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  1. An implementation approach to rotation programs
    Autor*in: Korpela, Ville; Lombardi, Michele; Saulle, Riccardo D.
    Erschienen: May 2021
    Verlag:  Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Milano, Italia

    Rotation programs are widely used in societies. Some examples are job rotations, rotation schemes in the management of common-pool resources, and rotation procedures in fair division problems. We study rotation programs via the implementation of... mehr

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    Rotation programs are widely used in societies. Some examples are job rotations, rotation schemes in the management of common-pool resources, and rotation procedures in fair division problems. We study rotation programs via the implementation of Pareto efficient social choice rules under complete information. The notion of the rotation program predicts the outcomes. A rotation program is a myopic stable set whose states are arranged circularly, and agents can effectively move only between two consecutive states. We provide characterizing conditions for the implementation in rotation programs and show that, for multi-valued rules, our notion of rotation monotonicity is necessary and sufficient for implementation. Finally, we identify two classes of assignment problems that are implementable in rotation programs.

     
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    hdl: 10419/237740
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei ; 2021, 015
    Schlagworte: Rotation Programs; Job Rotation; Assignment Problems; Implementation; Right Structures; Stability
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 53 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Myopic oligopoly pricing
    Autor*in: Bos, Iwan; Marini, Marco; Saulle, Riccardo D.
    Erschienen: March 2021
    Verlag:  Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Milano, Italia

    This paper examines capacity-constrained oligopoly pricing with sellers who seek myopic improvements. We employ the Myopic Stable Set stability concept and establish the existence of a unique pure-strategy price solution for any given level of... mehr

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    This paper examines capacity-constrained oligopoly pricing with sellers who seek myopic improvements. We employ the Myopic Stable Set stability concept and establish the existence of a unique pure-strategy price solution for any given level of capacity. This solution is shown to coincide with the set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria when capacities are large or small. For an intermediate range of capacities, it predicts a price interval that includes the mixed-strategy support. This stability concept thus encompasses all Nash equilibria and offers a pure-strategy solution when there is none in Nash terms. In particular, it provides a behavioral rationale for different types of pricing dynamics, including real-world economic phenomena such as Edgeworth-like price cycles, price dispersion and supply shortages.

     
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    hdl: 10419/233094
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei ; 2021, 009
    Schlagworte: Electricity Access; Energy Demand; Rural Development; Bottom-up Modelling; Sub-Saharan Africa; Multi-sectoral Approach; Water-Energy-Food-Environment Nexus
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 50 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. An implementation approach to rotation programs
    Autor*in: Korpela, Ville; Lombardi, Michele; Saulle, Riccardo D.
    Erschienen: December 2021
    Verlag:  Aboa Centre for Economics, Turku

    We study rotation programs within the standard implementation framework under complete information. A rotation program is a myopic stable set whose states are arranged circularly, and agents can effectively move only between two consecutive states.... mehr

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    We study rotation programs within the standard implementation framework under complete information. A rotation program is a myopic stable set whose states are arranged circularly, and agents can effectively move only between two consecutive states. We provide characterizing conditions for the implementation of efficient rules in rotation programs. Moreover, we show that the conditions fully characterize the class of implementable multi-valued and efficient rules.

     
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    hdl: 10419/265188
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / Aboa Centre for Economics ; no. 150
    Schlagworte: Rotation Programs; Job Rotation; Assignment Problems,Implementation; rights structures; Stability
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 55 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Myopic oligopoly pricing
    Autor*in: Bos, Iwan; Marini, Marco; Saulle, Riccardo D.
    Erschienen: December 2021
    Verlag:  Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Milano, Italia

    This paper examines capacity-constrained oligopoly pricing with sellers who seek myopic improvements. We employ the Myopic Stable Set solution concept and establish the existence of a unique pure-strategy price solution for any given level of... mehr

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    This paper examines capacity-constrained oligopoly pricing with sellers who seek myopic improvements. We employ the Myopic Stable Set solution concept and establish the existence of a unique pure-strategy price solution for any given level of capacity. This solution is shown to coincide with the set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria when capacities are large or small. For an intermediate range of capacities, it predicts a price interval that includes the mixed-strategy support. This stability concept thus encompasses all Nash equilibria and offers a pure-strategy solution when there is none in Nash terms. It particularly provides a behavioral rationale for different pricing patterns, including Edgeworth price cycles and states of hyper-competition with supply shortages. We also analyze the impact of a change in firm size distribution. A merger among the biggest firms may lead to more price dispersion as it increases the maximum and decreases the minimum myopically stable price.

