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  1. The response to dynamic incentives in insurance contracts with a deductible
    evidence from a differences-inregression-discontinuities design
    Autor*in: Klein, Tobias J.; Salm, Martin; Upadhyay, Suraj
    Erschienen: 02 April 2020
    Verlag:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

    Zugang:
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    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    LZ 161
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; DP14552
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 63 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. The response to dynamic incentives in insurance contracts with a deductible
    evidence from a differences-in-regression-discontinuities design
    Autor*in: Klein, Tobias J.; Salm, Martin; Upadhyay, Suraj
    Erschienen: March 2020
    Verlag:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    We develop a new approach to quantify how patients respond to dynamic incentives in health insurance contracts with a deductible. Our approach exploits two sources of variation in a differences-in-regression-discontinuities design: deductible... mehr

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    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 4
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We develop a new approach to quantify how patients respond to dynamic incentives in health insurance contracts with a deductible. Our approach exploits two sources of variation in a differences-in-regression-discontinuities design: deductible contracts reset at the beginning of the year, and cost-sharing limits change over the years. Using rich claims-level data from a large Dutch health insurer we find that individuals are forward-looking. Changing dynamic incentives by increasing the deductible by €100 leads to a reduction in healthcare spending of around 3% on the first days of the year and 6% at the annual level. The response to dynamic incentives is an important part of the overall effect of cost-sharing schemes on healthcare expenditures - much more so than what the previous literature has suggested.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/216420
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 13108
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 62 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Patient cost-sharing and risk solidarity in health insurance
    Autor*in: Klein, Tobias J.; Salm, Martin; Upadhyay, Suraj
    Erschienen: 25 August 2023
    Verlag:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

    Zugang:
    Verlag (lizenzpflichtig)
    Verlag (lizenzpflichtig)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    LZ 161
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; DP18395
    Schlagworte: Health insurance; moral hazard; patient cost-sharing; risk solidarity
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 66 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Patient cost-sharing and redistribution in health insurance
    Autor*in: Klein, Tobias J.; Salm, Martin; Upadhyay, Suraj
    Erschienen: January 2024
    Verlag:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    Health insurance premiums often do not reflect individual health risks, implying redistribution from individuals with low health risks to individuals with high health risks. This paper studies whether more cost-sharing leads to less redistribution... mehr

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    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 4
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Health insurance premiums often do not reflect individual health risks, implying redistribution from individuals with low health risks to individuals with high health risks. This paper studies whether more cost-sharing leads to less redistribution and to lower welfare of high-risk individuals. This could be the case because more cost-sharing increases out-of-pocket payments especially for high-risk individuals. We estimate a structural model of healthcare consumption using administrative data from a Dutch health insurer. We use the model to simulate the effects of a host of counterfactual policies. The policy that was in place was a 350 euro deductible. Our counterfactual experiments show that redistribution would decrease when the deductible would increase. Nonetheless, high-risk individuals can benefit from higher levels of cost-sharing. The reason is that this leads to lower premiums because both high-risk and low-risk individuals strongly react to the financial incentives cost-sharing provides.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 16778
    Schlagworte: health insurance; moral hazard; patient cost-sharing; redistribution
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 66 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. Essays on policies to curb rising healthcare expenditures
    Autor*in: Upadhyay, Suraj
    Erschienen: [2022]
    Verlag:  Tilburg University, Tilburg

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    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
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    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VS 181
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Dissertation
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9789056686864
    Weitere Identifier:
    Schriftenreihe: [Dissertation series] / [Center for Economic Research, Tilburg University] ; [nr. 684 (2022)]
    Schlagworte: Gesundheitskosten; Gesundheitspolitik; Krankenversicherung; Selbstbeteiligung; Gesundheitsmarkt; Niederlande
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 193 Seiten), Illustrationen
    Bemerkung(en):

    Dissertation, Tilburg University, 2022