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  1. Zero-intelligence vs. human agents
    an experimental analysis of the efficiency of double auctions and over-the-counter markets of varying sizes
    Autor*in: Attanasi, Giuseppe; Centorrino, Samuele; Manzoni, Elena
    Erschienen: [2020]
    Verlag:  Università die Verona, Department of Economics, [Verona]

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    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series / Department of Economics, University of Verona ; WP number 5 (March 2020)
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 46 Seiten)
  2. Zero-intelligence vs. human agents
    an experimental analysis of the efficiency of double auctions and over-the-counter markets of varying sizes
    Autor*in: Attanasi, Giuseppe; Centorrino, Samuele; Manzoni, Elena
    Erschienen: March, 2020
    Verlag:  Department of Economics, Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY

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    Schriftenreihe: Departmental working papers / Stony Brook University, College of Arts & Sciences, Department of Economics ; 20, 04
    Schlagworte: Market Design; Classroom Experiment; Agent-based Modelling; Game-theoretic Modelling
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 40 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Women at work
    gender quotas, municipality elections and local spending
    Autor*in: Andreoli, Francesco; Manzoni, Elena; Margotti, Margherita
    Erschienen: [2021]
    Verlag:  Università die Verona, Department of Economics, [Verona]

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    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series / Department of Economics, University of Verona ; WP number 3 (February 2021)
    Schlagworte: Gender bias; municipal budget; local policy; municipal council; Italy; Law 251/2012
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 40 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Issue salience and women’s electoral performance
    theory and evidence from Google trends
    Autor*in: Cella, Michela; Manzoni, Elena; Scervini, Francesco
    Erschienen: [2023]
    Verlag:  Department of Economics, Management and Statistics, University of Milano-Bicocca, Milan, Italy

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    Schriftenreihe: DEMS working paper series ; no. 527 (September 2023)
    Schlagworte: gender bias; elections; female politicians
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 38 Seiten)
  5. Issue salience and women's electoral performance
    theory and evidence from google trends
    Autor*in: Cella, Michela; Manzoni, Elena; Scervini, Francesco
    Erschienen: January 2024
    Verlag:  CESifo, Munich, Germany

    In this paper we study whether and how the belief that the gender of politicians affects their competence on different issues influences electoral outcomes depending on the salience of those issues. We first propose a theoretical model of... mehr

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    In this paper we study whether and how the belief that the gender of politicians affects their competence on different issues influences electoral outcomes depending on the salience of those issues. We first propose a theoretical model of issue-specific gender bias in elections which can describe both the presence of a real comparative advantage ('kernel-of-truth' case, or stereotype) and the case of pure prejudice. We show that, if the bias exists, it influences electoral results and that its effect can be partially reversed by successful information transmission during the electoral campaign. We then empirically investigate the relation between issue salience and women's performance using US data on House and Senate elections. Estimates of issue salience are obtained using Google Trends data. Exploiting the longitudinal dimension of the dataset at district level and an IV strategy to rule out possible endogeneity, we show a positive correlation between the salience of those issues that are typically listed as feminine and women's electoral outcomes. We therefore conclude that a bias indeed exists. The average effect of the bias is sizable with respect to the share of votes for women candidates, even if not large enough to significantly increase the probability that women candidates win elections.

     
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/296011
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo working papers ; 10922 (2024)
    Schlagworte: gender bias; elections; female politicians
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 42 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Belief-dependent preferences and reputation
    experimental analysis of a repeated trust game
    Autor*in: Attanasi, Giuseppe; Battigalli, Pierpaolo; Manzoni, Elena; Nagel, Rosemarie
    Erschienen: [2018]
    Verlag:  IGIER, Università Bocconi, Milano, Italy

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    Auflage/Ausgabe: This version: April, 2018
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series / IGIER ; n. 622
    Schlagworte: Repeated psychological game; reputation; guilt; almost complete information
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 38 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. Incomplete information models of guilt aversion in the trust game
    Autor*in: Attanasi, Giuseppe; Battigalli, Pierpaolo; Manzoni, Elena
    Erschienen: [2015]
    Verlag:  IGIER, Università Bocconi, Milano, Italy

