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  1. Competition among public good providers for donor rewards
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  Research platform Empirical and Experimental Economics, University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck, Austria

    We present experimental evidence for decision settings where public good providers compete for endogenous donations offered by outside donors. Donors receive benefits from public good provision but cannot provide the good themselves. The performance... mehr

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    We present experimental evidence for decision settings where public good providers compete for endogenous donations offered by outside donors. Donors receive benefits from public good provision but cannot provide the good themselves. The performance of three competition mechanisms is examined in relation to the level of public good provision and transfers offered by donors. In addition to a contest with rewards proportional to effort to all public good providers, we study two contests with exclusion from transfers, namely a winner-takes-all and a losergets-nothing. We compare behavior in these three decision settings to the default setting of no-transfers. Results for this novel decision environment with endogenous prizes show that contributions to the public good are not significantly different in the winner-takes-all and loser-gets-nothing settings, but donor's transfers are significantly lower in winner-takes-all. Initially, the winner-takes-all and loser-gets-nothing settings lead to a significant increase in public good contributions compared to the setting where transfers are proportional to contributions for everyone; but this difference diminishes over decision rounds. All three contest with endogenous prizes generate consistent and significantly higher public good provision compared to the setting with no-transfers.

     

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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/250151
    Schriftenreihe: Working papers in economics and statistics ; 2021, 29
    Schlagworte: Public Good; Institution; Externality; Contests; Laboratory Experiment
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 46 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Substitution of social concerns under the Covid-19 pandemic
    Erschienen: [2020]
    Verlag:  Research platform Empirical and Experimental Economics, University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck, Austria

    Think tanks and political leaders have raised concerns about the implications that the Covid-19 response and reconstruction might have on other social objectives that were setting the international agenda before the Covid-19 pandemic. We present... mehr

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    Think tanks and political leaders have raised concerns about the implications that the Covid-19 response and reconstruction might have on other social objectives that were setting the international agenda before the Covid-19 pandemic. We present experimental evidence for eight consecutive weeks during April-May 2020 for Austria, testing the extent to which Covid-19 concerns might substitute other social concerns such as the climate crisis or the protection of vulnerable sectors of the society. We measure behavior in a simple donation task where participants receive e3 that they can distribute between themselves and different charities. While participants in one treatment have the opportunity to donate, if any, to eight different charities including a rich set of social concerns (Baseline), participants in a second treatment can choose to donate, if any, to the same charities and, in addition, to the Covid-19 Solidarity Response Fund for the World Health Organization (Covid-19). In a third treatment, participants can only decide on distributing the e3 between themselves and the Covid-19 Solidarity Response Fund (Covid-19 Only). Our results show that introducing the Covid-19 Solidarity Response Fund does not significantly change aggregate donations (donations represent 76.3% of endowment in Baseline and 70.2% in Covid-19, t(584) = 1.938, p = 0.053, n = 585). But, given positive donations to the Covid19 Solidarity Response Fund, this entails significantly lower donations to the other eight charities (76.3% in Baseline and 60.8% in Covid-19, t(584) = 5.868, p < 0.001, n = 585). Moreover, our results point to a high support to the WHO Covid-19 Fund: In the treatment where the WHO Covid-19 Fund is the only available recipient, participants donate about 50% of their endowment (Covid-19 Only), while in the treatment where it is one out of nine recipients, donations are still 9.5% of endowment (Covid-19) . Overall, our results indicate that donations to diverse social concerns are partially substituted by donations to the Covid-19 fund; yet, this substitution is far from replacing all other social concerns. 6556 Charitable donation.

     

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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/238254
    Schriftenreihe: Working papers in economics and statistics ; 2020, 30
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 35 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Donations to increase productivity in public good production
    experimental evidence
    Erschienen: [2023]
    Verlag:  Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck, Austria

    This research is inspired by in-kind donations that have the capacity to increase the marginal benefit (productivity) in provision of public goods, for example by providing critical infrastructure that increases the productivity of resources utilized... mehr

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    This research is inspired by in-kind donations that have the capacity to increase the marginal benefit (productivity) in provision of public goods, for example by providing critical infrastructure that increases the productivity of resources utilized by local public good providers. We provide experimental evidence from a twostage decision environment where donors (outsiders), who benefit from a public good, send transfer donations to providers (insiders) of the public good, who also receive benefits. We find that that donors are willing to offer transfers at a sufficiently high level to increase the productivity (MPCR) of the public good. Public good provision by insiders, however, is neither increased significantly above levels observed in treatments with the same MPCR where outsiders' donations are used as compensation rewards to insiders, nor in treatments without donations. Thus, whether a given MPCR is reached endogenously through donations by outsiders or exogenously does not significantly affect insiders' public good provision. In addition, when comparing continuous to threshold endogenous changes in the MPCR, we cannot find significant differences in public good provision, despite transfer donations by outsiders are higher for threshold increases in the MPCR.

     

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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/278419
    Auflage/Ausgabe: This version: March 2023
    Schriftenreihe: Working papers in economics and statistics ; 2023, 02
    Schlagworte: Public goods; Privately Provided Public Goods; Institution; Externality; Donation; Reciprocity
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 47 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. No response to changes in marginal incentives in one-shot public good experiments
    Erschienen: [2023]
    Verlag:  Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck, Austria

    We report novel results from changes in the marginal per capita return (MPCR) in a one-shot public good game where participants make a single provision decision. Data was collected using three "data collection processes": an online experiment... mehr

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    We report novel results from changes in the marginal per capita return (MPCR) in a one-shot public good game where participants make a single provision decision. Data was collected using three "data collection processes": an online experiment conducted on Prolific, an online experiment conducted with a subject pool of university students, and an experiment implemented following the conventional procedures of the economic laboratory with university students. In three between-subject treatment conditions, we confront participants from each of these three samples with either a low MPCR of 0.4, a high MPCR of 0.8 holding constant the individual endowment, or a high MPCR of 0.8 reducing the individual endowment to hold constant maximum possible group earnings. Based on a total sample size of 952 participants, we find that, unlike results from previous experiments where subjects make multiple contribution decisions in varying experimental designs, contributions to the public good are not different for the different MPCR conditions we study. We consider these results to be highly relevant in highlighting the limits to our understanding of cooperative behavior for settings without repeated interactions.

     

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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/278531
    Schriftenreihe: Working papers in economics and statistics ; 2023, 08
    Schlagworte: Voluntary contribution mechanism; Public goods; Marginal per capita return; Social dilemma; Experiments
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 32 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. Experimental evidence on sharing rules and additionality in transfer payments
    Erschienen: [2020]
    Verlag:  Research platform Empirical and Experimental Economics, University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck, Austria

    This study presents experimental evidence on the effectiveness of alternative institutional arrangements designed to allow providers of public good services to be subsidized by non-providers. The decision setting is a repeated linear public good game... mehr

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    This study presents experimental evidence on the effectiveness of alternative institutional arrangements designed to allow providers of public good services to be subsidized by non-providers. The decision setting is a repeated linear public good game with two groups, insiders and outsiders. Insiders make contributions to a public good that benefits both insiders and outsiders. Outsiders, unable to provide the public good, can send transfers to compensate insiders. The institutions under consideration are motivated primarily by payments for ecosystem services (PES), such as payments for climate protection. The decision settings, however, capture attributes of many forms of charitable giving. Results are presented from two studies. Study 1, based on a 2x2 design, considers two sharing rules for group payments and whether an additionality criterion is present or not. With the equal sharing rule, insiders receive an equal share of transfers. With the proportional rule, insiders receive a share of transfers proportional to their relative contributions in their group. When the additionality criterion is present, transfers are received contingent on insiders providing the public good at a level higher than in initial decision periods, where a transfer option is not present. Study 2 examines a setting where individual outsiders are able to target transfers to individual insiders, allowing outsiders to endogenously choose the specific distribution of transfers among the insiders. The sharing rules studied result in significant differences in cooperation levels. Both the proportional share and targeted-transfers rules lead to greater public good provision relative to the equal share rule. Contrary to its alleged relevance to PES programs, additionality does not lead to sustained increases in public good provision. On the other hand, additionality may improve the cost-effectiveness of transfer programs by precluding transfer payments when subsidies do not increase public good provision.

     

    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/238246
    Schriftenreihe: Working papers in economics and statistics ; 2020, 22
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 46 Seiten), Illustrationen