     
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    hdl: 10419/249967
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei ; 2021, 032
    Schlagworte: Bounded Rationality; Capacity Constraints; Mergers; Myopic Stable Set; Oligopoly Pricing; Supply Shortages
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 57 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. Decreasing incomes increase selfishness
    Autor*in: Gagnon, Nickolas; Saulle, Riccardo D.; Zaunbrecher, Henrik W.
    Erschienen: December 2021
    Verlag:  Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Milano, Italia

    We use a controlled laboratory experiment to study the causal impact of income decreases within a time period on redistribution decisions at the end of that period, in an environment where we keep fixed the sum of incomes over the period. First, we... mehr

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    We use a controlled laboratory experiment to study the causal impact of income decreases within a time period on redistribution decisions at the end of that period, in an environment where we keep fixed the sum of incomes over the period. First, we investigate the effect of a negative income trend (intra-personal decrease), which means a decreasing income compared to one's recent past. Second, we investigate the effect of a negative income trend relative to the income trend of another person (inter-personal decrease). If intra-personal or inter-personal decreases create dissatisfaction for an individual, that person may become more selfish to obtain compensation. We formalize both effects in a multi-period model augmenting a standard model of inequality aversion. Overall, conditional on exhibiting sufficiently-strong social preferences, we find that individuals indeed behave more selfishly when they experience decreasing incomes. While many studies examine the effect of income inequality on redistribution decisions, we delve into the history behind one's income to isolate the effect of income changes.

     
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    hdl: 10419/249968
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei ; 2021, 033
    Schlagworte: Income Inequality; Income Change; Social Preferences; Social Comparison; Income Redistribution
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 63 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Decreasing incomes increase selfishness
    Autor*in: Gagnon, Nickolas; Saulle, Riccardo D.; Zaunbrecher, Henrik W.
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  Università degli studi di Padova, dSEA, [Padova]

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    Sprache: Englisch
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    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Marco Fanno working papers ; 274 (July 2021)
    Schlagworte: Income Inequality; Income Change; Social Preferences; Social Comparison; Income Redistribution
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 53 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. An implementation approach to rotation programs
    Autor*in: Korpela, Ville; Lombardi, Michele; Saulle, Riccardo D.
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  Università degli studi di Padova, dSEA, [Padova]

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    Schriftenreihe: Marco Fanno working papers ; 273 (April 2021)
    Schlagworte: Rotation Programs; Job Rotation; Assignment Problems,Implementation; rights structures; Stability
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 50 Seiten), Illustrationen
  8. Myopic oligopoly pricing
    Autor*in: Bos, Iwan; Marini, Marco; Saulle, Riccardo D.
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  Università degli studi di Padova, dSEA, [Padova]

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    Schriftenreihe: Marco Fanno working papers ; 271 (December 2021)
    Schlagworte: Bounded Rationality; Capacity Constraints; Mergers; Myopic Stable Set; Oligopoly Pricing; Supply Shortages
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 53 Seiten), Illustrationen
  9. Implementation in vNM stable set
    Autor*in: Korpela, Ville; Lombardi, Michele; Saulle, Riccardo D.
    Erschienen: [2022]
    Verlag:  Department of Economics and Management "Marco Fanno", University of Padova, Padova

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    Schriftenreihe: Marco Fanno working papers ; 283 (September 2022)
    Schlagworte: stable set; implementation; rights structure; farsightedness
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 55 Seiten), Illustrationen
  10. The last will be first, and the first last
    segregation in societies with relative payoff concerns
    Autor*in: Herings, Peter Jean-Jacques; Saulle, Riccardo D.; Seel, Christian
    Erschienen: [2020]
    Verlag:  Università degli studi di Padova, Dipartimento di scienze economiche "Marco Fanno", [Padova]