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    Auflage/Ausgabe: This version: January, 2015
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series / IGIER ; n. 480
    Schlagworte: Psychological games; Trust Game; guilt; incomplete information
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 32 Seiten), Illustrationen
  8. News, emotions, and policy views on immigration
    Autor*in: Manzoni, Elena; Murard, Elie; Quercia, Simone; Tonini, Sara
    Erschienen: May 2024
    Verlag:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    How do emotions affect policy views on immigration? How do they influence the way people process and respond to factual information? We address these questions using a survey experiment in Italy, which randomly exposes around 7,000 participants to... mehr

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    How do emotions affect policy views on immigration? How do they influence the way people process and respond to factual information? We address these questions using a survey experiment in Italy, which randomly exposes around 7,000 participants to (i) sensational news about immigrant crimes, (ii) statistical information about immigration, or to (iii) the combination of both. First, we find different effects of news depending on the severity of the reported crime: while the news of a rape against a young woman significantly increases the demand for anti-immigration policies, there is no impact of the news of a petty theft. Consistent with a causal role of emotions, we find that the rape news triggers a stronger emotional reaction than the theft news, while having a similar effect on factual beliefs. Second, we document that information provision corrects beliefs, irrespective of whether participants are also exposed to the rape news. Yet, the exposure to the rape news strongly influences whether belief updating translates into change in policy views: when presented in isolation, information tends to reduce anti-immigration views; when combined with the rape news, the impact of the latter dominates and participants increase their anti-immigration views to the same extent as when exposed to the rape news only. This evidence suggests that, once negative emotions are triggered, having more accurate factual knowledge no longer matters for forming policy views on immigration.

     
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    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 17017
    Schlagworte: news; information; immigration; experiment; belief; emotions
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 67 Seiten), Illustrationen
  9. Social comparison and risk taking behavior
    Autor*in: Gamba, Astrid; Manzoni, Elena; Stanca, Luca M.
    Erschienen: 2014
    Verlag:  Univ. [u.a.], Jena

    This paper studies the effects of social comparison on risk taking be- havior. In our framework, decision makers evaluate the consequences of their choices as changes with respect to both their own and their peers’ conditions. We test experimentally... mehr

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    This paper studies the effects of social comparison on risk taking be- havior. In our framework, decision makers evaluate the consequences of their choices as changes with respect to both their own and their peers’ conditions. We test experimentally whether different positions in the social ranking determine different risk attitudes. Subjects interact in a simulated workplace environment, where they receive possibly different wages as compensation for effort and then undertake a risky decision that may give them an extra gain. We find that social comparison matters for risk attitudes. In addition, risk aversion decreases with the size of social gains. As a consequence, subjects are less risk averse in social loss than in small social gain, whereas their risk attitudes do not differ between social loss and large social gain.

     
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/108538
    Schriftenreihe: Jena economic research papers ; 2014-031
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (23 S.), Ill.
  10. Emotions matter for policy-making
    an example on tacit collusion and guilt
    Autor*in: Ferrario, Rossella; Manzoni, Elena
    Erschienen: [2020]
    Verlag:  Università die Verona, Department of Economics, [Verona]

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    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series / Department of Economics, University of Verona ; WP number 20 (December 2020)
    Schlagworte: guilt aversion; tacit collusion
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 12 Seiten)
  11. Gender bias and women's political performance
    Autor*in: Cella, Michela; Manzoni, Elena
    Erschienen: [2020]
    Verlag:  Università die Verona, Department of Economics, [Verona]

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    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series / Department of Economics, University of Verona ; WP number 16 (September 2020)
    Schlagworte: gender bias; elections; female politicians
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 35 Seiten)
  12. Extreme events, ex post renegotiation and vagueness of campaign promises
    Autor*in: Manzoni, Elena
    Erschienen: [2020]
    Verlag:  Università die Verona, Department of Economics, [Verona]

