 180
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 1 (2010,9)
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    This study investigates the impact of pre-play communication on the outcomes in Cournot duopoly and triopoly experiments, using both students and managers as subjects. Communication is implemented by two different devices, a ‘standardized-communication’ and a free-communication device. We find that the effect of communication on collusion is larger in duopoly than in triopoly. Moreover, managers behave in a similar way under the two communication devices, while students are more influenced by the free-communication than by the standardized-communication device. In addition, managers select lower aggregate quantities than students, and communication enhances the difference between the subject pools in duopoly but reduces this difference in triopoly. Inspecting individual behavior, in all treatments the output adjustment is significantly correlated with the previous round’s best response strategy. In the treatments with communication, the effect of imitation becomes larger and crowds out the effect of myopic best response. Finally, in all treatments duopoly results in more collusion than triopoly. -- Artefactual field experiment ; subject pools ; Cournot oligopoly ; managers ; cheap talk

     
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    hdl: 10419/41551
    Schriftenreihe: Economics working paper / Christian-Albrechts-Universität Kiel, Department of Economics ; 2010-09
    Schlagworte: Oligopol; Spieltheorie; Kommunikation; Wettbewerbsbeschränkung; Feldforschung; Studierende; Führungskräfte
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (53 S.), graph. Darst.
  11. Essays in experimental economics
    Autor*in: Waichman, Israel
    Erschienen: 2009

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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Dissertation
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    Schlagworte: Experiment; Oligopol; Duopol; Emissionshandel; Investition; Anreiz; Theorie; Schienenpersonenverkehr; Straßenverkehr; Verhandlungstheorie; Kiel; Schleswig-Holstein-Ticket; Mitfahrgelegenheit
    Umfang: XIII, 142 Bl., graph. Darst.
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    Kiel, Univ., Diss., 2009
  12. On the role of social wage comparisons in gift-exchange experiments
    Autor*in: Ch'ng, Kean Siang; Requate, Tilman; Waichman, Israel
    Erschienen: 2010
    Verlag:  Univ., Dep. of Economics, Kiel

    This study extends a bilateral gift exchange experiment by Clark et al. (2010) who investigate how feedback of information about wages paid in the market affects both employers’ wage setting and workers’ performance. We provide either quantitative or... mehr

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    Universitätsbibliothek Kiel, Zentralbibliothek
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    This study extends a bilateral gift exchange experiment by Clark et al. (2010) who investigate how feedback of information about wages paid in the market affects both employers’ wage setting and workers’ performance. We provide either quantitative or qualitative information on the average wage paid in all worker-employer-relationships, and we also study repeated relationships (fixedmatching). We find that information on the average wage reduces (increases) both wage offers and effort levels in one-shot (repeated) relationships. -- Gift-exchange ; reciprocity ; wage difference ; economic experiment

     
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    hdl: 10419/44351
    Schriftenreihe: Economics working paper / Christian-Albrechts-Universität Kiel, Department of Economics ; 2010-11
    Schlagworte: Lohnstruktur; Leistungsmotivation; Austauschtheorie; Wiederholte Spiele; Experiment
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 7 S., 557 KB), graph. Darst.
  13. Self-nudging is more ethical, but less efficient than social nudging
    Autor*in: Diederich, Johannes; Goeschl, Timo; Waichman, Israel
    Erschienen: 05 Mai 2023
    Verlag:  Heidelberg University, Department of Economics, Heidelberg

    Manipulating choice architectures to achieve social ends ('social nudges') raises problems of ethicality. Giving individuals control over their default choice ('selfnudges') is a possible remedy, but the trade-offs with efficiency are poorly... mehr

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    Manipulating choice architectures to achieve social ends ('social nudges') raises problems of ethicality. Giving individuals control over their default choice ('selfnudges') is a possible remedy, but the trade-offs with efficiency are poorly understood. We examine under four different information structures how subjects set own defaults in social dilemmas and whether outcomes differ between the self-nudge and two exogenous defaults, a social (full cooperation) and a selfish (perfect free-riding) nudge. Subjects recruited from the general population (n = 1,080) play a ten-round, ten-day voluntary contribution mechanism online, with defaults triggered by the absence of an active contribution on the day. We find that individuals' own choice of defaults structurally differs from full cooperation, empirically affirming the ethicality problem of social nudges. Allowing for self-nudges instead of social nudges reduces efficiency at the group level, however. When individual control over nudges is non-negotiable, self-nudges need to be made public to minimize the ethicality-efficiency trade-off.

     
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    hdl: 10419/278454
    Auflage/Ausgabe: This version: April 25, 2023
    Schriftenreihe: AWI discussion paper series ; no. 726 (April 2023)
    Schlagworte: Choice architecture; defaults; public goods; self-nudge; online experiment
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (30, xiv Seiten), Illustrationen