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  1. Governing a common-pool resource in a directed network
    Autor*in: Richefort, Lionel; Point, Patrick
    Erschienen: 2010
    Verlag:  Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Milano

    A local public-good game played on directed networks is analyzed. The model is motivated by one-way flows of hydrological influence between cities of a river basin that may shape the level of their contribution to the conservation of wetlands. It is... mehr

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 125 (2010,147)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    A local public-good game played on directed networks is analyzed. The model is motivated by one-way flows of hydrological influence between cities of a river basin that may shape the level of their contribution to the conservation of wetlands. It is shown that in many (but not all) directed networks, there exists an equilibrium, sometimes socially desirable, in which some stakeholders exert maximal effort and the others free ride. It is also shown that more directed links are not always better. Finally, the model is applied to the conservation of wetlands in the Gironde estuary (France). -- Common-pool Resource ; Digraph ; Cycle ; Independent Set ; Empirical Example

     
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    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/43430
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; 147.2010
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 36 S., 404,76 KB), graph. Darst.
  2. Empowerment of social norms on water consumption
    Autor*in: Pedehour, Pauline; Richefort, Lionel
    Erschienen: July 2021
    Verlag:  Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Milano, Italia

    This study develops a model of water extraction with endogenous social norms. Many users are connected by a unique shared resource that can become scarce in case of over-exploitation. Preferences of individuals are guided by their extraction values... mehr

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    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 125
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    This study develops a model of water extraction with endogenous social norms. Many users are connected by a unique shared resource that can become scarce in case of over-exploitation. Preferences of individuals are guided by their extraction values and their taste for conformity to social norms which provide incentives to follow others. As the main result of this study, the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium is established under a sufficient condition. Afterward, some comparative statics analysis shows the effects of change in individual heterogeneous parameters, conformism, and density of the network on the global quantity extracted. Welfare and social optimum properties are established to avoid the tragedy of the commons and sub-optimal consumptions of water. Lastly, this theoretical framework is completed by extensions to highlight levers of water preservation, including the calibration of social norm incentives.

     
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      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/237745
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei ; 2021, 020
    Schlagworte: Comparative statics; Conformism; Nash equilibrium; Network; Social norms; Water extraction
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 52 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Networks of many public goods with non-linear best replies
    Autor*in: Rébillé, Yann; Richefort, Lionel
    Erschienen: 2015
    Verlag:  Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Milano

    We model a bipartite network in which links connect agents with public goods. Agents play a voluntary contribution game in which they decide how much to contribute to each public good they are connected to. We show that the problem of finding a Nash... mehr

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 125 (2015,57)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We model a bipartite network in which links connect agents with public goods. Agents play a voluntary contribution game in which they decide how much to contribute to each public good they are connected to. We show that the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium can be posed as a non-linear complementarity one. The existence of an equilibrium point is established for a wide class of individual preferences. We then find a simple sufficient condition, on network structure only, that guarantees the uniqueness of the equilibria, and provide an easy procedure for building networks that respects this condition.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
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    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/113958
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; 57.2015
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (27 S.), graph. Darst.
  4. Warm-glow giving in networks with multiple public goods
    Autor*in: Richefort, Lionel
    Erschienen: 2017
    Verlag:  Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, [Milano]

    This paper explores a voluntary contribution game in the presence of warm-glow effects. There are many public goods and each public good benefits a different group of players. The structure of the game induces a bipartite network structure, where... mehr

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 125 (2017,32)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    This paper explores a voluntary contribution game in the presence of warm-glow effects. There are many public goods and each public good benefits a different group of players. The structure of the game induces a bipartite network structure, where players are listed on one side and the public good groups they form are listed on the other side. The main result of the paper shows the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium. The unique Nash equilibrium is also shown to be locally asymptotically stable. Then the paper provides some comparative statics analysis regarding pure redistribution, taxation and subsidies. It appears that small redistributions of wealth may sometimes be neutral, but generally, the effects of redistributive policies depend on how public good groups are related in the contribution network structure.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
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    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/177226
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; 2017, 32
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 35 Seiten), Illustrationen