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  1. Correlation neglect in student-to-school matching
    Autor*in: Rees-Jones, Alex; Shorrer, Ran; Tergiman, Chloe J.
    Erschienen: February 2020
    Verlag:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    W 1 (26734)
    Fernleihe:
    uneingeschränkte Fernleihe, Kopie und Ausleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Druck
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research ; 26734
    Schlagworte: Schulauswahl; Experiment; Matching; Entscheidungstheorie; USA
    Umfang: 41 Seiten, Illustrationen
    Bemerkung(en):

    Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe
  2. Behavioral Economics in Education Market Design
    A Forward-Looking Review
    Autor*in: Rees-Jones, Alex; Shorrer, Ran
    Erschienen: February 2023
    Verlag:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass

    The rational-choice framework for modeling matching markets has been tremendously useful in guiding the design of school-assignment systems. Despite this success, a large body of work documents deviations from the predictions of this framework that... mehr

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    Verlag (lizenzpflichtig)
    Resolving-System (lizenzpflichtig)

    Standort:
    Sächsische Landesbibliothek - Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Universitätsbibliothek Freiburg
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Technische Informationsbibliothek (TIB) / Leibniz-Informationszentrum Technik und Naturwissenschaften und Universitätsbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    The rational-choice framework for modeling matching markets has been tremendously useful in guiding the design of school-assignment systems. Despite this success, a large body of work documents deviations from the predictions of this framework that appear influenced by behavioral-economic phenomena. We review these findings and the body of behavioral theories that have been presented as possible explanations. Motivated by this literature, we lay out paths for behavioral economists to be directly useful to education market design

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: NBER working paper series ; no. w30973
    Schlagworte: Verhaltensökonomik; Bildungsverhalten; Präferenztheorie; Market Design; Micro-Based Behavioral Economics
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource, illustrations (black and white)
    Bemerkung(en):

    Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
  3. Optimal truncation in matching markets
    Autor*in: Coles, Peter A.; Shorrer, Ran
    Erschienen: 2013
    Verlag:  Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Milano

    Since no stable matching mechanism can induce truth-telling as a dominant strategy for all participants, there is often room in matching markets for strategic misrepresentation (Roth [25]). In this paper we study a natural form of strategic... mehr

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 125 (2013,49)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Since no stable matching mechanism can induce truth-telling as a dominant strategy for all participants, there is often room in matching markets for strategic misrepresentation (Roth [25]). In this paper we study a natural form of strategic misrepresentation: reporting a truncation of one's true preference list. Roth and Rothblum [28] prove an important but abstract result: in certain symmetric, incomplete information settings, agents on one side of the market ("the women") optimally submit some truncation of their true preference lists. In this paper we put structure on this truncation, both in symmetric and general settings, when agents must submit preference lists to the Men-Proposing Deferred Acceptance Algorithm. We first characterize each woman's truncation payoffs in an incomplete information setting in terms of the distribution of her achievable mates. The optimal degree of truncation can be substantial: we prove that in a uniform setting, the optimal degree of truncation for an individual woman goes to 100% of her list as the market size grows large, when other women are truthful. In this setting, we demonstrate the existence of an equilibrium where all agents use truncation strategies. Compared to truthful reporting, in any equilibrium in truncation strategies, welfare diverges for men and women: women prefer the truncation equilibrium, while men would prefer that participants truthfully report. In a general environment, we show that the less risk averse a player, the greater the degree of her optimal truncation. Finally, when correlation in preferences increases, players should truncate less. While several recent papers have focused on the limits of strategic manipulation, our results serve as a reminder that without the pre-conditions ensuring truthful reporting, even in settings where agents have little information, the potential for manipulation can be significant.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/74820
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; 49.2013
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (35 S.), graph. Darst.