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  1. Cross-game learning and cognitive ability in auctions
    Autor*in: Giebe, Thomas; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Kocher, Martin; Schudy, Simeon
    Erschienen: November 2021
    Verlag:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    Overbidding in second-price auctions (SPAs) has been shown to be persistent and associated with cognitive ability. We study experimentally to what extent cross-game learning can reduce overbidding in SPAs, taking into account cognitive skills.... mehr

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    Overbidding in second-price auctions (SPAs) has been shown to be persistent and associated with cognitive ability. We study experimentally to what extent cross-game learning can reduce overbidding in SPAs, taking into account cognitive skills. Employing an order-balanced design, we use first-price auctions (FPAs) to expose participants to an auction format in which losses from high bids are more salient than in SPAs. Experience in FPAs causes substantial cross-game learning for cognitively less able participants but does not affect overbidding for the cognitively more able. Vice versa, experiencing SPAs before bidding in an FPA does not affect bidding behavior by the cognitively less able but, somewhat surprisingly, reduces bid shading by cognitively more able participants, resulting in lower profits in FPAs. Thus, cross-game learning has the potential to benefit bidders with lower cognitive ability whereas it has little or even adverse effects for higher ability bidders.

     
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    hdl: 10419/248941
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo working paper ; no. 9396 (2021)
    Schlagworte: cognitive ability; cross-game learning; experiment; auction; heuristics; first-price auctions; second-price auctions
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 26 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Cournot meets Bayes-Nash
    a discontinuity in behavior infinitely repeated duopoly games
    Autor*in: Argenton, Cédric; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Müller, Wieland
    Erschienen: 15 February 2022
    Verlag:  CentER, Tilburg University, [Tilburg]

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    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / CentER ; no. 2022, 003
    Schlagworte: Cournot; Bayesian game; Bayes-Nash equilibrium; repeated games; collusion; cooperation; experimental economics
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 25 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Anchored strategic reasoning
    Autor*in: Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Seres, Gyula
    Erschienen: [2022]
    Verlag:  Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190, [München]

    Anchoring is a robust behavioral phenomenon modeled predominantly as a bias in individual judgment. We propose a game-theoretic model that considers players’ beliefs about others’ behavior as a mediator for the effect of the anchor on a player’s... mehr

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    Anchoring is a robust behavioral phenomenon modeled predominantly as a bias in individual judgment. We propose a game-theoretic model that considers players’ beliefs about others’ behavior as a mediator for the effect of the anchor on a player’s choice. The results establish that anchoring in strategic interactions reported in the literature can be rationalized by anchored beliefs about the opponents’ intentions. Notwithstanding, we also demonstrate that a player might adjust away from rather than toward the anchor in games where choices are strategic substitutes.

     
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    hdl: 10419/256781
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / Rationality & Competition, CRC TRR 190 ; no. 314 (January 25, 2022)
    Schlagworte: Anchoring Bias; Auctions; Games; Incomplete Information; Strategy
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 11 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Are strategies anchored?
    Autor*in: Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Seres, Gyula
    Erschienen: [2019]
    Verlag:  Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190, Munich, Germany

    Anchoring is one of the most studied and robust behavioral biases, but there is little knowledge about its persistence in strategic settings. This article studies the role of anchoring bias in private-value auctions. We test experimentally two... mehr

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    Anchoring is one of the most studied and robust behavioral biases, but there is little knowledge about its persistence in strategic settings. This article studies the role of anchoring bias in private-value auctions. We test experimentally two different anchor types. The announcement of a random group identification number but also of an upper bid limit in the first-price sealed-bid auction result in higher bids. We show that such behavior can be explained as a rational response to biased beliefs. In Dutch auctions, the effect of a starting price, is negative. We demonstrate that the long-established ranking that the Dutch auction generates lower revenue than the first-price sealed-bid auction crucially depends on the size of the anchor.

     
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    hdl: 10419/222108
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / Rationality & Competition, CRC TRR 190 ; no. 211 (December 11, 2019)
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 33 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. How do sellers benefit from Buy-It-Now prices in eBay auctions?
    Autor*in: Grebe, Tim; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Kröger, Sabine
    Erschienen: 2019
    Verlag:  Verein für Socialpolitik, [Leipzig]

    We investigate experimentally on eBay how sellers set prices in "Buy-It-Now" (BIN) auctions. We find that the eBay format leads to prices substantially below those expected in second-price auctions. Moreover, our results reveal that the information... mehr

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    We investigate experimentally on eBay how sellers set prices in "Buy-It-Now" (BIN) auctions. We find that the eBay format leads to prices substantially below those expected in second-price auctions. Moreover, our results reveal that the information available on eBay about buyer experience and bidding behavior correlates with the observed price deviation. Sellers respond strategically to this information. More experienced sellers ask for higher BIN-prices, whereas seller risk aversion does not effect their price decisions. Compared to an eBay auction without a BIN-price, the BIN-auction is more efficient and generates significantly higher revenue.

