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  1. Sequential school choice with public and private schools
    Autor*in: Andersson, Tommy; Dur, Umut Mert; Ertemel, Sinan; Kesten, Onur
    Erschienen: October 2023
    Verlag:  Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Lund

    Motivated by school admissions in Turkey and Sweden, we investigate a sequential twostage admission system with public and private schools. A sequential notion of truthfulness, called straightforwardness, is introduced. Contrary to one-stage systems,... mehr

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 815
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    Motivated by school admissions in Turkey and Sweden, we investigate a sequential twostage admission system with public and private schools. A sequential notion of truthfulness, called straightforwardness, is introduced. Contrary to one-stage systems, sequentiality leads to a trade-off between the existence of a straightforward equilibrium and non-wastefulness. We identify the unique set of rules for two-stage systems that guarantees the existence of a straightforward equilibrium and reduces waste. Existing admission systems are analyzed within our general framework.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Auflage/Ausgabe: This version: October 31, 2023
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / Department of Economics, Lund University ; 2023, 12
    Schlagworte: market design; sequential school choice; private schools; public schools; straightforward SPNE; non-wastefulness
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 42 Seiten)
  2. Blood allocation with replacement donors
    a theory of multi-unit exchange with compatibility-based preferences
    Autor*in: Han, Xiang; Kesten, Onur; Ünver, M. Utku
    Erschienen: 2021
    Verlag:  Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA, USA

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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Boston College working papers in economics ; 1038
    Schlagworte: Blood transfusion; market design; multi-unit exchange; dichotomous preferences; endogenous pricing
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 88 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. School choice with consent
    an experiment
    Autor*in: Cerrone, Claudia; Hermstrüwer, Yoan; Kesten, Onur
    Erschienen: February 2022
    Verlag:  Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn

    Public school choice often yields student placements that are neither fair nor efficient. Kesten (2010) proposed an efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance algorithm (EADAM) that allows students to consent to waive priorities that have no effect on... mehr

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    Public school choice often yields student placements that are neither fair nor efficient. Kesten (2010) proposed an efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance algorithm (EADAM) that allows students to consent to waive priorities that have no effect on their assignment. In this article, we provide first experimental evidence on the performance of EADAM. We compare EADAM with the deferred acceptance mechanism (DA) and with two variants of EADAM. In the first variant, we vary the default option: students can object - rather than consent - to the priority waiver. In the second variant, the priority waiver is enforced. We find that both efficiency and truth-telling rates are substantially higher under EADAM than under DA, even though EADAM is not strategy-proof. When the priority waiver is enforced, we observe that efficiency further increases, while truth-telling rates decrease relative to the EADAM variants where students can dodge the waiver. Our results challenge the importance of strategy-proofness as a condition of truth-telling and point to a trade-off between efficiency and vulnerability to preference manipulation.

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 21.11116/0000-0009-F2B5-9
    hdl: 10419/262307
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion papers of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; 2022, 2
    Schlagworte: efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance algorithm; school choice; consent; defaultrules; law
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 52 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Sequential school choice with public and private schools
    Autor*in: Andersson, Tommy; Dur, Umut Mert; Ertemel, Sinan; Kesten, Onur
    Erschienen: December 2018
    Verlag:  Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Lund

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    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/260268
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / Department of Economics, Lund University ; 2018, 39
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 41 Seiten)
  5. From Boston to Chinese parallel to deferred acceptance
    theory and experiments on a family of school choice mechanisms
    Autor*in: Chen, Yan; Kesten, Onur
    Erschienen: 2013
    Verlag:  WZB, Berlin

    We characterize a parametric family of application-rejection school choice mechanisms, including the Boston and Deferred Acceptance mechanisms as special cases, and spanning the parallel mechanisms for Chinese college admissions, the largest... mehr

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 388 (2013,205)
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    We characterize a parametric family of application-rejection school choice mechanisms, including the Boston and Deferred Acceptance mechanisms as special cases, and spanning the parallel mechanisms for Chinese college admissions, the largest centralized matching in the world. Moving from one extreme member to the other results in systematic changes in manipulability, stability and welfare properties. Neither the ex-post dominance of the DA over the equilibria of Boston, nor the ex-ante dominance of Boston equilibria over the DA in stylized settings extends to the parallel mechanisms. In the laboratory, participants are most likely to reveal their preferences truthfully under the DA mechanism, followed by the Chinese parallel and then the Boston mechanisms. Furthermore, while the DA is significantly more stable than the Chinese parallel mechanism, which is more stable than Boston, efficiency comparisons vary across environments.

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
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    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/74787
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB), Research Area Markets and Choice, Research Unit Market Behavior ; SP II 2013-205
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (71 S.), graph. Darst.
  6. A theory of school-choice lotteries
    Autor*in: Kesten, Onur; Ünver, M. Utku
    Erschienen: 2010
    Verlag:  Boston College, Dept. of Economics, Chestnut Hill, Mass.

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Working papers in economics ; 737
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (54 S.), graph. Darst.
  7. The probabilistic serial assignment mechanism
    Autor*in: Kesten, Onur; Kurino, Morimitsu; Ünver, M. Utku
    Erschienen: 2010
    Verlag:  Boston College, Dept. of Economics, Chestnut Hill, Mass.