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    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series / Department of Economics, University of Verona ; WP number 10 (June 2020)
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 9 Seiten)
  13. Last minute policies and the incumbency advantage
    Autor*in: Manzoni, Elena; Penczynski, Stefan P.
    Erschienen: 2012
    Verlag:  CESifo, München

    This paper models a purely informational mechanism behind the incumbency advantage. In a two-period electoral campaign with two policy issues, a specialized incumbent and an unspecialized, but possibly more competent challenger compete for election... mehr

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    This paper models a purely informational mechanism behind the incumbency advantage. In a two-period electoral campaign with two policy issues, a specialized incumbent and an unspecialized, but possibly more competent challenger compete for election by voters who are heterogeneously informed about the state of the world. Due to the asymmetries in government responsibility between candidates, the incumbent's statements may convey information on the relevance of the issues to voters. In equilibrium, the incumbent sometimes strategically releases his statement early and thus signals the importance of his signature issue to the voters. This gives rise to the incumbency advantage. We find that, since the incumbent's positioning on the issue reveals private information which the challenger can use in later statements, the incumbent's incentives to distort the campaign are decreasing in the quality of the incumbent, as previously documented by the empirical literature. However, we show that this implies a non-monotonicity in the distortions that arise in equilibrium. -- incumbency advantage ; electoral competition ; information revelation

     
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/57287
    RVK Klassifikation: QB 910
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; 3773
    Schlagworte: Politiker; Berufserfahrung; Wahlkampf; Informationsverhalten; Theorie
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 24 S., 455 KB)
  14. Social comparison and risk taking behavior
    Autor*in: Gamba, Astrid; Manzoni, Elena
    Erschienen: 2014
    Verlag:  Univ. [u.a.], Jena

    We study theoretically and experimentally decision making under uncertainty in a social environment. We introduce an interdependent preferences model that assumes that the decision maker evaluates monetary outcomes in relation both with his... mehr

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    We study theoretically and experimentally decision making under uncertainty in a social environment. We introduce an interdependent preferences model that assumes that the decision maker evaluates monetary outcomes in relation both with his individual and his social reference point. In the experiment we reproduce a workplace environment whereby subjects interact in an effort task, earn (possibly) different wages from this task and then undertake a risky decision that may give them an extra bonus. Controlling for intrinsic risk attitudes, we find that both downward and upward social comparison strongly influence risk attitudes and that they both generate more risk loving behavior. Moreover, we find that a propension to envy counterposes such effect, by increasing risk aversion.

     
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/98438
    Schriftenreihe: Jena economic research papers ; 2014-001
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (45 S.), Ill.
  15. Last minute policies and the incumbency advantage
    Autor*in: Manzoni, Elena; Penczynski, Stefan P.
    Erschienen: October 2014
    Verlag:  Universität Mannheim, Department of Economics, Mannheim

    This paper models a purely informational mechanism behind the incumbency advantage. In a two-period electoral campaign with two policy issues, a specialized incumbent and an unspecialized, but possibly more competent challenger compete for election... mehr

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    This paper models a purely informational mechanism behind the incumbency advantage. In a two-period electoral campaign with two policy issues, a specialized incumbent and an unspecialized, but possibly more competent challenger compete for election by voters who are heterogeneously informed about the state of the world. Due to the asymmetries in government responsibility between candidates, the incumbent's statement may convey information on the relevance of the issues to voters. In equilibrium, the incumbent sometimes strategically releases his statement early and thus signals the importance of his signature issue to the voters. We find that, since the incumbent's positioning on the issue reveals private information which the challenger can use in later statements, the incumbent's incentives to distort the campaign are decreasing in his quality, as previously documented by the empirical literature. The distortions arising in equilibrium are decreasing in the incumbent's effective ability; however, the distortions may be increasing in the incumbent's reputation of expertise on his signature issue.

     
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/129577
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series / University of Mannheim, Department of Economics ; 14-24
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 39 Seiten), Illustrationen