     
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    hdl: 10419/203606
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; Array
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 24 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Risk, reward and uncertainty in buyer-seller transactions
    the seller’s view on combining posted prices and auctions
    Autor*in: Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Kröger, Sabine
    Erschienen: [2023]
    Verlag:  CIRANO, [Montréal]

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    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / CIRANO ; 2023s, 13
    Schlagworte: asymmetric information; laboratory experiment; field experiment; auction; BIN-auction; Buy-It-Now auction; BIN-price; Buy-It-Now price; combined mechanism
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 15 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. Asymmetric auction experiments with(out) commonly known beliefs
    Autor*in: Güth, Werner; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta
    Erschienen: 2002
    Verlag:  Max-Planck-Inst. for Research into Economic Systems, Strategic Interaction Group, Jena

  8. Bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions
    an experimental study
    Autor*in: Güth, Werner; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Wolfstetter, Elmar
    Erschienen: 2001
    Verlag:  Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Berlin

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    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Sonderforschungsbereich 373 Quantifikation und Simulation Ökonomischer Prozesse ; 2001,15
    Schlagworte: Auktionstheorie; Spieltheorie; Experiment; Theorie
    Umfang: 29 S, graph. Darst, 21 cm
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  9. Please, marry me!
    An experimental study of risking a joint venture
    Autor*in: Güth, Werner; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Tjotta, Sigve
    Erschienen: 1999
    Verlag:  Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Berlin

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    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Quantifikation und Simulation Ökonomischer Prozesse ; 1999,92
    Schlagworte: Familienökonomik; Verhandlungstheorie; Frauen; Männer; Bildungsinvestition; Experiment; Theorie
    Umfang: 26 S
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  10. Please, marry me!
    An experimental study of risking a joint venture
    Autor*in: Güth, Werner; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Tjøtta, Sigve
    Erschienen: 2000

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    Schriftenreihe: Working papers in economics / Department of Economics, University of Bergen ; 00,5
    Schlagworte: Familienökonomik; Verhandlungstheorie; Frauen; Männer; Bildungsinvestition; Experiment; Theorie
    Umfang: 25 S
  11. Bidder preferences among auction institutions
    Autor*in: Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Salmon, Tim
    Erschienen: 2002
    Verlag:  Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Berlin

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    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Quantifikation und Simulation Ökonomischer Prozesse ; 2002,86
    Schlagworte: Auktionstheorie; Experiment; Theorie
    Umfang: 35 S, graph. Darst
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  12. Cross-game learning and cognitive ability in auctions
    Autor*in: Giebe, Thomas; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Kocher, Martin; Schudy, Simeon
    Erschienen: [2022]
    Verlag:  Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190, [München]

    Overbidding in sealed-bid second-price auctions (SPAs) has been shown to be persistent and associated with cognitive ability. We study experimentally to what extent cross-game learning can reduce overbidding in SPAs, taking into account cognitive... mehr

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    Overbidding in sealed-bid second-price auctions (SPAs) has been shown to be persistent and associated with cognitive ability. We study experimentally to what extent cross-game learning can reduce overbidding in SPAs, taking into account cognitive skills. Employing an order-balanced design, we use first-price auctions (FPAs) to expose participants to an auction format in which losses from high bids are more salient than in SPAs. Experience in FPAs causes substantial cross-game learning for cognitively less able participants but does not affect overbidding for the cognitively more able. Vice versa, experiencing SPAs before bidding in an FPA does not substantially affect bidding behavior by the cognitively less able but, somewhat surprisingly, reduces bid shading by cognitively more able participants, resulting in lower profits in FPAs. Thus, 'cross-game learning' may rather be understood as 'cross-game transfer', as it has the potential to benefit bidders with lower cognitive ability whereas it has little or even adverse effects for higher-ability bidders.

