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  1. A structural model of a multitasking salesforce
    job task allocation and incentive plan design
    Autor*in: Kim, Minkyung; Sudhir, K.; Uetake, Kosuke
    Erschienen: 2019
    Verlag:  Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut

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    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VS 29
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Cowles Foundation discussion paper ; no. 2199 (September 2019)
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 55 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. When salespeople manage customer relationships
    multidimensional incentives and private information
    Autor*in: Kim, Minkyung; Sudhir, K.; Uetake, Kosuke; Canales, Rodrigo
    Erschienen: February 2018
    Verlag:  Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Cowles Foundation discussion paper ; no. 2122
    Schlagworte: Beziehungsmarketing; Verkaufspersonal; Vergütungssystem; Leistungsanreiz; Asymmetrische Information; Moral Hazard; Adverse Selektion
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 73 Seiten), Illustrationen
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    Die ursprüngliche Zählung der Serie war Nr. 3022, später wurde die Zählung auf Nr. 2122 geändert
  3. Multidimensional sales incentives in CRM settings
    customer adverse selection and moral hazard
    Autor*in: Kim, Minkyung; Sudhir, K.; Uetake, Kosuke; Canales, Rodrigo
    Erschienen: December 2016
    Verlag:  Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut

    In many firms, incentivized salespeople with private information about their customers are responsible for customer relationship management (CRM). Private information can help the firm by increasing sales efficiency, but it can also hurt the firm if... mehr

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    Standort:
    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    In many firms, incentivized salespeople with private information about their customers are responsible for customer relationship management (CRM). Private information can help the firm by increasing sales efficiency, but it can also hurt the firm if salespeople use it to maximize own compensation at the expense of the firm. Specifically, we consider two negative outcomes due to private information — ex-ante customer adverse selection at the time of acquisition and ex-post customer moral hazard after acquisition. This paper investigates potential positive and negative responses of a salesforce to managerial levers — multidimensional incentives for acquisition and retention performance and job transfers that affect the level of private information.Salespeople are responsible for managing customer relationships and compensated through multidimensional performance incentives for customer acquisition and maintenance at many firms. This paper investigates how a salesperson's private information on customers affect their response to multiple dimensions of incentives. Using unique matched panel data that links individual salesperson performance metrics with customer level loans and repayments from a microfinance bank, we find that sales people indeed possess private information that is not available to the firm. Salespeople use the private information to engage in adverse selection of customers in response to acquisition incentives. Customer maintenance incentives serve a dual purpose; they not only reduce loan defaults, but also moderate adverse selection in customer acquisition. Transfers that eliminate private information reduces the adverse selection effects of acquisition incentives, but increase loan defaults — customer moral hazard. Despite the potential negative adverse selection effects due to private information, the effort increasing effect of each of the three dimensions of sales management we investigate — acquisition incentive, maintenance incentive and transfers all have a net positive effect on firm value. Methodologically, the paper introduces an identification strategy to separate customer adverse selection and customer moral hazard (loan repayment), by leveraging the multidimensional incentives of an intermediary (salesperson) responsible for both customer selection and repayment with private information about customers

     
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    Format: Online
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    Schriftenreihe: Cowles Foundation discussion paper ; no. 2085
    Schlagworte: Beziehungsmarketing; Anreiz; Konsumentenverhalten; Adverse Selektion; Moral Hazard; Mikrofinanzierung; Mexiko
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 40 Seiten)
  4. Signaling in Online Credit Markets
    Autor*in: Kawai, Kei; Onishi, Ken; Uetake, Kosuke
    Erschienen: 2021
    Verlag:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass

    We study how signaling affects equilibrium outcomes and welfare in an online credit market using detailed data on loan characteristics and borrower repayment. We build and estimate an equilibrium model in which a borrower may signal her default risk... mehr

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    Standort:
    Sächsische Landesbibliothek - Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden
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    Standort:
    Universitätsbibliothek Freiburg
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    Standort:
    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    Standort:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
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    Standort:
    Technische Informationsbibliothek (TIB) / Leibniz-Informationszentrum Technik und Naturwissenschaften und Universitätsbibliothek
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    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We study how signaling affects equilibrium outcomes and welfare in an online credit market using detailed data on loan characteristics and borrower repayment. We build and estimate an equilibrium model in which a borrower may signal her default risk through the reserve interest rate. Comparing a market with and without signaling relative to the benchmark with no asymmetric information, we find that adverse selection destroys as much as 34% of total surplus, up to 78% of which can be restored with signaling. We also estimate backward-bending supply curves for some markets, consistent with the prediction of Stiglitz & Weiss (1981)

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    Schriftenreihe: NBER working paper series ; no. w29268
    Schlagworte: Asymmetrische Information; Kreditmarkt; Signalling; Wohlfahrtsanalyse
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource, illustrations (black and white)
    Bemerkung(en):

    Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers