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  1. The design of a central counterparty
    Autor*in: Kuong, John Chi-Fong; Maurin, Vincent
    Erschienen: 17 November 2022
    Verlag:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

    Zugang:
    Verlag (lizenzpflichtig)
    Verlag (lizenzpflichtig)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    LZ 161
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; DP17679
    Schlagworte: Collateral; Monitoring
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 68 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Monetary policy deliberations
    committee size and voting rules
    Autor*in: Maurin, Vincent; Vidal, Jean-Pierre
    Erschienen: 2012
    Verlag:  European Central Bank, Frankfurt am Main

    Standort:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 534 (1434)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/153867
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series / European Central Bank ; 1434
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (48 S.), graph. Darst.
  3. Fragility of secured credit chains
    Autor*in: Gottardi, Piero; Maurin, Vincent; Monnet, Cyril
    Erschienen: [2023]
    Verlag:  Universität Bern, Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences, Department of Economics, Bern, Switzerland

    We present a model of secured credit chains in which assets generated from intermediation activity and pledged as collateral create fragility. A dealer stands between a borrower and a financier. The dealer borrows from the financier to fund her... mehr

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    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 182
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We present a model of secured credit chains in which assets generated from intermediation activity and pledged as collateral create fragility. A dealer stands between a borrower and a financier. The dealer borrows from the financier to fund her project, subject to a moral hazard problem, In addition, the dealer can intermediate between the financier and the borrower, forming a credit chain. Intermediation profits can thus act as collateral for the loan to fund the dealer's own project. When these profits are risky, however, using them as collateral may undermine the dealer's incentives, generating fragility in the chain. The arrival of news about the value of the revenue of the intermediation activity further increases fragility. This fragility channel generates a premium for safe or opaque collateral. The environment considered in our model applies to various situations, such as trade credit chains, securitization and repo markets.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/278437
    Auflage/Ausgabe: This version: February, 2023
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion papers / Universität Bern, Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences, Department of Economics ; 23, 04 (April, 2023)
    Schlagworte: Collateral; Secured Lending; Intermediation; Fragility
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 56 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Fragility of secured credit chains
    Autor*in: Gottardi, Piero; Maurin, Vincent; Monnet, Cyril
    Erschienen: [2023]
    Verlag:  Study Center Gerzensee, Gerzensee

    We present a model of secured credit chains in which assets generated from intermediation activity and pledged as collateral create fragility. A dealer stands between a borrower and a financier. The dealer borrows from the financier to fund her... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 529
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We present a model of secured credit chains in which assets generated from intermediation activity and pledged as collateral create fragility. A dealer stands between a borrower and a financier. The dealer borrows from the financier to fund her project, subject to a moral hazard problem, In addition, the dealer can intermediate between the financier and the borrower, forming a credit chain. Intermediation profits can thus act as collateral for the loan to fund the dealer's own project. When these profits are risky, however, using them as collateral may undermine the dealer's incentives, generating fragility in the chain. The arrival of news about the value of the revenue of the intermediation activity further increases fragility. This fragility channel generates a premium for safe or opaque collateral. The environment considered in our model applies to various situations, such as trade credit chains, securitization and repo markets.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/278453
    Auflage/Ausgabe: This version: February, 2023
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / Study Center Gerzensee ; 23, 01
    Schlagworte: Collateral; Secured Lending; Intermediation; Fragility
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 56 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. A theory of repurchase agreements, collateral re-use, and repo intermediation
    Autor*in: Gottardi, Piero; Maurin, Vincent; Monnet, Cyril
    Erschienen: July 2017
    Verlag:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich

    We show that repurchase agreements (repos) arise as the instrument of choice to borrow in a competitive model with limited commitment. The repo contract traded in equilibrium provides insurance against fluctuations in the asset price in states where... mehr

    Standort:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 63 (6579)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We show that repurchase agreements (repos) arise as the instrument of choice to borrow in a competitive model with limited commitment. The repo contract traded in equilibrium provides insurance against fluctuations in the asset price in states where collateral value is high and maximizes borrowing capacity when it is low. Haircuts increase both with counterparty risk and asset risk. In equilibrium, lenders choose to re-use collateral. This increases the circulation of the asset and generates a "collateral multiplier" effect. Finally, we show that intermediation by dealers may endogenously arise in equilibrium, with chains of repos among traders.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
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    Volltext (kostenfrei)
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    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/167565
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; no. 6579
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 65 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. A theory of repurchase agreements, collateral re-use, and repo intermediation
    Autor*in: Gottardi, Piero; Maurin, Vincent; Monnet, Cyril
    Erschienen: [2017]
    Verlag:  European University Institute, Badia Fiesolana, Italy

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VS 38 (2017,3)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
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    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 1814/45725
    Schriftenreihe: EUI working papers ; ECO 2017, 03
    Schlagworte: repos; collateral multiplier; limited commitment; intermediation
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 64 Seiten), Illustrationen