     
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    hdl: 10419/282050
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / Rationality & Competition, CRC TRR 190 ; no. 358 (December 27, 2022)
    Schlagworte: Cognitive ability; cross-game learning; cross-game transfer; experiment; auction; heuristics; first-price auctions; second-price auctions
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 41 Seiten), Illustrationen
  13. Risk, reward and uncertainty in buyer-seller transactions
    the seller's view on combining posted prices and auctions
    Autor*in: Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Kröger, Sabine
    Erschienen: [2023]
    Verlag:  Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190, [München]

    In Buy-It-Now auctions, sellers can post a take-it-or-leave-it price offer prior to an auction. While the literature almost exclusively looks at buyers in such combined mechanisms, the current paper summarizes results from the sellers' point of view.... mehr

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    In Buy-It-Now auctions, sellers can post a take-it-or-leave-it price offer prior to an auction. While the literature almost exclusively looks at buyers in such combined mechanisms, the current paper summarizes results from the sellers' point of view. Buy-It-Now auctions are complex mechanisms and therefore quite challenging for sellers. The paper discusses the seller's curse, a bias that sellers might fall prey to in such combined mechanisms, and how experience counterbalances this bias. Furthermore, the paper explores the role of information and bargaining power on behavior and profit prospects in Buy-It-Now auctions.

     
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    hdl: 10419/282074
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / Rationality & Competition, CRC TRR 190 ; no. 382 (February 09, 2023)
    Schlagworte: asymmetric information; laboratory experiment; field experiment; auction; BIN-auction; Buy-It-Now auction; BIN-price; Buy-It-Now price; combined mechanism
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 14 Seiten), Illustrationen
  14. Buy-it-Now prices in eBay auctions
    the field in the lab ; conference paper
    Autor*in: Grebe, Tim; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Kröger, Sabine
    Erschienen: 2014
    Verlag:  ZBW, [Kiel

    In eBay s Buy-it-Now auctions sellers can post prices at which buyers can purchase a good prior to an auction. We study how sellers set Buy-it-Now prices when buyers have independent private values for a single object for sale. We test the... mehr

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    In eBay s Buy-it-Now auctions sellers can post prices at which buyers can purchase a good prior to an auction. We study how sellers set Buy-it-Now prices when buyers have independent private values for a single object for sale. We test the predictions of a model by combining the real auction environment (eBay auction platform and eBay traders) with the techniques of lab experiments. We observe that the eBay auction format supports deviations from truthful bidding leading to auction prices below those expected in second price auctions. Our proposed extension of the model results not only in a better fit of the data but provides new predictions to test. We find the information that is available on eBay is correlated with the level that eBay auction prices deviate from prices based on true value bidding. Sellers adjust their Buy-it-Now prices according to this information in the direction predicted by the model. They increase their BIN price when facing a population of more experienced buyers, when observing a higher number of submitted bids or more last-minute bidding from at least one bidder. More experienced sellers also ask for higher BIN prices.

     
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    hdl: 10419/100611
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; V3
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (29 S.), graph. Darst.
  15. Procurement experiments
    how to choose quality when its costs are not known
    Autor*in: Güth, Werner; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Kröger, Sabine
    Erschienen: 2000
    Verlag:  Humboldt-Univ., Wirtschaftswiss. Fak., Berlin

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    RVK Klassifikation: QB 910
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; 173
    Schlagworte: Öffentlicher Auftrag; Auktionstheorie; Produktqualität; Verhandlungstheorie; Experiment; Theorie
    Umfang: 25, VI S, graph. Darst
  16. Comparative study of one-bid versus two-bid auctions
    Autor*in: Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Sonsino, Doron
    Erschienen: 2001
    Verlag:  Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Berlin

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    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Quantifikation und Simulation Ökonomischer Prozesse ; 2001,69
    Schlagworte: Auktionstheorie; Experiment; Theorie
    Umfang: 39 S, graph. Darst
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  17. Does a short-term increase in incentives boost performance?
    Autor*in: Angelova, Vera; Giebe, Thomas; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta
    Erschienen: 2017
    Verlag:  Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190, Munich, Germany

    If agents are exposed to continual competitive pressure, how does a short-term variation of the severity of the competition affect agents' performance? In a real-effort laboratory experiment, we study a one-time increase in incentives in a sequence... mehr

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    If agents are exposed to continual competitive pressure, how does a short-term variation of the severity of the competition affect agents' performance? In a real-effort laboratory experiment, we study a one-time increase in incentives in a sequence of equally incentivized contests. Our results suggest that a short-term increase in incentives induces a behavioral response but does not boost total performance.