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    Schriftenreihe: Marco Fanno working papers ; 249 (March 2020)
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 33 Seiten), Illustrationen
  11. The last will be first, and the first last
    segregation in societies with relative payoff concerns
    Autor*in: Herings, Peter Jean-Jacques; Saulle, Riccardo D.; Seel, Christian
    Erschienen: [2020]
    Verlag:  Graduate School of Business and Economics, Maastricht

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    Auflage/Ausgabe: RM/18/027-revised
    Schriftenreihe: [Research memorandum] / Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE) ; RM/20, 011
    Schlagworte: Kooperatives Spiel; Koalition; Soziale Gruppe; Theorie
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 34 Seiten), Illustrationen
  12. Bertrand competition with asymmetric costs
    a solution in pure strategies
    Autor*in: Demuynck, Thomas; Herings, Peter Jean-Jacques; Saulle, Riccardo D.; Seel, Christian
    Erschienen: [2018]
    Verlag:  Graduate School of Business and Economics, Maastricht

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    Schriftenreihe: [Research memorandum] / Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE) ; RM/18, 002
    Schlagworte: Bertrand Competition; Asymmetric Costs; Myopic Stable Set
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 10 Seiten), Illustrationen
  13. The myopic stable set for social environments
    Autor*in: Demuynck, Thomas; Herings, Peter Jean-Jacques; Saulle, Riccardo D.; Seel, Christian
    Erschienen: [2018]
    Verlag:  Graduate School of Business and Economics, Maastricht

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    Auflage/Ausgabe: RM/17/002 revised
    Schriftenreihe: [Research memorandum] / Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE) ; RM/18, 001
    Schlagworte: Soziale Beziehungen; Soziale Gruppe; Nash-Gleichgewicht; Kooperatives Spiel; myopic stable set (MMS); Shapley-Scarf housing matching model
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 49 Seiten)
  14. The myopic stable set for social environments
    Autor*in: Demuynck, Thomas; Herings, Peter Jean-Jacques; Saulle, Riccardo D.; Seel, Christian
    Erschienen: [2017]
    Verlag:  Graduate School of Business and Economics, Maastricht

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    Schriftenreihe: [Research memorandum] / Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE) ; RM/17/002
    Schlagworte: Soziale Beziehungen; Soziale Gruppe; Nash-Gleichgewicht; Kooperatives Spiel; myopic stable set (MMS); Shapley-Scarf housing matching model
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 37 Seiten), Illustrationen
  15. The myopic stable set for social environments
    Autor*in: Demuynck, Thomas; Herings, Peter Jean-Jacques; Saulle, Riccardo D.; Seel, Christian
    Erschienen: 2017
    Verlag:  Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, [Milano]

    We introduce a new solution concept for models of coalition formation, called the myopic stable set. The myopic stable set is defined for a very general class of social environments and allows for an infinite state space. We show that the myopic... mehr

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    We introduce a new solution concept for models of coalition formation, called the myopic stable set. The myopic stable set is defined for a very general class of social environments and allows for an infinite state space. We show that the myopic stable set exists and is non-empty. Under minor continuity conditions, we also demonstrate uniqueness. Furthermore, the myopic stable set is a superset of the core and of the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria in noncooperative games. Additionally, the myopic stable set generalizes and unifies various results from more specific environments. In particular, the myopic stable set coincides with the coalition structure core in coalition function form games if the coalition structure core is non-empty; with the set of stable matchings in the standard one-to-one matching model; with the set of pairwise stable networks and closed cycles in models of network formation; and with the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria in finite supermodular games, finite potential games, and aggregative games. We illustrate the versatility of our concept by characterizing the myopic stable set in a model of Bertrand competition with asymmetric costs, for which the literature so far has not been able to fully characterize the set of all (mixed) Nash equilibria.

     
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    Schriftenreihe: Array ; 2017, 26
    Schlagworte: Soziale Beziehungen; Soziale Gruppe; Nash-Gleichgewicht; Kooperatives Spiel; myopic stable set (MMS); Shapley-Scarf housing matching model
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 39 Seiten), Illustrationen