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  1. Investor sentiment and the (discretionary) accrual-return relation
    Autor*in: Jiang, Jiajun; Liu, Qi; Sun, Bo
    Erschienen: 2020
    Verlag:  Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, [Washington, DC]

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    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VS 201
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
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    Schriftenreihe: International finance discussion papers ; number 1300 (September 2020)
    Schlagworte: Investor sentiment; Uncertainty; Earnings management; Accrual anomaly
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 27 Seiten)
  2. Essays on executive compensation
    Autor*in: Liu, Qi
    Erschienen: 2012

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    B 412433
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    uneingeschränkte Fernleihe, Kopie und Ausleihe
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Dissertation
    Format: Druck
    Schlagworte: Managervergütung; Leistungsanreiz; Risikopräferenz; Investition; Konjunktur; Unternehmenswert; Theorie; Pay-for-luck; Excessive risk-taking; Führungskräfte; Lohn; Mitarbeiterkapitalbeteiligung; Pensionskasse; Fremdkapital; Theorie; Leistungsentgelt; Managervergütung; Aktienoption; Risikoaversion; Performance-Messung; Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie
    Umfang: ix, 115 Seiten
    Bemerkung(en):

    Enthält 3 Beiträge

    Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 2012
  3. Managerial compensation under privately-observed hedging
    Autor*in: Liu, Qi; Sun, Bo
    Erschienen: March 2016
    Verlag:  Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, [Washington, DC]

    This paper studies how private information in hedging outcomes affects the design of managerial compensation when hedging instruments serve as a double-edged sword in that they may be used for both corporate hedging and earnings management. On the... mehr

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VS 201 (1160)
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    This paper studies how private information in hedging outcomes affects the design of managerial compensation when hedging instruments serve as a double-edged sword in that they may be used for both corporate hedging and earnings management. On the one hand, financial vehicles can offer customized contracts that are closely tailored to manage specific risk and improve hedging efficiency. On the other hand, involvement in hedging may give rise to manipulation through misstatement of the value estimates. We show that the use of privately-observed hedging may actually require greater pay-for-performance in managerial compensation. The cross-sectional variations in managerial compensation lend support to our model

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: International finance discussion papers ; number1160
    Schlagworte: Hedging; Asymmetrische Information; Managervergütung; Leistungsanreiz; Vertragstheorie
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 19 Seiten)
  4. Contracting with feedback
    Autor*in: Lin, Tse-chun; Liu, Qi; Sun, Bo
    Erschienen: August 2015
    Verlag:  Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, [Washington, DC]

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VS 201 (1143)
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
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    Schriftenreihe: International finance discussion papers ; number1143
    Schlagworte: Managervergütung; Leistungsentgelt; Börsenkurs; Unternehmenswert; Transaktionskosten; USA; Reg-SHO Pilot program
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 65 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. Relative wealth concerns, executive compensation, and systemic risk-taking
    Autor*in: Liu, Qi; Sun, Bo
    Erschienen: May 2016
    Verlag:  Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, [Washington, DC]

    Given the recent empirical evidence on peer effects in CEO compensation, this paper theoretically examines how relative wealth concerns, in which a manager's satisfaction with his own compensation depends on the compensation of other managers, affect... mehr

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VS 201 (1164)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Given the recent empirical evidence on peer effects in CEO compensation, this paper theoretically examines how relative wealth concerns, in which a manager's satisfaction with his own compensation depends on the compensation of other managers, affect the equilibrium contracting strategy and managerial risk-taking. We find that such externalities can generate pay-for-luck as an efficient compensation vehicle in equilibrium. In expectation of pay-for-luck in other firms, tying managerial pay to luck provides insurance to managers against a compensation shortfall relative to executive peers during market fluctuations. When all firms pay for luck, we show that an effort-inducing mechanism exists: managers have additional incentives to exert effort in utilizing investment opportunities, which helps them keep up with their peers during industry movements. In addition, we show that compensation arrangements involving pay-for-luck that are efficient from the shareholders' perspective can nonetheless exacerbate aggregate fluctuations in the real economy by incentivizing excessive systemic risk-taking, especially in periods of heightened risk

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: International finance discussion papers ; number1164 (May 2016)
    Schlagworte: Managervergütung; Leistungsanreiz; Risikopräferenz; Investition; Konjunktur; Unternehmenswert; Theorie; Pay-for-luck; Excessive risk-taking
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 46 Seiten)
  6. Incentive contracting under ambiguity aversion
    Autor*in: Liu, Qi; Lu, Lei; Sun, Bo
    Erschienen: February 2017
    Verlag:  Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, [Washington, DC]

    This paper studies a principal-agent model in which the information on future firm performance is ambiguous and the agent is averse to ambiguity. We show that if firm risk is ambiguous, while stocks always induce the agent to perceive a high risk,... mehr

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    Standort:
    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
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    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VS 201 (1195)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    This paper studies a principal-agent model in which the information on future firm performance is ambiguous and the agent is averse to ambiguity. We show that if firm risk is ambiguous, while stocks always induce the agent to perceive a high risk, options can induce him to perceive a low risk. As a result, options can be less costly in incentivizing the agent than stocks in the presence of ambiguity. In addition, we show that providing the agent with more incentives would induce the agent to perceive a higher risk, and there is a discontinuous jump in the compensation cost as incentives increase, which makes the principal reluctant to reset contracts frequently when underlying fundamentals change. Thus, compensation contracts exhibit an inertia property. Lastly, the model sheds some light on the use of relative performance evaluation, and provides a rationale for the puzzle of pay-for-luck in the presence of ambiguity

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: International finance discussion papers ; number1195 (February 2017)
    FRB International Finance Discussion Paper ; No. 1195
    Schlagworte: Leistungsentgelt; Managervergütung; Aktienoption; Risikoaversion; Performance-Messung; Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 41 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. Composing Like an Ancient Chinese Poet: Learn to Generate Rhythmic Chinese Poetry
    Autor*in: He, Ming; Chen, Yan; Zhao, Hong-Ke; Liu, Qi; Wu, Le; Cui, Yu; Zeng, Gui-Hua; Liu, Gui-Quan

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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Aufsatz aus einer Zeitschrift
    Format: Online
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    Übergeordneter Titel:
    Enthalten in: Journal of computer science and technology; Boston, Mass. [u.a.] : Springer, 1986-; 38, Heft 6 (30.11.2023), 1272-1287, 12.2023; Online-Ressource
    Weitere Schlagworte: (lcsh)Computer science.; (lcsh)Software engineering.; (lcsh)Computer science.; (lcsh)Data structures (Computer science).; (lcsh)Information theory.; (lcsh)Artificial intelligence.; (lcsh)Application software.; Computer Science.; Software Engineering.; Theory of Computation.; Data Structures and Information Theory.; Artificial Intelligence.; Computer and Information Systems Applications.
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource.
  8. Workshop on "Modelling of Complex Systems by Cellular Automata" - Simulating Market Dynamics with CD++
    Autor*in: Liu, Qi
    Erschienen: 2005

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    Quelle: Online Contents Komparatistik
    Beteiligt: Wainer, Gabriel
    Medientyp: Aufsatz aus einer Zeitschrift
    Format: Druck
    Übergeordneter Titel: Journal of modern literature; Bloomington, Ind. : Indiana University, 1970-; Band 3515 (2005), Seite 368-372