     
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    hdl: 10419/185730
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / Rationality & Competition, CRC TRR 190 ; no. 60 (December 28, 2017)
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 15 Seiten), Illustrationen
  18. Asymmetric auction experiments with(out) commonly known beliefs
    Autor*in: Güth, Werner; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta
    Erschienen: 2002
    Verlag:  Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems, Strategic Interaction Group, Jena

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    Schriftenreihe: Papers on strategic interaction ; 2002,36
    Schlagworte: Auktionstheorie; Experiment; Theorie; Entscheidung unter Unsicherheit; Kognition
    Umfang: 6 Bl, 30 cm
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  19. Competition and fatigue at work
    Autor*in: Angelova, Vera; Giebe, Thomas; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta
    Erschienen: 2018
    Verlag:  Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190, Munich, Germany

    We study theoretically and experimentally the role of fatigue and recovery within a competitive work environment. At work, agents usually make their effort choice in response to competition and monetary incentives. At the same time, they have to take... mehr

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    We study theoretically and experimentally the role of fatigue and recovery within a competitive work environment. At work, agents usually make their effort choice in response to competition and monetary incentives. At the same time, they have to take into account fatigue, which accumulates over time if there is insufficient recovery. We model a sequence of work periods as tournaments that are linked through fatigue spillovers, inducing a non-time-separable decision problem. We also allow for variations in incentives in one work period, in order to analyze spillover effects to the work periods "before" and "after". Making recovery harder should, generally, reduce effort. This theoretical prediction is supported by the experimental data. A short-term increase in incentives in one period should lead to higher effort in that period, and, due to fatigue, to strategic resting before and after. Our experimental results confirm the former, whereas we do not find sufficient evidence for the latter. Even in the presence of fatigue, total effort should positively respond to higher-powered incentives. This is not supported by our data. Removing fatigue, we find the expected increase in total effort. For work environments, this may imply that the link between monetary incentives and effort provision becomes weaker in the presence of fatigue or insufficient recovery between work periods.

     
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    hdl: 10419/194030
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / Rationality & Competition, CRC TRR 190 ; no. 134 (December 20, 2018)
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 30 Seiten), Illustrationen
  20. How do sellers benefit from buy-it-now prices in Ebay auctions?
    an experimental investigation
    Autor*in: Grebe, Tim; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Kröger, Sabine
    Erschienen: 2018
    Verlag:  Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190, Munich, Germany

    In Buy-It-Now (BIN, hereafter) auctions, sellers can make a "take-it-or-leave-it" price offer (BIN price) prior to an auction. We analyse experimentally how eBay sellers set BIN prices and whether they benefit from offering them. Using the real eBay... mehr

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    In Buy-It-Now (BIN, hereafter) auctions, sellers can make a "take-it-or-leave-it" price offer (BIN price) prior to an auction. We analyse experimentally how eBay sellers set BIN prices and whether they benefit from offering them. Using the real eBay environment in the laboratory, we find that the eBay auction format supports deviations from truthful bidding leading to auction prices substantially below those expected in second-price auctions. Our results reveal that the observed price deviations are not an artefact due to the existence of the BIN price, rather a consequence of the specific features of the eBay-auction format - a mixture between sealed-bid and open second-price auction with a fixed end-time. Moreover, we find that information available on eBay can be used as indicator for the price deviation and that sellers respond strategically to this information. Seller risk aversion does not affect BIN prices and more experienced sellers ask for higher BIN prices. The introduction of BIN prices to eBay auctions has an enhancing effect: the eBay BIN auction is more efficient and generates significantly higher revenue compared to a standard eBay auction without a BIN price.

     
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    hdl: 10419/185767
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / Rationality & Competition, CRC TRR 190 ; no. 97 (May 16, 2018)
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 35 Seiten), Illustrationen
  21. Comparative study of one-bid versus two-bid auctions
    Autor*in: Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Sonsino, Doron
    Erschienen: 2001
    Verlag:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    We compare the standard one-bid first price auction to a corresponding two-bid first price auction where each buyer may place two bids: a high bid and a low one and the winner pays his low bid if this was higher than all other bids. We characterize... mehr

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    We compare the standard one-bid first price auction to a corresponding two-bid first price auction where each buyer may place two bids: a high bid and a low one and the winner pays his low bid if this was higher than all other bids. We characterize the equilibria of the two mechanisms and prove some results on the ranking of revenues and expected utilities across the two mechanisms for the symmetric case. We show that subjects in a computerized experiment prefer the two-bid auction over the one-bid auction when given the possibility of choosing among the two and we claim that this and other aspects of subjects' behavior conform to the equilibrium predictions for risk-averse subjects. We also report some discrepancies between the experimental results and the equilibrium predictions and provide some alternative explanations to the observed behavior. -- experiments ; sealed-bid private-value auctions