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Working papers in economics ; 742
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (62 S.)
  8. When speed is of essence
    perishable goods auctions
    Autor*in: Hafalir, Isa; Kesten, Onur; Sherstyuk, Katerina; Tao, Cong
    Erschienen: December 2023
    Verlag:  University of Hawai'i at Mānoa, Department of Economics, Honolulu, HI

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    Schriftenreihe: Working paper series / University of Hawai'i at Mānoa, Department of Economics ; no. 23, 10
    Schlagworte: auction theory; time costs; laboratory experiments
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 85 Seiten), Illustrationen
  9. Efficient lottery design
    Autor*in: Kesten, Onur; Kurino, Morimitsu; Nesterov, Alexander
    Erschienen: 2015
    Verlag:  WZB, Berlin

    There has been a surge of interest in stochastic assignment mechanisms which proved to be theoretically compelling thanks to their prominent welfare properties. Contrary to stochastic mechanisms, however, lottery mechanisms are commonly used for... mehr

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 388 (2015,203)
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    There has been a surge of interest in stochastic assignment mechanisms which proved to be theoretically compelling thanks to their prominent welfare properties. Contrary to stochastic mechanisms, however, lottery mechanisms are commonly used for indivisible good allocation in real-life. To help facilitate the design of practical lottery mechanisms, we provide new tools for obtaining stochastic improvements in lotteries. As applications, we propose lottery mechanisms that improve upon the widely-used random serial dictatorship mechanism and a lottery representation of its competitor, the probabilistic serial mechanism. The tools we provide here can be useful in developing welfare-enhanced new lottery mechanisms for practical applications such as school choice.

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
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    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/107132
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB), Research Area Markets and Choice, Research Unit Market Behavior ; SP II 2015-203
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (37 S.), graph. Darst.
    Bemerkung(en):

    Parallel als Druckausg. erschienen
  10. The equitable top trading cycles mechanism for school choice
    Autor*in: Hakimov, Rustamdjan; Kesten, Onur
    Erschienen: 2014
    Verlag:  WZB, Berlin

    A particular adaptation of Gale's top trading cycles procedure to school choice, the so-called TTC mechanism, has attracted much attention both in theory and practice due to its superior efficiency and incentive features. We discuss and introduce... mehr

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    A particular adaptation of Gale's top trading cycles procedure to school choice, the so-called TTC mechanism, has attracted much attention both in theory and practice due to its superior efficiency and incentive features. We discuss and introduce alternative adaptations of Gale's original procedure that can offer improvements over TTC in terms of equity along with various other distributional considerations. Instead of giving all the trading power to those students with the highest priority for a school, we argue for the distribution of the trading rights of all slots of each school among those who are entitled to a slot at that school, allowing them to trade in a thick market where additional constraints can be accommodated. We propose a particular mechanism of this kind, the Equitable Top Trading Cycles (ETTC) mechanism, which is also Pareto efficient and strategy-proof just like TTC and eliminates justified envy due to pairwise exchanges. Both in simulations and in the lab, ETTC generates significantly fewer number of justified envy situations than TTC.

     
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    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/104065
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB), Research Area Markets and Choice, Research Unit Market Behavior ; SP II 2014-210
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (40 S.), graph. Darst.
  11. On the (im)possibility of improving upon the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism
    Autor*in: Kesten, Onur; Kurino, Morimitsu
    Erschienen: 2012
    Verlag:  WZB, Berlin

    This paper studies a general school choice problem with or without outside options. The Gale-Shapley student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism (DA) has played a central role not only in theory but also in important practical applications. We... mehr

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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 388 (2012,202)
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    This paper studies a general school choice problem with or without outside options. The Gale-Shapley student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism (DA) has played a central role not only in theory but also in important practical applications. We show that in problems where some students cannot credibly submit a single school as the only acceptable option, it is possible to improve upon DA without sacrificing strategyproofness. On the other hand, in unrestricted problems where no outside options necessarily exist, it is not possible to improve upon DA via a strategy-proof mechanism. -- Student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism ; strategy-proofness ; Pareto dominance ; outside options Es wird ein allgemeines school-choice-Problem untersucht mit und ohne "outside options". Der "Gale-Shapley student-proposing deferred acceptance"-Mechanismus (DA) spielt eine zentrale Rolle nicht nur in der Theorie sondern auch in wichtigen praktischen Anwendungen. Wir zeigen, dass in Situationen, in denen einige Schüler nicht glaubwürdig nur eine einzige Schule als akzeptable Option angeben können, der DA verbessert werden kann, ohne dass die Nichtmanipulierbarkeit ("strategy proofness") des Mechanismus dafür geopfert werden muss. Auf der anderen Seite gilt für Situationen, in denen nicht notwendigerweise "outside options" existieren, dass der DA nicht verbessert werden kann mit Hilfe eines nichtmanipulierbaren Mechanismus. -- Student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism ; strategy-proofness ; Pareto dominance ; outside options

     
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/60234
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB), Research Area Markets and Politics, Research Unit Market Behavior ; SP II 2012-202
    Schlagworte: Schulauswahl; Matching; Shapley-Wert; Schule; Quotenregulierung; Theorie; USA
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 13 S., 560,99 KB), graph. Darst.
    Bemerkung(en):

    Zsfassung in dt. Sprache