     
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    hdl: 10419/62708
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 2001,69
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 39 S., 458,35 KB), graph. Darst.
  22. Bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions
    an experimental study
    Autor*in: Güth, Werner; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Wolfstetter, Elmar
    Erschienen: 2001
    Verlag:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    We review an asymmetric auction experiment. Based on Plum (1992) private valuations of the two bidders are independently drawn from distinct but commonly known distributions, one of which stochastically dominating the other. We test the qualitative... mehr

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    We review an asymmetric auction experiment. Based on Plum (1992) private valuations of the two bidders are independently drawn from distinct but commonly known distributions, one of which stochastically dominating the other. We test the qualitative properties of that model of asymmetric auctions, in particular whether the weak bidder behaves more aggressively than the strong and then test bidders’ preference for first- vs. second–price auctions. -- Experiments ; Sealed Bid Auctions ; Asymmetric Bidders ; Private-Independent Values

     
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    hdl: 10419/62694
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 2001,15
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 30 S., 356,87 KB), graph. Darst.
  23. Auctions and fair division games
    a cross-cultural bidding experiment
    Autor*in: Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta
    Erschienen: 2000
    Verlag:  Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

    This paper presents the results of experiments carried out in two countries, Germany and Bulgaria, and for different allocation rules (first vs. second price auction vs. fair division game). The data analysis of the sealed-bid, private... mehr

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    This paper presents the results of experiments carried out in two countries, Germany and Bulgaria, and for different allocation rules (first vs. second price auction vs. fair division game). The data analysis of the sealed-bid, private value-contests compares the bid function in both countries, some features of the bidding behavior (learning of risk neutral equilibrium bidding, truthful bidding, decision time, bid adjustments) as well as the efficiency rates and the price expectations. The main results obtained in Germany were replicated with the Bulgarian subjects.

     
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    hdl: 10419/62165
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373 ; 2000,31
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 24 S., 2,13 MB), graph. Darst.
  24. How eBay sellers set 'Buy-it-now' prices
    bringing the field into the lab
    Autor*in: Grebe, Tim; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Kröger, Sabine
    Erschienen: 2006
    Verlag:  Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15, Mannheim [u.a.]

    In this paper we introduce a new type of experiment that combines the advantages of lab and field experiments. The experiment is conducted in the lab but using an unchanged market environment from the real world. Moreover, a subset of the standard... mehr

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    In this paper we introduce a new type of experiment that combines the advantages of lab and field experiments. The experiment is conducted in the lab but using an unchanged market environment from the real world. Moreover, a subset of the standard subject pool is used, containing those subjects who have experience in conducting transactions in that market environment. This guarantees the test of the theoretical predictions in a highly controlled environment and at the same time enables not to miss the specific features of economic behavior exhibited in the field. We apply the proposed type of experiment to study seller behavior in online auctions with a Buy-It-Now feature, where early potential bidders have the opportunity to accept a posted price offer from the seller before the start of the auction. Bringing the field into the lab, we invited eBay buyers and sellers into the lab to participate in a series of auctions on the eBay platform. We investigate how traders' experience in a real market environment influences their behavior in the lab and whether abstract lab experiments bias subjects' behavior.

     
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/93956
    Schriftenreihe: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; 181
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (27 S.), Ill., graph. Darst.
  25. Anomalies in auction choice behavior
    Autor*in: Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Salmon, Tim
    Erschienen: 2006
    Verlag:  Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15, Mannheim [u.a.]

    Ivanova-Stenzel and Salmon (2004a) established some interesting yet puzzling results regarding bidders' preferences between auction formats. The finding is that bidders strongly prefer the ascending to the first price sealed bid auction on a ceteris... mehr

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    Ivanova-Stenzel and Salmon (2004a) established some interesting yet puzzling results regarding bidders' preferences between auction formats. The finding is that bidders strongly prefer the ascending to the first price sealed bid auction on a ceteris paribus basis but they are not willing to pay up to an entry price for entering into an ascending auction instead of a first price that would equalize the profits between the two. While it was found that risk aversion on the part of the bidders could resolve this anomaly the claim that risk aversion drives overbidding in first price auctions is somewhat controversial. In this study we examine two competing explanations for the observed behavior; loss aversion and 'clock aversion', i.e. a dislike for some aspect of the clock based bidding mechanism. We find that neither alternative explanation can account for bidders' auction choice behavior leaving risk aversion as the only un-falsified hypothesis.

     
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    hdl: 10419/93823
    Schriftenreihe: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; 174
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (15 S.), graph. Darst.